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ABSTRACT 
Title of Thesis: The Russian Record of the Winter War, 1939-
1940: An Analytical Study of Soviet Records 
of the War with Finland from 30 November 
1939 to 12 March 1940 
James Venceslav Anzulovic, Jr., Doctor of Philosophy, 1968 
Thesis directed by: Dr. Gordon W. Prange 
This dissertation is an analytical examination of 
material published by the Soviet Union which concerned the 
Winter War with Finland from 30 November 1939 to 12 March 
1940. 
The events leading to the conflict grew out of Russian 
efforts to protect their northwestern borders after the 
defeat of Poland in September 1939. Diplomatic pressures 
enabled the Soviet Union to establish air and naval bases 
along the Baltic coast in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania by 
the end of October 1939. However, efforts to obtain similiar 
concessions from Finland, especially the leasing of Hanko at 
the mouth of the Gulf of Finland, proved unsuccessful. 
The first material published by the Soviet Union about 
the Finnish situation was part of a newspaper campaign during 
November 1939. At first this campaign merely denounced those 
Finnish leaders who were known to be opposed to a diplomatic 
settlement with the USSR. Gradually this campaign increased 
in tempo and after the alleged firing of Finnish artillery 
on Russian borderguards at Mainila on 26 November 1939, 
Soviet newspapers began to call for the punishment of the 
Finnish Government. 
Along with this part of the campaign, the Russian 
press also pictured Finland as a small nation divided by 
class conflict and supported only by certain western impe-
rialistic powers. The Soviet writers predicted that such 
a nation could not resist the Red Army, especially as the 
Finnish proletariat would certainly rise against their 
bourgeois masters. 
With the beginning of the Soviet attack on 30 November 
1939 the Red press trumpeted the early successes of the Red 
Army and Red Fleet and confidently predicted a swift end to 
the Finnish Government in Helsinki. To support this the 
Russian newspaper pointed to the foundation of a revolu-
tionary Peoples' Government of Finland in the newly-captured 
city of Terioki under Otto Kuusinen. This regime, it was 
confidently predicted, would provide the leadership for the 
expected proletarian revolt in Finland. 
By mid-December 1939 when it had become apparent that 
the Soviet forces were not likely to sweep over Finland nor 
the proletariat to rise in revolt, there came a subtle 
change over the Soviet press releases. Stories about the 
conflict appeared less often. Contempt for the resistance 
of the Finns tended to disappear and more emphasis was 
given to the difficulties encountered by the Red Army. 
References to the Terioki-based Peoples' Government of 
Finland diminished almost to the vanishing point. Only the 
heroic deeds of individual Soviet fighting men increased in 
the press coverage during late December 1939 and January 
1940. 
When the Red Army began its drive to break the 
"Mannerheim Line 11 on the Karelian Isthmus in February 1940, 
press coverage of the fighting increased significantly. 
Even then, the earlier predictions of a complete victory 
over the Helsinki Government were not repeated. Along with 
this the Peoples' Government of Finland was completely 
ignored throughout this period. For these reasons the 
rather sudden announcement of the Treaty of Moscow on 12 
March 1940 was rather easier to accept. These changes in 
the Soviet newspaper campaign during the Winter War indicate 
that the Russian press did respond to events, much like all 
newspapers, and that the Russian pe?,ple could not be made 
to believe everything their leaders might wish them to 
believe. 
The personal experiences of the Soviet fighting men 
published in newspapers and books during and after the 
Winter War revealed a great deal about the problems of the 
Soviet armed forces. One of the first problems mentioned 
was the lack of coordination between the various arms. 
Other defects were a lack of training and equipment for 
winter combat and a deficiency in scouting and patrolling 
which left the Red Army at the mercy of swift-moving Finnish 
ski patrols. All of this arose because of a lack of proper 
leadership in the higher ranks of the Red Army. According 
to these recollections, these defects were finally dealt with 
before the campaign which broke the "Mannerheim Line" in 
February 1940. 
The major lesson of this study was the discovery that 
Soviet records, despite their domination by the officially 
acceptable truth, can be useful in obtaining information 
about developments in the USSR. Through a careful reading ~ 
of these sources and an understanding of the requirements of 
censorship, one can readily obtain a better understanding of 
the problems of the Soviet leadership and even some idea as 
to the feelings of the Russian people in response to the 
events which make up the history of our times. 
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THE INITIAL ATTACK OF THE SOVIET UNION ON FINLAND 
(30 November 1939--16 December 1939} 
V 
This map shows the major Soviet routes of attack into 
Finland during the first three weeks of the Winter War. The 
railroads and waterways shown are only the most important 
transportation lines in that nation. There are, of course, 
many more rivers, lakes, canals and railroad lines in Finland 
but to have included them would have only made the picture 
more complicated. 
This picture of the Soviet attack is an interesting 
one. It should be noted that the aggressive moves at either 
end of Finland, i.e., the Red Fleet's movements in the Gulf 
of Finland and the 14th Soviet Army's seizure of the Petsamo 
region, seem to have been planned to cut the Finns off from 
any aid that might arrive by sea. The 7th Soviet Army from 
Leningrad and the 8th Soviet Army from Petrozavodsk were 
moving to break through the eastern Karelian defenses and 
clear a good road into southern Finland. 
The 9th Soviet Army at Uhtka, however, has remained 
something of a mystery as to the purpose and strategy of its 
attacks along the extended eastern borders of Finland. A 
solution is suggested by the map. Even if the 8th and 9th 
Soviet Armies succeeded in breaking through in eastern Karelia 
the result would most likely be a rapid retreat north and west 
of all Finnish forces. With its suppl¥ routes open to Sweden 
at Kemi, the Finns could play a very difficult guerrila war 
among the lakes and forests of western and central Finland. 
If the 9th Soviet Army, however, could seize most of the water-
ways and railroads of eastern Finland, Soviet forces would be 
in an excellent position to outflank such a retreat or at 
least to cut off the supply lines into Sweden. It was thus 
very likely that the attacks of the units of the 9th Soviet 
Army had as their objective the seizure of transportation 
routes in eastern Finland, not a direct drive to cut the 
nation in two. 
The Winter Roads which provide the only transportation 
routes to Petsamo and Norway are merely strips cleared through 
the forests and/or tundra. Brush is laid down and water 
poured over it. This quickly freezes in the cold weather. 
These roads are limited in their use, however, because of the 
problem of weather (think what even a brief warm spell could 
do) and the inability of the ice surface to avoid shattering 
under the impact of heavy vehicles. 
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By April 1939, it was clear that Nazi Germany had 
embarked upon a career of aggrandizement in Europe. In the 
preceding six years Adolf Hitler had rearmed his nation, 
defied the western powers of England and France and swallowed 
Austria and Czechoslovakia. With the rise of a warlike Third 
Reich on its western frontier, the leaders of the Soviet 
Union, hoping to stay neutral in case of world conflict, 
began a search for security. 
In the spring of 1939, there were tentative feelers 
between the Kremlin and the Wilhelmstrasse. 1 By late July and 
early August negotiations were definitely underway to secure 
a working political accord between the two dictatorships. 
Since Germany wanted to avoid a two-front war over the Polish 
question and Russia wished to buy time and secure her western 
borders, the two countries reached agreement in the notorious 
Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact of 23 August 1939. 2 
1Raymond James Sontag and James Stuart Beddie (eds.), 
Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939-1941: Documents from the Archives 
of the German Foreign Office, State Department Publication No. 
3025 (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 
1948), pp. 1-32. 
2 Walter c. Langsam, Documents and Readings 1n the 




A secret protocol in this pact provided for a division 
of eastern Europe between Germany and the USSR. 1 With the 
Nazi destruction of Poland in September 1939, Hitler and 
Stalin set out to take over their "spheres of influence" 
assigned in the secret protocol as amended on 28 September 
1939.
2 
Accordingly, Finland and the three Baltic States were 
acknowledged by Germany as within Russia's "sphere of 
influence." In swift succession, during late September and 
early October, the nations of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania 
were forced to sign pacts of "friendship and mutual aid" with 
the Soviet Union.3 These agreements allowed Soviet armed 
forces to establish various naval and air bases in these 
Baltic stateso Thus Russia secured her western border and in 
effect protected the southern approaches to Leningrad. As 
long as Finland remained apart from these "mutual assistance" 
agreements, however, there was still a way for a potential 
aggressor to mount an attack on the northwestern frontiers 
of the USSR. 
On 6 October, therefore, Soviet leaders invited the 
Finns to send representatives to Moscow to discuss 
1sontag and Beddie, p. 78. 
2 Ibid., p. 104. 
3"Text of Estonian Treaty," New Yor.k Times, 29 Septem-
ber 1939, p. 8; "Text of the Latvian Pact, 11 New York Times 6 
October 1939, p • . 9; and "Text of the Lithuanian Pact," New 
York Times, 11 October 1939, p. 6. 
confidentially a "change in relations between the two 
countries. 111 The Kremlin requested border adjustments on 
3 
the Karel1an Isthmus to protect Leningrad and the withdrawal 
of the Finns from the Ribachi peninsula in the north to secure 
the approaches to the port city of Murmansk. To protect the 
sea lands to Kronstadt and Leningrad the Kremlin also asked 
the Finnish Government to sell the four major islands in the 
Gulf of Finland: Seiskari, Lavansaari, Tytarsaari and 
Suursaari (Hogland), and lease Hanko Cape at the mouth of the 
Gulf as a naval base. These positions, combined with the 
Soviet naval base at Paldiski (Baltiski Port) in Estonia 
would, so the Russian military experts thought, secure 
Leningrad from any sea-borne threat. 
The Finns seemed willing enough to permit border 
rectifications on the Karelian Isthmus and on the Arctic 
Coast. They also appeared ready to consider the sale of the 
Gulf Islands. But they catagorically refused to discuss the 
leasing of a naval base at the mouth of the Gulf of Finland. 
Since this lease was felt by the Kremlin to be absolutely 
necessary for the security of Leningrad, the talks in Moscow 
came to an end on 13 November 1939.
2 
It would appear that at 
this point, while the Finns thought the discussions had merely 
1Vaino Tanner, The Winter ar: 
1939-1940 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 19 7), p. 22, 
cited hereafter as The Winter War. (Tanner was Head of the 
Finnish Social Democratic Party and Foreign Minister from 
1 December 1939 to 15 March 1940.) 
2 l.!2.!.£., pp. 66-68. 
4 
been postponed, the Soviet leaders had decided that diplo• 
macy could not solve Russia ' s Baltic problem and they then 
resolved to use force. As a result the Red Army invaded 
Finland on 30 November 1939 while the Red Banner Baltic Fleet 
occupied the Gulf islands and the Red Air Force bombed 
Helsinki and other population centers in Finland. 
In reviewing the published literature on this conflict, 
the present writer discovered several years ago that one area 
has not been very closely examined--the field of Soviet 
material relating to the war. This can be easily understood 
because the large amount of propaganda present in all Com-
munist writing has tended, in many cases, to obscure the real 
grains of fact contained in many published works. It will be 
the purpose of this thesis to analyze representative examples 
of Russian material, both from newspapers and books, in an 
attempt to understand what the Kremlin leadership was trying 
to do and what they wanted the Russian people to read about 
their efforts to "protect the northwestern frontiers of the 
socialist state." Because so much propaganda is present in 
Soviet materials and because the factual record of the Russo-
Finnish War is still so scanty, this thesis will compare the 
Communist version of the conflict with the best available 
western sources in an attempt to balance the record. 
The first part of the thesis will systematically 
examine the Russo-Finnish conflict as it appeared in the Soviet 
press during the period from 1 November 1939 to 13 March 1940. 
Selected newspaper articles will be combined with a cursory 
study of the events of the war in order to trace the cir-
cumstances which may have had a bearing on the attitude of 
the Communist news bosses. This study will also try to 
examine the question of just how accurately the Red news 
sources reported the events of the Winter War. 
In preparing this thesis the author has relied for 
the most part on five Russian newspapers: Pravda and 
Izvestiya, the news organs of the "Great Communist Party 
(of bolsheviks)" and the Supreme Soviet of the USSR respec-
tively; Krasnaya Zvezda, the Red Army's newspaper; Trud, the 
mouthpiece of the Peoples' Commissariat of Labor Unions; and 
Komsomolskaya Pravda, the journal of the "Lenin Young Com-
munist Youth League." Copies of Krasnie Flot, the news source 
for the various Soviet naval forces and Industriya were also 
examined but only occasional references are made to these 
two journals because the collection of these newspapers in 
the Library of Congress is relatively spotty and the articles 
which appeared tn them contributed little to the total 
picture of Soviet information about the war. 
The second part of this thesis will examine the 
personal recollections of the Russian participants in the 
Russo-Finnish War. These accounts have been found in the 
various newspapers and a number of books published by Soviet 
authorities in the years following the Peace of Moscow. The 
present study will make a selective analysis of these accounts 
in an effort to determine how the individual Red Army man, 
sailor, airman, commissar and commander remembered his part in 
the battles with the "Whitefinns. 11 More importantly, these 
recollections will be analyzed to try to understand what 
prevented the Soviet armed forces from accomplishing their 
1 mission of "crushing the bankrupted gang of Ryti-Tanner," 
much sooner than they did. 
6 
The major collections of personal experiences consulted 
for this thesis were the two volumes of Boi v Finlyandii, 
V Snega Finlyandii , V Boya Protiv Belofinnii, Dekabr, 1932 
Goda, Flot v Boyas Belofinnaii, and Borba za Ostriva. 
Other works from the Russian will be utilized, of course, but 
the basic ideas of this report were developed largely from 
the above sources. 
1Risto Ryti, leader of the Agrarian Party and Premier 
of Finland from December 1939 to March 1940 . 
CHAPTER I 
THE ADVENT OF WAR IN THE NORTH 
(1 November 1939--26 November 1939) 
The negotiations between the Finnish delegation and 
the Soviet representatives in Moscow during October 1939 on 
the question of securing Russian bases in Finland had been 
carried on under a veil of newspaper silence at the request 
of the Soviet Government. But on 31 October at the first 
meeting of the Supreme Soviet, the head of the Council of 
Commissars, Vyacheslav M. Molotov, made a report to the 
delegates in which he revealed the complete details of the 
Russo-Finnish negotiations from the Soviet viewpoint. 1 The 
public announcement of these confidential talks was extremely 
disturbing to the Finnish negotiators, then on their way back 
2 to Moscow to continue the meetings. In spite of this Soviet 
breach of diplomatic etiquette, the Finnish delegation, after 
consulting with Helsinki, decided to continue on to the 
Russian capital. 
Unfortunately these renewed negotiations did not result 
1 "The Text of Molotov's Speech," New York Daily 
Worker, 1 November 1939, p. 2. 
2Tanner, The Winter War, pp. 59-60. 
7 
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in any agreement between the two nations. The leasing of Hanko 
Cape as a Russian naval base still remained the chief stumbling 
block. The Finnish delegation, which hoped that these talks 
would be revived at some future date, left Moscow on 13 Novem-
ber. For the time being diplomacy had come to an end. 
One of the results of these negotiations had been the 
relaxation of Finnish mobilization which had been ordered by 
Marshal Gustav Mannerhetm on 14 October. 1 Preparations for the 
defense of Finland were stopped and reservists who had been 
called to the colors began to return home . Strangely enough, 
this period tn early November corresponded to an increased 
"war of nerves" against Finland in the Russian presso How-
ever, the Finns seemed to have felt that the Reds were merely 
"trying to soften Finland into a state of acquiescence towards 
making concessions. 112 Thus while the Soviet press was 
stirring up animosity against Finland, the Finns were relaxing 
their guard in the hope that the Moscow talks would be renewed. 3 
The theme of the Soviet press during this period was 
twofold. In the first place the Finns were pictured as a 
divided nation. At the top was a "governing clique" that was 
see.king an all-out war with the Soviet Union while the 
"working classes" at the bottom of the social structure were 
1Gustav Mannerheim, Memoirs of Marshal Mannerheim, 
translated with introduction by Eric Lewenhaupt {New York: 
E. P. Dutton, 1954), p. 309. 
2Tanner, The Winter War, p. 85. 
3John Henry wuorinen, A History of Finland (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1965), p. 347. 
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against such a conflict and therefore violently opposed the 
warmongering policy of the "ruling circles" tn HelstnkL For 
their second point the Russian newspapers blasted Finnish 
leaders as a rabid group of warmongers who were supported by 
western imperialists, while the great mass of the Finnish 
people were described as sunk tn poverty and bloody poltttcal 
repression. Obviously these lower classes did not support 
the warlike policy of their "black reactionary" rulers. 
Soviet press reports before November on Finland were 
not unlike those concerning any of the other Scandinavian 
countries. There were the usual articles about the economic 
difficulties which were being faced by the Finnish people, 
and the comings and goings of various Finnish delegations 
during October. 1 Other than these notices Finland might just 
as well have been on the other side of the world. 
The news famine on Finland ended abruptly wtth the 
speech of Molotov before the Supreme Soviet on 31 October. 
Hts address covered all fields of Soviet diplomacy but his 
most stgniftcant emphasis was on the Finnish question. For 
some weeks the foreign press had been predicting that the 
111 Priezd v Mos.kvu Upolnomochennovo Ftnlyandskovo 
Pratitel'stva g-na I. K. Paastkivt" (The Arrival tn Moscow of 
the Representative of the Finnish Government, Mr. Paasikivt) 
Krasnaya Zvezda, 12 October 1939, p. l; "Priem t. Molotovtam 
Upolnomochennovo Ftnlyandskovo Pravitel ' stva, g-na I. K. 
Paast.kivt" (The Reception by Com. Molotov of the Representa-
tive of the Ftnntsh Government, Mr. I. K. Paasiklvi) Krasnaya 
Zvezda, 14 October 1939, p. l; "Priezd Upolnomochennovo 
Ftnlyands.kovo Pravttel'stva11 (The Arrival of the Representative 
of the Finnish Government) Krasnaya Zvezda, 24 October 1939, 
p. 1. 
10 
Russians and the Finns would soon announce an agreement in 
the same way that the Baltic States had "fallen into the 
Soviet sphere." Now the Russians had admitted that there 
had been a hitch in their plans. The Finns had proved 
difficult and did not seem ready to accept Russian guidance . 
The speech therefore was a sort of international bombshell, 
for it marked the first setback in the Russian plan to control 
the northern Baltic. 
Surprisingly enough, Molotov ' s address, though direct 
and forceful, contained only a veiled threat against the 
Finnish Government. The single note of warning can be found 
in the last paragraph: 
• • • We are certain that the Finnish leading 
circles properly understand the importance of consol-
idating friendly Soviet-Finnish relations and that the 
Finnish public men will not yield to anti-toviet 
influence or instigation from any quarter. 
The warning was plain enough. Finland was not to seek 
allies and things would go well for her. But if there was 
any hint of intervention, she would have to accept the con-
sequences. In short the Russians served notice on the Finnish 
Government that they meant to have their own way in the 
Baltic. 
On 3 November the first rumblings of trouble appeared 
in the Russian newspapers. An article in 1'.!:1!g pointed out 
that the foreign press, especially in Finland, had protested 
111 0.konchaniye Do.klada tot. V. M. Molotova" (The Opening 
Speech of Comrade v. M. Molotov), Pravda, 1 November 1939, 
p. 2. 
11 
too loudly about these negotiations and had looked upon the 
Soviet terms as a "threat to the West. 111 The article also 
noted that the speech of the Finnish Foreign Minister, Eljas 
Erkko, on 1 November in Helsinki was a definite threat of war 
against the USSR. 
On the same day Pravda too carried an article which 
commented on the unfavorable reaction of the Finnish press to 
the Moscow terms. Indicating that some Finnish leaders were 
unfriendly towards the Soviet Union, this official organ 
noted that the actions of the Finnish Government, such as the 
evacuation of city populations, the mobilization of supplies 
and the change of industries to a war footing could be looked 
upon as a "series of measures which made sense only in case 
of a nation preparing for war. 11 Then, too, Erkke's speech 
was labelled a threat to the USSR because he indicated "what 
forces would guarantee the neutrality and freedom of Finland 
in the event of a threat to its neutrality." In response to 
these dangers to the Soviet State, the article announced that 
the Russian people were resolved to 11 ••• throw back to the 
devil all the games of the political gamblers ••• (and) 
guarantee the safety of the USSR: not overlooking anything 
111rnostrannaya o Dokladye tov. Molotova na Vneocherednoi 
Pyatoi Sessii Verhovnov Soveta SSSR" (Foreigners about the 
Speech of Com. Molotov at the Opening Session of the Supreme 
Soviet of the USSR), Trud, p. 4. 
(and) overcoming all and every obstacle on the way to the 
goa1. 11 l 
12 
Basically the articles scored the point that there 
were some Finnish leaders who did not like the idea of nego-
tiation with the Soviet Union. These leaders, led by Erkke, 
so the press asserted, acted as though they wanted war with 
the Soviet Union. In this desire, it was reasoned, they 
evidently expected help from "certain western powers,"; the 
Soviet people, therefore, were told to be on guard against 
such a threat. For the most part, these articles seemed to 
have served as a warning both to the Soviet people and the 
Finnish negotiators then in Moscow. 
By 12 November there were definite signs of stepped 
up activity in the Soviet press against Finland. In both 
Izvestiya and Pravda there appeared a reprint of an article 
from the left-wing Finnish magazine Soihtu which revealed 
that the warlike preparations of the Finnish Government had 
caused the workers to hope for the success of the Soviet-
Finnish negotiations. The implications were that the Finnish 
working classes had a different attitude towards , the possibil-
ity of a settlement with the USSR than did the Finnish 
2 
political leaders. 
lrrK Voprosu Sovets.ko-Finlyandih Peregovorah" (On the 
Question of the Soviet-Finnish Negotiations), Pravda, p. 2. 
211sjurnal Soihtu o Sovets.ko-Finlyandih Peregovorah 11 
(The Magazine Soihtu about the Soviet Finnish Negotiations), 
Izvestiya, p. 4, and Pravda, p. l. 
h 
13 
On this same day~ also published an article in 
which the author argued eloquently that the Finns must be 
planning an attack on the USSR with the help of the "Anglo-
French imperialistso" Here the Soviet press scored a signif ... 
icant point, for this was the first time that it identified 
the imperialist powers who were allegedly supporting Finland's 
political leaders. Heretofore Russia's newspapers spoke in 
general terms about "imperialistic powers," but now they 
pointed the finger directly at England and France. 
After all, Finland with its own forces, so Trud 
continued " , . . . could not resist an aggressor who might 
try to invade its territory for a war against the USSR." Then, 
too, since Finland was such a small nation her political 
leaders must be dragging the country into war with the support 
of the West. Of course no intelligent person would want this 
but, with the backing of the West, these political intriguers 
would go "into a fight with the Soviet Union with its 183 
million fiery patriots." Naturally, the article concluded, 
the Soviet people must 11 strengthen the security of Leningrad, 
and • • • 
. l 
end every intrigue in spite of everything." 
On the next day Pravda and other newspapers reinforced 
the picture of Finland as a nation split by economic and 
political troubles which, it was claimed, were brought about 
principally by the warlike measures which had been initiated 
1F. Lopanov, "Finskie Mal 1bruki Vedut Opasnou Igru" 
(The Finnish Malbruks Play a Dangerous Game), Trud, p. 2. 
14 
in October. In connection with these preparations, the article 
estimated that "Finland could not maintain such a position 
for more than 4-7 months." It then went on to predict that 
"the government. . . will declare that the Soviet proposals 
are impossible. 111 As the Russian press saw it the outlook 
for a settlement with the Finns grew less likely every day. 
A further development in the growing campaign against 
Finland appeared in an article in Komsomolskaya Pravda on the 
14th. This was in the form of a letter written by a prominent 
Danish Communist. It purported to be a description of condi-
tions inside Finland, but in reality it was part of the usual 
attack on the "mad Finnish leaders" who were leading their 
nation to war. Utilizing a great deal of historical material, 
the author demonstrated that the "bourgeois government" had 
been the enemy of the "liberties of the Finnish people" for 
the past twenty years. During this excursion into history, 
the old motto of some defunct Finnish right-wing groups "a 
greater Finland up to the Urals" was brought out as a possible 
motive for the aggressive actions of the Finnish military. 
The letter also pointed out that the Finnish people were 
against this policy of aggression as were the working classes 
or Denmark. This being the case the hopes of the present 
l"Polosjeniei v Finlyandii" (The Situation in Finland), 
J>ravda, p. 2. 
15 
F innish government for support among the Scandinavian countries 
was only a pipe dream. 1 
The above viewpoint received official "sanction" in an 
article which was widely printed throughout the Red press on 
16 November. Here again one sees the slogan of the Finnish 
reactionaries who have always "dreamed of extending the 
borders of Finland to the Urals" presented as the real reason 
for the "aggressive actions" of . the Helsinki Government. 
'~inland .has been orienting itself towards the West," the 
message read, "so that at the first opportunity they could 
reveal their hostility to the Soviet Union. 112 This certainly 
was indicative of western support, it was argued, and of the 
activities of "the Finnish black-reaction." Even the efforts 
of the Finnish rightists to convince the people that the 
diplomatic rupture was temporary was only "an attempt to 
influence public opinion by introducing falsehoods. 113 This 
Piece concluded as follows: 
It is evident that the Finnish ruling circles do not 
wish an agreement with the USSR, that they will continue 
their antisoviet policy. The wide mass of the Finnish 
people sincerely desire the arrangement of friendly rela-
tions with the Soviet Union. The hostile antisoviet 
course has no support.4 
1Martin Andersen Ne.kse, "Vo.krug Finlyandii" (Around 
Finland), Komsomolskaya Pravda, .p. 3. 
211Antisovits.kaya Kampaniya v Finlyandii" (The Anti-
soviet Campaign in Finland), Pravda, p. 4. 
3rbid. 
4rbtd. 
These ideas were further emphasized in a series of 
stories subtitled "Letters from Finland," which appeared 
during this period in the newspaper Komsomolskaya Pravda. 
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The one to which reference is now made was published on 17 
November. It supported the view that the Finnish workers and 
peasants were definitely against the Helsinki Government's 
policy of aggressive actions on the Russian border. Of 
course pro-Russian sentiment of the Finnish working classes 
was suppressed by the "okranka" (secret police) and the 
"United Front" of Finnish political parties. 1 However, the 
author ended on a note of optimism: 
With such terror and persecution the officials will 
not be able to break the resistance of the people, to 
take them into an antisoviet war. The adventurers will 
not be able to sacrifice the peac~ of the Finnish ~eople 
for the sake of the interests of London and Paris. 
Here again was further reference to the western 
imperialists. 
The very next day another article appeared in 
Komsomolskaya Pravda. Its subject was a proclamation of the 
Central Committee of the Finnish Communist Party. The sheer 
fact of such a proclamation, it was reasoned, was further 
proof that there was a body of discontent within Finland 
which would be in favor of a settlement with Russia. The 
proclamation recited the wrongs done to the Finnish workers 
1A. Kalervoinen, "Finskaya Molodesj Protiv Avanturistov 
i Provokatorov" (The Finnish Youth Are Against the Adven-
turers and Provokers), Komsomolskaya Pravda, p. 2. 
2Ibid. -
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by the "bourgeois rulers" over the past twenty years. It 
also answered the argument of the Finnish Government that it 
was merely protecting the sovereignty of the nation. 
Observed the anonymous author: 
It is funny when the Soviet proposals are considered 
an infringement on the sovereignty of Finland by the same 
circles which, in the case of sovereignty, were prepared 
to surrender the constitutional rights of Finland to the 
Tzar ani who after this in 1918 sold their nation to the 
Kaiser. 
Naturally the "manifesto met with great interest in the fac-
tories and plants, the barracks and among the forest workers 
of Finland. 112 
In a two-column front-page story in Krasnaya Zvezda on 
19 November entitled "The Ruling Circles Are Provo.king War 
with the USSR," the reader was given a review of the entire 
picture of "Finnish aggressions" against the Soviet Union. It 
pointed out that after the leaders of Finland had entered into 
talks with the USSR, certain rightist circles in that country 
began a "specious campaign against the socialist state." This 
campaign was intended, so the story indicated, to discredit 
beforehand any Soviet proposal which might eliminate the 
troubles in the Baltic. These same rightist circles, the 
account continued, also began a program of "brazen defamation" 
to "provoke hatred against the muscovite." Even the military 
took an active part in this effort. In the Finnish magazine, 
1
"Golos Fins.kovo Naroda" (The Voice of the Finnish 
People), Komsomols.kaya Pravda, .p. 4. 
2Ihid. -
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Suomen Kuvalshti, two articles were printed which seriously 
considered the possibility of war with Russia. This, the 
story pointed out, was definite indication of the aggres-
siveness of the Finnish Army. 1 
Not only that but this same account insisted that the 
"imperialist West" had its hand in the Finnish pie. Proof 
of this were the two "good will" visits in 1925 and in 1939 
of a certain British Major General Walter Kirk to Finland to 
observe the development of the Finnish Army. According to 
the article these trips were made not only to inspect the 
Finnish Army but to supervise its training. What is more, 
during his earlier visit this "remarkable man" evidently not 
only organized and trained the entire Finnish Army but even 
drew up the plans and directed the construction of the 
so-called Kirk- Mannerheim fortifications on the Karelian 
Isthmus. General Kirk managed to accomplish this astonishing 
feat, so the story ran, in the total elapsed time of some 
eleven months. One can well understand the natural concern 
that the Russians felt when they learned that this same 
superman had complimented the Finns on their military devel-
opment. Of course, this evidence was only being utilized 
as "proof" of the complete control of Finnish territory by 
the "imperialist West." This same Soviet line continued with 
the assertion that the Finnish armed forces were being 
reinforced from abroad. "All sorts of adventurers and lovers 
1"Pravyashchiei Krugi Finlyandii Provotziruut Voinu 
s SSSR, 11 Krasnaya Zvezda, 19 November 1939, p. 12. 
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of battle have been brought together by a (warlike) zeal," 
said the article. "With such help the boldness of the 
Finnish Army becomes clear: it is no joke that they threaten 
1 to defeat and disperse the Red Army." 
This article concluded with a warning about an old 
Finnish proverb: 11 A Finn is worth 10 Russians." Krasnaya 
Zvezda observed that such ideas only encouraged the already 
aggressive Finnish rightists to carry out their plans to 
invade the USSR. This led to the gloomy observation: 
''Despite their implacable antisoviet policy, they continue 
on a downward path. 112 
The above review is an excellent example of the type 
of campaign which was waged in the Russian press during this 
period. Any chance observation by a Finnish publication or 
the visit of foreign military observers was made to appear 
as an indication of the aggressive intention of the "Helsinki 
warmongers." All this contributed to the Russian picture of 
Finland as a focus of war in the North. 
What the Russian leaders were doing, of course, is 
clear. They were first of all building up a case against 
Finland and in the same breath warning the West (France and 
England) against intervention should the Soviet Government 
find it necessary to take forceful action to "restrain the 
raging Finns. 11 
2Ibid. 
····-------~------
In another story which appeared on 20 November in 
Krasnaya Zvezda, Pravda and other newspapers, additional 
"proof" of the aggressive intentions of the Finns in the 
Baltic was supplied. This time the Soviets drew upon an 
article from the Swedish Communist newspaper Nu Dag for their 
evidence. "It is well understood that the Government (of 
Finland) has the power to terminate this atmosphere which 
is hostile to the USSR, but it does nothing," so ran the 
charge. 1 Therefore the very fact that the "Helsinki man-
agers" had allowed their newspapers to print adverse comments 
on the Soviet Union was a further indication of the aggres-
sive intent of Finland towards her neighbor to the east. 
Other pieces of the Soviet "picture of Finland" 
appeared in a series of small articles during the month of 
November which were printed on those pages of Russian news-
papers devoted to news items from foreign sources. For the 
most part these reports added up to the view that the October 
mobilization had a bad effect upon the economic situation in 
Finland, especially in respect to rents, prices and high 
taxes. All this created intolerable conditions for the 
families of married reservists who had been called to the 
colors and as a result the Finnish people were very discon-
tented with the policy of their present Government. While 
these articles were too small to be considered especially 
111Shveds.kaya Gazeta s Politi.ke Finlyandii" (A Swedish 
Newspaper about the Policy of Finland), Krasnaya Zvezda, 
p. 12. 
important, they nevertheless served to keep the Russian 
picture of the Finnish nation constantly before the people 
of the Soviet Union. 
On 21 November the Soviet press for the first time 
launched a direct attack on their old enemies, the Finnish 
Social Democrats. Izvestaya blasted their leaders for 
betraying their original principles. Instead of fighting 
for the high ideals of true socialism, they had become a 
II i soc al-democratic aristocracy. 11 As a result they were no 
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longer "fighting for the betterment of the material welfare 
of the workers, poor-peasants and the intelligentsia," nor 
11 for the widening of democratic rights and for peace among 
peopleo" On the other hand "this group of aristocrats had 
been as~imilated with the capitalists and fascists and has 
wandered into the camp of black reaction. The workers, 
peasants and intelligentsia should leave the party. 111 
Another story which emphasized the perfidy of the 
Social Democrats had this to say about their part in the 
ill-fated Moscow negotiations: 
••• one notes the clumsy veering of the leaders 
of the Social-Democrats. After they had worked for a 
breaking of the negotiations with the USSR from their 
camp comes a timid voice (calling) for the e.mployment 
of "all possible (means) for the continuation of the 
talks." This, in particular, is found in a statement 
by the president of the parliamentary committee of 
foreign affairs svato (Svento) (who is) very sorry 
that there is n~ agreement with the USSR. 
The crocodile tears of Postine Svento (Social-
1"suomen Penvil'eliya' o Predatel'stve Finskoi Sotz:I.al-
Demo.kratii" (Suomen Penuilelia about the Perfidity of the 
Finnish Social-Democrats), Izvestiya, P• 4. 
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Democrat deputy to the Parliament) involuntarily reveals 
the antisoviet course of the reactionary leaders of the 
Social-Democrats.l 
This quote was typical of the method used by the 
Russian press to discredit the statements of Finnish leaders. 
The semi-humorous reference to "crocodile tears" and other 
zoological features played a great part in certain Soviet 
stories about the efforts of the Finnish leaders to explain 
their side of the diplomatic situation. 
In a story of the 24th a Finnish author, in another 
of the "Letters from Finland 11 series, reviewed the situation 
from th~ Communist point of ~iew. According to this writer, 
the reactionaries utilized all the forms of propaganda to 
promote their hopes to conquer a "greater Finland to the 
Urals." It seems as though "bourgeois history and poetry, 
by the 'large and small robbers of feathers • have given a 
tone to (Finnish) literature in which it appears that the 
territory from the Finnish border to the Urals (and) to the 
Siberian rivers Obi and Yenese, by some .kind of mythical 
2 'right ' belong to Finland." This "exaggerated claim," 
according to the author, was evidently the basis for the 
reactionary attack on the USSR. 
on the other hand the young Finnish workers had not 
l"Razgul Antisovetskoi Kampanii v Finlyandii" (The 
Outpouring of the Antisoviet Campaign in Finland), Krasnaya 
Zvezda, 23 November 1939, P• 4. 
2A. Kalervoinen, '~inskaya Trudyashchayasya Molodesj 
Deug sovets.kovo Naroda" (The Finnish Working Youth Are The 
Friends of the soviet People), Komsomolskaya Pravda, p. 2. 
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forgotten that Finland received her freedom from the hands 
of these same Bolsheviks whom the reactionaries were planning 
to attack. The reason there was no open protest by the 
youthful proletariat in Helsinki against this aggressive 
policy was the "bloody terror" employed by the Finnish 
leaders to suppress the political action of these young 
workers. In spite of that: 
No police prohibition, no cruelty of repression, 
no terror can destroy in the breasts of the Finnish 
youth the love for the great socialist state ••• The 
younger generation of the Finnish people together with 
all the workers will conduct a fight against the 
antisoviet war, kindlfd by you, the retained lords of 
foreign imperialists. 
The final major article in this period appeared on 
26 November in Pravda and was widely reprinted throughout the 
Russian press on the next day. This story, entitled 11 A Clown 
in the Office of Premier" received some notice in the foreign 
press as well. It was a report of a speech made by Finnish 
Premier A. K. Kayander in which he tried to explain the 
position of Finland in the recent negotiations. As had been 
noted, the Russian correspondents when they report such 
events try to discredit the speaker with a heavy layer of 
odious comparisons. In the case of the Finnish Premier it 
seems that he: 
••• changed the concert platform into the ring 
of a circus tent. As a clown he somersaulted and spoke 
all topsy-turvy. He stood on his head and walked on 
his hands. 
With the adder creeps the Finnish 1rem1er. He sobs, besmearing tears on a dirty face. 
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These insults were a rude way of calling Premier 
Kayander a liar. The article did not stop here in discred-
iting the Finnish position. All the "proofs" of "western 
influence" in Finland and the encouragement of the English 
newspapers, it continued, lead to the conclusion that the 
Finns were meditating an immediate attack on the Soviet Union. 
Thus in this period of 1-26 November one can see the 
growing Russian press campaign against Finland. From the 
Molotov speech of the 1st and the "editorials" of the 3rd 
to the satire on the policy speech of the Finnish Premier it 
can be said that Russian newspaper reports moved from "kind 
advice" to ridicule. For the most part, Soviet leaders 
seemed to have been intent upon presenting a picture of 
Finland as the focus of war in northeast Europe. The "reac-
tionary ruling clique" in Helsinki was described as using 
every means to convince the Finnish people that the 
"muscovite" was their great enemy. These "bourgeois man-
agers," so ran the Soviet accusation, revived the old hopes 
of the Finnish nationalists for a greater "Finland to the 
Urals. 11• Since it was hard to imagine that even the "mad 
rulers of Helsinki" could hope to accomplish this ambitious 
program with only the resources of Finland, the Russians 
revived the old revolutionary myth that the Finns were going 
to allow the "western imperialists" to use their country as 
1"Shut Gorohovii Na Postu Prem'era," Pravda, p. 1. 
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a springboard for an attack on the "state of socialism. 11 The 
delusions of the Finnish "rightist circles" combined with the 
power of the western allies, the Soviet line continued, 
caused the Finns to become an unendurable menace to the city 
of Lenin, the "cradle of the proletarian revolution. 11 
But there was more to the story than this. According 
to the Russian writers, the picture was not too black. In 
spite of the "maniac ravings" of their bourgeois leaders, the 
Finnish people would not support them in such a mad adventure 
as an attack on Soviet Russia. Indeed, these workers were so 
suppressed that they would probably fight against any attempt 
by their political leaders to invade the Soviet Union. Thus 
While Finland constituted a danger to the strategic position 
of the USSR, Stalin's newspapers ground out the old theme 
that the Finnish people were so divided that the nation could 
not fight a real war. 
It is interesting to note that with all the writing in 
the Soviet press about foreign influences in Finland no mention 
Was ever made of Germany. This is true despite the fact that 
the Finnish Army had been trained and armed largely from 
German sources at the end of the first World War. To protect 
the Nazi-Soviet alliance the Russians evidently decided to 
overlook the German influence in this "focal point of war" 
in the northern Baltic. 
CHAPTER II 
JUSTIFICATION FOR ATTACK--THE MAINILA SHOTS 
(27 November 1939--30 November 1939) 
Towards the end of November the Soviet press campaign 
against Finland increased appreciably. The event around 
Which the Soviet leaders built their anti-Finnish campaign 
was the so-called "Mainila Shots 11 that took place on the 
Russo-Finnish border in the western part of the Karelian 
Isthmus (see Map II). Here is the report of the incident 
that appeared in all the Russian newspapers: 
On 26 November at 15 hours, 45 minutes our 
soldiers stationed a kilometer northwest of Mainila 
were suddenly fired on from Finnish territory by 
artillery. In all there were seven rounds fired. 
Killed were three Red Army men and one sergeant, 
wounded were seven Red Army men, one sergeant and 
one second lieutenant. Colonel Tikomirov, chief 
of staff of the first division, was sent to inves-
tigate the area. The incident caused great 
commotion among the troops stationed in the area 
opposite the Finns ..• 1 
To this "outrageous incident" the Soviet Government 
reacted immediately. That same day the Foreign Office in 
Moscow protested the shooting and asked Finland to withdraw 
111vozmushchenie Provokatziei Finlyandskoi Voenshinie" 
(The Insolent Provocation of the Finnish Military), Krasnaya 
!vezda, 27 November 1939, P· 2. 
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her forces from the border to a distance of 25 kilometers to 
It i nsure the security of Leningrad. 11 The Finns quickly 
answered the Russian charge. The next day in a rather stiff 
note they insisted that the Finnish Army was not responsible 
for the incident. They also suggested a mutual withdrawal 
or all forces so that the incident could be investigated by 
a border commission in accordance with the Russo-Finnish 
nonaggression pact of 1934.1 
This caused the Russians to take still another step. 
On 28 November they not only rejected the Finnish suggestion 
but abrogated their nonaggression pact with Finland of 1934 
as well, thus freeing their hands -from any diplomatic 
restrictions. As a result the Finnish Foreign Office sent a 
much more conciliatory answer the next day which accepted the 
Russian demand for a withdrawal of Finnish forces. By then, 
however, time had run out. 
The Soviet Government did not even answer this latest 
note. Instead Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Molotov, 
broadcast a rousing speech which condemned the Finns as 
aggressors and accused them of planning an attack on the 
Leningrad area. 2 To substantiate these accusations the Red 
Ar.my reported that their forces had repulsed Finnish "infantry 
luThe Shape of Things to Come, tt The Nati on ( 2 December 
l939), P• 593• 
2uotvet Sovetskovo Pravitel'stva Na Notu Finlyandskovo 
Pravitel'stva" (The Answer of the Soviet Government to the 
Note of the Finnish Government), Pravda, 29 November 1939, 
p. 1. 
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units" which had tried to cross the Russo-Finnish border on 
the 29th. The next day at 8:00 A.M. the Red Army moved 
across the boundary to 11 punish these raging provokers of' war 
in their own territory. 111 
The Russian newspapers during the last f'our days of' 
November were almost completely dominated by the "Mainila 
Shots" and the diplomatic notes which resulted f'rom this 
incident. Besides f'ront-page stories about diplomatic 
exchanges and the speeches of' Molotov, one could read two 
other types of' articles. The f'irst of' these were the so-called 
"eyewitness" accounts of' the Mainila incident. In actual f'act 
most of' these stories were "on the spot" reports .from news 
service correspondents who apparently went immediately to 
the Mainila barrier to give a f'irsthand report of' this 
example o.f "Finnish aggression." 
The other type of' article concerned itself' with 
meetings of' Russian workers or soldiers who proclaimed that 
the Soviet people were solidly behind their party and govern-
ment in its policy of' punishing the Finnish uwarmongers. 11 
Many o.f these articles contained speeches and resolutions 
from the various meetings held in 11 workers 1 clubs" throughout 
the USSR. The use of' such articles to verify the drif't of' 
Russian public opinion is suspect f'or none of' the speakers 
ventured to disagree with o.fficial policy. The articles are 
111 Ssjimutsys Kulaki Ot Gneva" (They Clench Their 
Fists in Anger), Krasnaya Zvezda, 29 November 1939, P• 2. 
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very useful, however, in determining just what the Soviet 
leaders wanted their people to believe during these crucial 
days before the actual outbreak of the Russo-Finnish War. 
On 27 November the Soviet press blossomed with a 
front-page announcement of the note of protest sent to Finland 
by Molotov. After reviewing the facts as presented by the 
Red Army communique, Molotov pointed out that the Soviet 
Government had warned the Finns about the possibility of just 
such incidents during the recent Moscow talks. As a result 
of this incident the Russian Government requested that the 
Finnish army on the Karelian Isthmus withdraw its border 
units some 20 to 25 kilometers from the boundary. In order 
to soften this demand, the note announced: 
The Soviet Government does not intend to 
'blow up' this rebellious act of attack by units 
of the Finnish Army, since perhaps these units were 
badly controlled by the Finnish commanders. How-
ever, it is desirable that such rebellious acts 
from now on will not take place. 1 
The note seemed to have been an effort to place the 
Soviet Government in the position of offering a 11 reasonableu 
solution to a very touchy situation. After all the Red Army 
did not move immediately into Finland to "punish the inciters 
of war." Then, too, the Soviet Government did not demand 
that the Finns find and punish the perpetrators of this 
"international outrage." All the Kremlin leaders wanted was 
1"Note Sovetskovo Pravitel 1 stva Po Povodu Provokat-
zionnovo Obstrela Sovetskih Viosk Pinlyandskim Voinskim 
Chastyamau (The Note of the Soviet Government about the 
Provoking Shooting of Soviet Troops by the Finnish Military), 
Pravda, P• 2. 
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the removal of the Finnish border guards to a respectful 
distance so that this type of incident would never reour. 
Under the circumstances this seemed a reasonable reaction to 
a situation which might well have called for stronger 
measures. For the most part, this "requestn could be con-
sidered a final Russian effort to give the Finns another 
chance to end the diplomatic stalemate rather than force the 
Russians to take the ultimate step of war to secure their 
strategic and political demands. 
The articles from the various "peoples' meetingsn on 
27 November, on the other hand, were more violent in tone and 
suggestion. Although they did not call for an armed invasion, 
they advocated a strong and active defense. Typical of these 
was the observation of a deputy commissar by the name of 
Pandhin: 
In answer to the provocations of the Karelian 
Isthmus we will increase our vigilance. The enemy 1 
1 will not take us unawares• We are ready at any 
minute to defend our sacred border. With the name 
of Stalin on (oul) lips we will go into battle and 
smash any enemy. 
Some of the articles berated Finnish diplomacy. A 
typical example follows: 
Our Government repeatedly offered to the Finnish 
Government a peaceful solution of all difficulties 
between the Soviet Union and Finland. But the 
leaders of the Finnish Government, it seems, hope 
for some other solution• To peaceful negotiations 
they prefer impudent provocative action. This 
l
11
privetstvuern Mudruu Politiku Nashevo Pravitel
1
stva" 
(We Welcome the Wise policy of Our Government), Krasnaya 
,gve zda, p. 2. 
cannot be allowed to them. Our Government will 
carry on the necessary measures to repress the 
activities of the warmongers.I 
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Still others warned Finland to behave. Listen to the 
workers of Leningrad: 
••• the limits of the toleration and peace-
fulness of the Soviet people have been reached. We 
will further not expose our troops, the city of 
Lenin and the sacred soil of the state to the dangers 
of more provocations. The unbridled hands of Finnish 
kulaks, armed by the capitalists, will immediately 
retire from the border to a proper distance. 
If the incompetent, but impudent, Finnish 
generals cannot keep good order and proper obedience 
in their gangs, we will not allow them to remain on 
the borders of our land any longer. 2 
Then examine this sample by a master-instructor of 
the plant "Red Proletariat," a certain comrade Pohvalenski: 
What do we know about Finland? 
This we know: the population is 
same as one of our cities, Leningrad. 
braggart-leaders of this nation dream 
the borders of Finland to the Urals. 
comrades, up to the Uralst 
about the 
And here the 
of extending 
You hear, 
As long as this was simply conversation we 
listened to them and paid little attention. But 
when the Finnish bandits open fire on our border 
guards, when they earnestly attempt an attack on 
the power of our state, then workers simply say: 3 •We will send you to your graves, you foolst' 
The editions of Russian newspapers which appeared on 
28 November scored the tense situation brought about by the 
lr,Obuzdat Zarvavshihsya Provokatorov Voinie" (Repress 
the Activities of the Provokers of War),~, p. 2. 
2B. Lavrenkev, "Bespredlen Gnev Narodnie" (The 
Limitless Anger of the People), Izvestiya, p. 2. 
311 obuzdat Nagletzovt" (Bury the Impudent Onest), 
Komsomolskaya Pravda, p. 2. 
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"Mainila Shots." Some of the most interesting stories which 
appeared were the accounts sent in by correspondents from 
the Mainila barrier. Many of these were very similar to 
their descriptions and conclusions. The authors painted a 
lurid picture of innocent Red soldiers being shot down in 
cold blood by the treacherous Finnish border guards. The 
best ttofficial" description of the incident appeared in 
Krasnaya Zvezda. This account was the most complete and 
most nearly agreed with the original communique of the 
Leningrad Military District: 
••• It was an ordinary day on the border. 
Snow fell. Low clouds slowly moved in the sky. On 
the frosty calm came the young voices of the Red 
Army men. In the forests, in the field the usual 
Red Army e.xercises took place. A group of skiers, 
preparing for competition, whirled from hill to 
hill. 
Suddenly from the surly Finnish area came the 
drumming of gunfire. Louder and louder. In the 
air the shells came with a growing howl. They tore 
into our Soviet earth and on the snow splashed 
young blood. 
'Prepare the guns for battle,' ordered the 
commander of a battery, but he recovered: 
'What am I doing? Well, if they provoke us, 
we will retire.' On the snow lay dead soldiers. 
Comrades gave first aid to the wounded. Recover-
ing from the pain, they told how they were torn 
by the shells which landed in tfe middle of their 
exercises at the top of a hill. 
There were two points here which might strike the 
casual reader as rather strange. The first concerns the 
fact that the troops in this area were out training. The 
1"v Rainoe Mainila" (In the Province or Mainila), 
Krasnaya Zvezda, p. 2. 
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Mainila barrier lies in the western part of the Karelian 
Isthmus within a sharp bend of the river nsister" which 
forms the border in this area. At this spot the Finns had 
guards on two sides of the border post. Why then hold 
maneuvers in plain sight of an enemy on two sides? Another 
part of this description told of skiers whirling from hill 
to hill. Unfortunately this particular area is very gentle 
terrain with no elevation of more than a hundred meters in 
any direction. A strange place to practice skiing. Perhaps 
it can be said that the reporter did not feel it necessary 
to go to the area to write a stirring account of the 
"atrocity." 
The second suspicious point in this narrative is the 
reaction of the battery commander when the "Finnish" shells 
struck. He at first prepared for battle and then decided to 
retreat if there was any further provocation. For one thing 
it is strange to find a battery commander in such an exposed 
position. Then, too, his conduct was rather odd to say the 
least. The normal reaction would have been to prepare for a 
fight to hold the road to Leningrad. However, this was not 
the only "eyewitness" story of the Mainila incident. 
There was a second account of the Mainila "aggression11 
and it also appeared in Krasnaya Zvezda. It is obvious too 
that a far more careful observer wrote this report than the 
one who penned the first story: 
The border guard Rechitskii went on a patrol 
with his section. Suddenly there was a swishing in 
the air. Then he was disturbed by a stunning 
explosion. Rechitskii stood on his guard: 1What 
does this mean?' 
This was 15 hours, 45 minutes (3:45 P.M.) of 
26 November. 
'Again a provocationt 1 said Grigorinko at his 
post of observation on the border, as over his head 
whistled the shells. 
On that day stationed at an outpost was the 
light machine gunner Dibrov. Having heard the 
artillery fire from the Finnish side, he gave the 
command: 1 To armst 1 
In a second everyone was ready to fight. 
The barrier commander explained to the border 
guards that it was impossible to retreat. 
'Go to your placeso Carry out combat prepara-
tions carefully.• 
The whole barrier became more watchful to 
defend the border of the beloved nation. 
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The men off duty went to look at the place where 
the shells had fallen. This was quite near the 
barrier, about 200 meters away. It was in a meadow. 
It was the usual place for tactical exercises. Now 
it was covered with holes from enemy shells. 
The enemy had shed the blood of good soldiers 
and commanders of the Red Army. Hatred and anger 
squeezed the breasts of the border guards ••• 
The area of Mainila barrier is a favorite place 
for the provocations of the Finnish white-bandits. 
Here took place the shooting of two Soviet border 
guards. Here the Finns send their spies. The 
barrier always uncovers the plots of the enemy, 
bringing them into clear water, since this barrier 
is the advance barrier of the section . 
• • • On the table of Bogolubov, the barrier's 
commissar, lay a shell splinter. Perhaps this piece 
of lead had wounded our soldiers. In a meeting, 
holding the splinter in his hands, Bogolubov said: 
'Let this evidence of the provocation remind 
us everi minute of the baseness and vileness of the 
enemy.• 
From this story it can be said that the Mainila 
barrier was somewhat upset by the shelling in spite of the 
1P. Nestorov and S. Solodovnikov, "Na Mainilskoi 
Zastava" (At the Mainila Outpost), Krasnaya Zvezda, p. 2. 
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fact that there had evidently been other provocations in the 
same area. Indeed, connuissar Bogolubov, evidently called a 
meeting sometime after the incident to explain the situation 
to his comrades. In spite of the fact that these men had 
just lost thirteen of their countrymen, the commissar does 
not even mention their names at this meeting. Instead he 
merely holds up a shell fragment as a sign of the "vileness 
of' the enemy." This is especially strange in an article in 
which almost every other person was carefully given a sur-
name. For that matter where are the names of' the "fallen 
heroes"? They did not appear in any story from the Mainila 
barrier or indeed in any part of the Russian press. As a 
matter of fact these thirteen "martyrs of Mainila11 have 
never appeared by name in any Russian account of the war. 
This is a strange omission from a government which prides 
itself on its careful records. 
For an answer to this mystery perhaps one should 
take a look at the Finnish description of the Mainila incident: 
Urko Sundvall said he was on duty at the spot 
(the Mainila barrier) at 2:30 P.M. He saw eleven 
Russians in the field sloping down in front of' the 
foremost building at Mainila. A horseman came 
riding up. He stopped for a moment to talk to 
them, and then all twelve went away in a westerly 
direction. The horseman went a short distance 
with them, then wheeled around and disappeared at 
a gallop in an easterly direction. Ten minutes 
later, Sundvall heard a shot fired crosswise from 
the east, and in a matter of twenty seconds a 
shell exploded just where the Russians had been. 
It was a loud explosion and seemed to make a big 
hole, because a lot of dirt was thrown into the 
air. The first shot was followed by six more, all 
the shells exploding in the same field. The last 
shell exploded at 3:05 P.M. Ten minutes later six 
men arrived on the spot where the shells had fallen, 
stayed three minutes in inspecting the ground, then 
went back. There was, of course, no dead or 
wounded; the spot was deserted at the time.L 
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If the Finnish version of the incident is compared 
with the second Russian tteyewitness 11 account, it becomes 
apparent that the incident consisted of seven rounds of 
artillery which landed in a field outside the Mainila barrier. 
It seems obvious too that the thirteen "victims of Mainila" 
were added to the story at some later time. This was prob-
ably done to create more public interest in what Moscow 
wanted the people to think was an insolent provocation by 
the Finns. Thus from a critical examination of all materials, 
it would seem likely that these seven rounds were fired by 
the Red Army to create an incident which could be used to 
justify any Russian invasion of Finland as a move to protect 
Leningrad. 
The various reports from public meetings which appeared 
on the 28th were principally concerned with violent threats 
of vengeance against the "bad-rulers" of Helsinki. A certain 
Lieutenant Marushchan, for instance, insisted: 
The fools who hold office in Finland threaten 
us with war. Haven't these artillery volleys been 
instigated by them? But the boastful soldiers 
forget that on the other side of the border stands 
1Herbert B. Elliston, Finland Fights (Boston: 
Little, Brown, 1940), p. 241. 
the greatest army in the world, which at any 
moment will ~ompel respect for the force of 
Soviet arms.l 
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In regards to the reaction of the Finnish workers to 
this "policy of provocation" the All-Moscow convention of 
writers observed: 
We know the Finnish workers are not respon-
sible for the policy of the provokers of war and 
are hostile to it. The Finnish workers at present 
do not wish to shed their blood in the service of 
native and foreign imperialists. So much more 
criminal
2
then is the policy of the raging adven-
turists. 
One special quality of these threats against Finland 
was the mention of the fate of the late Polish Republic. 
Evidently the Russians felt that there was a similarity in 
the two situations for they frequently commented: 
The political card-players of Finland must be 
reminded how the heroic Red Army battered the Polish 
lords, freeing the people of the Western Ukraine and 
Western White Russia from insufferable tyranny.3 
The same emphasis came from a stahanovite, one Aleksei 
Nikolaevich Zaborovski, who declared: 
It seems that the 1 fools ' do not understand that 
this is a bad trick (to play) on the Red Army. Well, 
if the bullies do not come to their senses, we will 
have to teach them a lesson such as was taught at 
1I. Agranovski, P. Karelin and v. Chernishev. "Na 
Karelskovo Peresheike" (On the Karelian Isthmus), 
Komsomolskaya Pravda, P• 2. 
211 Velik Gnev Naroda11 (The Great Anger of the People), 
Izvestiya, p. 2. 
311 Finskaya Voennaya Klika Poteryala Razum" (The 
Finnish Military Clique has Lost Its Mind), Komsomolskaya 
Pravda, P• 2. 
Hasan, Halhin-Gol, in the Western Ukraine and 
Western White Russia. 1 
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It would appear from the content of these and other 
articles that there was much discussion among Russian workers 
and soldiers concerning the possibilities of war with Finland. 
Not only that, but the Soviet comparison of the Finnish 
situation with the incidents on the Manchurian border with 
Japan and the advance of the Red Army into eastern Poland 
was especially indicative of Soviet thinking towards a 
potential war with the Finns. What the Soviet press was 
grinding out for the Russian public then was essentially 
this: a winter campaign against the Finns would be rela-
tively easy, just like the 11 liberationn of eastern Poland. 
At least this is the impression one gets from reading all 
these stories. 
On the front pages of all Russian newspapers on the 
29th appeared copies of the notes which had been exchanged 
between Finland and Russia during the previous day. These 
consisted of the text of the Finnish reply to the Molotov 
demands of the 27th and the Soviet answer to this proposal 
There can be no doubt that, in spite of all amenities, the 
crucial point of the earlier note was the demand for the 
withdrawal of Finnish forces 20 to 25 kilometers from the 
border of the Karelian Isthmus. The Finnish note countered 
1"Terpeniu Est Predel" (Patience is Over), Pravda, 
p. 2. 
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this demand with the suggestion that instead both nations 
withdraw their forces to an agreed-upon distance from the 
trouble spot. Even friendly western observers were somewhat 
astonished by this suggestion and explained it as a Finnish 
attempt to Mcall the bluff11 of the Soviet rulers •1 A 
further reading of the Finnish note, on the other hand, 
reveals that the Finns were merely proposing a move to clear 
the border of soldiers to facilitate the work of this com-
mission: 
The Finnish Government ••• in order that this 
incident can be clearly reported, offers to initiate 
an investigation by the joint border commission on 
the Karelian Isthmus in conformity with the Conven-
tion of the border commission concluded on 24 
September 1928.2 
It should be noted that the Finns did not set any 
certain distance for the withdrawal, only so far as would be 
necessary for the investigation of the incident at Mainila. 
This interpretation justified the following observation by 
Finnish Foreign Minister Viano Tanner: "It might have been 
supposed that with the dispatch of this factual reply the 
matter would be settled. 11 3 
1Elliston, p. 208. 
211 otvet Sovetskovo Pravitel 1 stva Na Notu Finlyandskovo 
Pravitel ' stvan (The Answer of the Soviet Government to the 
Note of the Finnish Government), Krasnaya Zvezda, P• 1. 
3Tanner, The Winter War, P• 86. 
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In considering the strategic situation in the Baltic, 
it was obvious that the Russians would not settle the 
matter on this basis. Ignoring the details of this Finnish 
offer, the Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs in his 
reply denounced the "mutual withdrawal" suggestion as just 
one more example of the aggressive intent of the present 
government of Finland. In his analysis of the situation 
Molotov said: 
The position of the Finnish and Soviet forces 
are not quite the same. No Soviet soldiers threaten 
the vital centers of Finland, indeed they are 
actually hundreds of kilometers from them. However, 
Finnish troops are stationed (only) 32 kilometers 
from a vital center of the USSR--Leningrad of some 
three and one-half million people, which has created 
a direct threat. It would be impossible for the 
Soviet troops stationed here to withdraw 25 kilo-
meters for that would place them in the suburbs of 
Leningrad, an absurd position to defend Leningrad. 1 
Since the Finns refused to comply with the initial 
request to withdraw their forces, the Soviet note concluded 
that they were trying to maintain a hostile position to 
threaten Leningrad. This refusal to consider the defensive 
situation of the Soviet Union was, in the eyes of the 
Kremlin leadership, a direct violation of the 1934 treaty 
of nonaggression between Finland and the USSR. Therefore, 
the Soviet Union abrogated this treaty and ordered the 
breaking off of diplomatic relations with the Helsinki 
Government. The Russian rulers obviously had now abandoned 
10otvet Sovetskovov Pravitel 1 stva Na Notu Finlyandskovo 
Pravitel'stva,tt loc. cit. 
all hopes for a negotiated settlement with Finland. 
The reports of the soldiers and workers' meetings for 
this day reveal how far "public opinion" in Russia had moved 
towards an acceptance of war as a possible solution to the 
Baltic problem. The speeches and resolutions at these 
meetings were filled with derogatory observations about the 
Finnish Government and its leaders: "The new impudent act 
of the provokers of war was the answer of the Finnish Govern-
ment to the upright note of the Soviet Government. No words 
can describe this obstinately mean answer of the Finnish 
managers."1 The Finnish 11 governmental pack" was warned 
that "they are playing with fire 11 and if the Finnish Army 
"forces us to speak with the language of fire, on that day 
(they) will sweat freely. 112 There seemed to have been 
universal agreement that if the Finns persisted in their 
attitude and actions, the Soviet people "and their powerful 
Red Army and War Fleet will send to the devil every trick 
of the political card-players and guarantee the independence 
of the USSR.tt3 
According to these speeches the peaceful inclinations 
of the Finnish workers and peasants, on the other hand, were 
1 "K Otvetu Zarvavshihsya Provokatorov Voiniel" (In 
Answer to the Raging Provokers of Wart), Izveztiya, p. 2. 
211 Budem Biet Vraga Besposhchadnot" (We will be 
Merciless to the Enemyt), Pravda, p. 1. 
3"Gotovie Razgromit Vraga Na Evo Sje Territorii 11 
(Ready to Crush the Enemy in His Own Territory), Krasnaya 
Zvezda, P• 2. 
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being suppressed by a reign of terror initiated by their 
bourgeoisie masters. It was pointed out at one meeting that 
in Finland "if you are hungry and cold, then you are accused 
of 'revolt,' of spreading 'false stories•" and the "secret 
police seize you by the throat. 0 As a result of this all 
of the Finnish working classes "are convinced that the Soviet 
Union does not want to threaten Finland.ul This oppression, 
according to Russia's leading newspaper, caused the proletar-
iat to oppose the government: 
••• with all means available ••• to protest 
against the provocative antisoviet policy of the 
Helsinki warmongers. The Finnish workers also 
protest against the violent evacuation, the Finnish 
wives and mothers demand the return of their men 
from the Army, the small depo~itors withdraw their 
money from the savings banks. 
So the Soviet people were being told that the condi-
tion of the Finnish population was by no means good. Cer-
tainly, to anyone reading the Russian newspapers, the nation 
of the Finns could not be expected to put up any effective 
resistance to a well-trained force such as the Red Army. 
In the opinion of the Soviet news writers the Finnish 
Army was not well led, for it was commanded by a group of 
nmad fools" who were determined to have war with the Soviet 
Union. With the tremendous odds against them and with such 
111 Finlyandskii Narod Protiv Podsjigatelei Voinie" 
(The Finnish People are Against the Warmongers), Trud, P• 2. 
2 A. Bartov, "Gel 1 singforsskie Provokatorie Za Rabotoy" 
(The Helsinki Provokers are at Work), Izvestiya, p. 4• 
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nridiculous .fools" as commanders o.f their armed .forces, it 
would seem impossible for any responsible government to plot 
war against the USSR, but apparently these political card-
1 players o.f Helsinki had decided on just such a course. 
Russian readers were assured that despite the presence o.f 
well-trained Schutzcorps and Jaegers, there would probably 
not be any real .fighting in Finland if the Red Army should 
have to "punish these warmongers within their own territory.n 
As one comrade, a certain Nodakov , a veteran o.f the Polish 
campaign, pointed out: 
When the Red Army came into the territory o.f 
Western White Russia in order to come to the de.fense 
o.f the oppressed brothers, the soldiers, serving in 
the . Polish Army, workers and peasants came over to 
our side and went together with t~e Red Army. That 
is the way it will be in Finland. 
An interesting picture o.f the conditions inside Finland 
was also presented in the soviet press. The Russian people 
were told, .for example, that the greater part o.f the popu-
lation o.f Finland was straining under the oppressive rule of 
the "Helsinki clique" and was violently against any sort of 
war with the Soviet Union. The Finnish Army, while outwardly 
good, was beset by the demands of wives and mothers to release 
the reservists who made up the majority o.f soldiers. In 
spite o.f this intense opposition the military leaders o.f 
1r. Agranovski, P. Karelin and v. Chernishev, "Na 
Granitzett (On the Border), Komsomolskaya Pravda, p. 2. 
211 Prihodit Konetz Terpeniu Sovetskovo Naroda L11 (The 
Patience o.f the Soviet People has Come to an EndL), Izvestixa, 
p O 1. 
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Finland, acting under the orders of the western imperialists, 
wanted to invade the USSR. With all this division within 
the nation, the Russian soldiers and civilians were assured 
that the punishment of these warmongers would be as easy as 
was the invasion of Poland in September 1939. The Finnish 
people, disgusted with their leaders, and violently opposed 
to war with the Soviet Union, would surely welcome the Red 
Army. 1 
In order to bolster their claim that the Finns 
intended to invade the Soviet Union, the Headquarters of the 
Leningrad Military District issued a communique which reported 
that Finnish patrols had attempted to cross the Russian 
border at two widely separated points. According to the 
report these crossings occurred first in the Rybachi area 
on the shore of the Arctic Ocean and next in the sector of 
the border post of Kyasyaselka just above Lake Ladoga (see 
Map II). 2 Whether these patrol clashes were merely the 
normal results of the tense situation along the border or a 
calculated attempt by the Russians to provoke a war, the 
whole situation was widely reported throughout the Soviet 
press in an obvious effort to justify the idea that Finland 
had become a base for potential attack against the "cradle 
of the revolution"--the city of Leningrad. 
1"Provokatorie Budut Unichtosjenie" (The Provokers 
will be Destroyed), Krasnaya Zvezda, JO November 1939, P• l. 
211 Noviei Provokatzii Finlyandskoi Voenshinie 11 (New 
Provocations of the Finnish Military), Krasnaya Zvezda, 29 
November 1939, P• 1. 
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The f'ront pages of' the Russian newspapers of' 30 
November were dominated by Molotov's speech which had been 
delivered over the radio to the soviet people the night 
bef'ore. In this address Molotov reviewed the entire situa-
tion f'rom the Russian standpoint. Citing the 11 new provoca-
tions" of' the Finnish military that had been reported by the 
Red Army, the Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs came to 
the conclusion that all diplomatic resources had been 
exhausted and tha.t the Soviet Union could now only 11 def'end 
herself' from the aggressions of Finland and her western 
allies." Evidently, to sof'ten the impact of this necessity, 
he held f'orth the hope of eventual reunification of' the 
Finnish and Karelian peoples, but only under a government of' 
Finnish leaders who were "f'riendly to the USSR." To this 
desired end the 11 sta te of socialism" would help the Finnish 
people secure their f'ree and independent growth. Indeed, 
according to this speech. the present diff'iculties would be 
ended only when "the efforts of' the Soviet Union has resolved 
this problem in f'riendly collaboration with the Finnish 
people." 1 
This latter point was important for it was the first 
direct, of'f'icial statement that assumed the Finnish people, 
as distinct f'rom their leaders, would very likely join the 
1"Rech Po Radio Predsedatelya Soveta Narodish Komissarov 
SSSR, Tov. v. M. Molotov~'(The Radio Speech by the President 
of the Soviet of' Peoples' Commissars of the USSR, Com(rade) 
v. M. Molotov), Pravda, p. 1. 
Soviet Union in its efforts to overthrow the bourgeoisie 
government in Helsinki. After this Molotov went on to 
announce that the Soviet Union did not desire to dominate 
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the "government of the Finns" but would go to war to "protect 
the borders of' the beloved t'atherland. 111 
If the reports on soldiers and workers' meetings of 
this day can be trusted, Molotov had the support of the 
Russian people for any action he wished to take to solve the 
Finnish difficulty. The present government of Finland was 
characterized in most of these stories as being composed of: 
••• bankrupted fools ••• who lie from the 
skin with defamations and with impudent provocations 
to blame the Soviet Union for war. To everyone of 
us it is clear that this, to a great degree, is 
repudiated by the ardor of the working people of 
Finland. The sick leaders and soldiers from the 
ca.mp of the imperialists are in a rage and are 
capable of any rash action. From such political 2 card-players one cannot expect a reasonable answer. 
The workers and soldiers of the USSR, apparently in 
response to this threat, warned the Finnish 11 political 
jugglers, the diplomatic tricksters, who do not wish to 
remember our sober and wise policy of peace, (that) we are 
prepared to speak in another language • • • the language of 
fire and steel. 11 
1Ibid. 
211 Rech, Polnaya Silie i Musjestva" (A Speech Strong 
with Force and Courage), Izvestiya, p. 1. 
3 11 Polomaem Zubia Zarvavshimsya Psam" (We will Break 
the Teeth of the Raging Dogs), Komsomolskaya Pravda, P• 1. 
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From these articles one could expect that the Red Army 
would not be unaided if and when it entered Finland. It was 
pointed out by a group of pilots of the Red Air Force that 
the words of Molotov's speech would fly "across the lines of 
fortifications at the border, the barriers, the cruel censor-
ship, across the heads of the unfortunate diplomatsn and 
would then ttpenetrate into Finland and carry the point to the 
hearts of the true sons of the Finnish nation. 111 As a result 
of hearing this message of hope "the Finnish people will 
dismantle all the machinations of the political gamblers and 
their masters. 112 
Thus the meeting reports summed up the situation in 
Finland as a nation led by a group of bourgeoisie puppets of 
the west who were carrying the Finnish people into a ruinous 
war at the orders of their capitalistic bosses. The working 
classes of Finland, however, were against this policy and 
would probably revolt against their government at the first 
opportunity. 
Another article of the 30th was concerned with the 
German reaction to the Finnish situation. It was unique 
because it was the first Russian report about the reaction 
of German newspapers to the Baltic problem since the 
beginning of the present emergency. The story revealed 
1 "K Otvetu Podsjigatelei Voiniet" (To Answer the 
Inciters of Wart), Krasnaya Zvezda, p. 1. 
2Ibid. 
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that the Nazi press generally approved of Soviet policy and 
condemned the Finnish leaders for their intransigent attitude. 1 
This summary permitted the Russians to announce that their 
actions towards Finland had the approval of their German 
partner. 
There is no doubt but that during the four days 
(27-30 November) the Soviet press tried to arouse the Russian 
people to a fever pitch for war against the "warmongering 
Finnish leaders of black reaction. 11 The emphasis of the 
reports about the Mainila 11 Shots11 and the 11 slaughtered 
comrades 11 would indicate that the Russian press men were 
trying to force the Finnish Government to accept their terms 
for a settlement of the strategic problems in the Baltic. 
Certainly the fact that the soviet rulers resorted to such 
extreme action in response to a presumably minor episode of 
uncertain origin could only have meant that "the diplomatic 
cupboards of Moscow were rather bare" at this point. 2 This 
would explain the necessity for the increased violence of 
the press attack against Finnish leadership as a prelude to 
the Winter War. 
The Soviet campaign against the Mainila "attack11 was, 
as has been shown, supported by many 11reports of the speeches 
1 11Germanskaya Pechat o Finlyandskih Provokatziya" 
(The German Press on the Finnish Provocations), Trud, p. 4. 
2 Anatole Gregorovich Mazour, Finland: Between East 
and West (New York: D Van Nostrand, 1956), p. 108. 
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and resolutions of ~he meetings of workers and peasants of 
the USSR, 11 which demonstrated the "unanimous support of the 
Russian people for the wise policy of their party and govern-
ment.111 There is no better illustration of the increasing 
warlike tone of these articles than the stark headlines which 
appeared over these stories in Krasnaya Zvezda. Here are a 
few examples: 11 The Red Army, Together with All the Soviet 
People, is Deeply Disturbed at the Impudence of the Finnish 
Inciters of War 11 ; 2 11 The Workers•-Peasants 1 Red Army Unani-
mously Welcomes the Determined and Resolute Policy of the 
Soviet Government 11 ;3 "The Red Army at Any Moment is Ready to 
Deliver a Crushing Blow at the Finnish Provokers of War 11 ;4 
"With an All-Destroying Blow We will Eliminate the Provoking 
Finnish Military. 115 The headlines illustrate quite vividly 
the steps by which the Russian people were led to accept the 
necessity of a war to destroy a nation which might serve as 
a base :for an attack on the ttbeloved fatherland. 11 
Actually Soviet pressure on Finland was closely 
patterned on the technique so successfully developed by the 
1"Golos Trudyaschihsya Sovetskovo L1 vova11 (The Voice 
of the Workers' Soviet of L'vov),~' 28 November 1939, 
P• 2. 
2
27 November 1939, P• 2. 
328 November 1939, P• 2. 
429 November 1939, P• 2 .. 
.530 November 1939, P• 1. 
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1 Nazis. This was certainly true for the campaign which 
ended on 30 November. It demonstrated the classic example 
of modern political-military aggression: the initial 
"reasonable" demands for bases and border rectifications, 
the doubtful border incidents, the whipping up of war fever 
among the people through the press and radio, the proclama-
tion of the aggressive intent of the potential victim, all 
rising to a well-timed crescendo on the day of the surprise 
attack. Indeed, the Russian leaders could well have 
congratulated themselves on a very careful campaign during 
which they had made very few mistakes. To be sure, there was 
little hope that this campaign would do much to convince the 
other nations of the world, but with the nonaggression pact 
with Germany the Russians could make their moves with the 
safe knowledge that no western power would be able to 
interfere before the Red steam roller crushed Finnish 
resistance. 
In retrospect, the major mistake of this well-organized 
press effort was the picture it presented to the Russian 
soldiers and civilians of conditions within Finland. 
According to Soviet sources, the Finnish people were divided 
along class lines. The leaders were "tools of the black 
reaction" who hated and feared the workers and jumped to the 
bidding of domestic and foreign capitalists. The laboring 
1"Shape of Things to Come," loc. cit. 
masses, suppressed by police terror and depressed by their 
hard living conditions, were on the threshold of revolt. 
Under these conditions the Finnish proletariat could be 
expected to join the Red Army if it should ever invade 
Finland. 
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The Finnish Army itself was divided by these same 
class differences. The common soldier, who came principally 
from the wo~king classes, would probably hasten to desert 
his unit and come over to the side of "triumphant socialism." 
Therefore, it seemed inevitable that the "invincible forces" 
of the state of socialism would sweep over the "rotten 
structure" of the Finnish Army and drive the bourgeoisie 
rulers out of Helsinki. After such a build-up the average 
Russian civilian or soldier could have little doubt that 
"the Russian-Finnish conflict would be merely a 'local' war, 
and that within three days, or at most a week, Finland would 
be brought to her knees. 111 
On this note of anticipated success the Russian press 
concluded its campaign to bestir the Soviet people and prepare 
them for a war with Finland. They had presented a good 
excuse for securing control of Finland (to protect Leningrad) 
and had predicted that any war, given the disparity in 
population and strength, would be very short. Unfortunately, 
1navid J. Dallin, Soviet Russta's Foreign Policy. 
1E39-19~0 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1942), pp. 
1 1-142. 
they neglected to convince the Finns of these facts. 'I'hat 
omlssion would create great difficulties later on. 
MAP II 
THE KARELIAN ISTHMUS AND THE FINNISH DEFENSES 
(29 November 1939) 
53 
This map consists of an outline of the Finnish defen-
sives dispositions on the Karelian Isthmus as of November 
1939. There are three areas of especial importance on this 
diagram. The first is the Neutral Zone established by the 
Treaty of Dorpat of 1922 from Muurila to Mainila. Within 
this zone the Finns agreed to dismantle all coastal artillery 
positions, especially at Ino and Terioki, and not to maintain 
major military units nor fixed land defenses in the area. 
The whole area was open to free inspection by the mixed 
border commission established by the Russo-Finnish Treaty 
of Neutrality of 1932 which was still in effect in 1939. 
The second point of importance concerned the Main 
Ship Channel from Leningrad to the mouth of the Gulf of 
Finland. Despite the dismantling of the coastal artillery 
positions at Ino and Terioki, this waterway through the 
Gulf of Finland could still be threatened by Finnish coast 
artillery positions at Muurila, Koivisto Island and other 
areas as shown. Since this channel marks the region of the 
first open water of the spring, the importance controlling 
this channel to defend Kronstadt and Leningrad becomes 
apparent. 
The third point refers to the location of the Manner-
heim Line on the Karelian Isthmus. It should be noted, first 
of all, that only the inland lakes and rivers which were 
important in the defense were reproduced on this diagram. 
With this in mind it can be observed that the Mannerheim Line 
was built so that it was almost completely covered by rela-
tively large bodies of water. Even when frozen over, these 
areas would provide wide fields of fire for weapons concealed 
in permanent fortifications behind them. The one exception 
to this rule was the western areas, particularly around 
Hoitinen (Summa) where only small creeks and bogs lay in 
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THE OPPOSING FORCES 
(29 November 1939) 
As the Russian and Finnish armed forces girded 
themselves for battle during the wet, snowy night of 29 
November 19391 it would be well to review what is known 
about the armies on either side in order to have a better 
understanding of the events of the first month of the war. 
The total number of men engaged on both sides is difficult 
to determine with complete accuracy . The Communist estimate 
or two hundred thousand Red Army troops which are supposed 
to have invaded Finland at 0800 on the morning of 30 November 
1939 should be accepted with reservation since it was pub-
lished well after the Russian failure to overrun southern 
Finland had become painrully evident . 2 On the other hand, 
Prime Minister Ruti's boast that the Finns could put three 
hundred thousand volunteers on the line3 was almost certainly 
an overstatement. According to most estimates, the number 
1v. Galahov , "Tridtzatoye Noyabrya" (The Thirtieth of 
November), Boi v Finlyandii (Moscow: Military Publishers, 
1941), p. 35. 
211War on Land," Army , Navy Journal (30 December 1939), 
p. 388. 
3Elliston, p . 142 . 
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of Soviet divisions which took part in the first phase of 
the conflict in Finland, amounted to something like twenty-
six infantry divisions and four tank brigades. 1 Since the 
Soviet infantry division had reorganized in 1937 to include 
2 approximately 18,378 men at full strength, the number of 
Russian troops engaged in the initial attack on Finland 
could have been something like 500,000. Of course this 
would not just be front-line strength but would also include 
the supporting arms and the service troops so necessary to 
maintain an army in the deep woods of eastern Finland. 
The difficulty of determining how many Finns were 
prepared to oppose Soviet aggression derives from the lack 
of uniformity in enumerating the volunteer replacement 
organizations which made up the largest part of their defense 
forces. 3 The Finnish regular army consisted only of eight 
full infantry divisions and one cavalry division, all of 
approximately 14,000 men each.4 But there were obviously 
more armed defenders, even on the Karelian Isthmus, than 
1Johannes Wilhelm Ohquist, Das Kampfende Finnland 
(Stuttgart: Alemanner Verlag, Albert Janus, 1944), p. 23. 
2A. N. Ivanov, Kurtz Zusammenstellun~ Ueber die 
Russische Armee (Berlin: R. Eisenschmidt,937), pp . 55-56. 
3Frederick Wilhelm Borgman, Der Ueberfall der 
Sow·etunion Auf Finnland 19 9-19 0 (Berlin: Gerhart 
Stalling, 19 Hereafter cited as Borgman,~ 
Ueberfall. 
4Michael Berchin and Eliahu Ben-Horin, The Red Armz 
(New York: W.W. Norton, 1942), p. 61. 
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could be accounted for in the estimated 60,000 men of the 
regular forces. Some competent observers have even judged 
the readily available Finnish reserves as high as 400,000 
men, 1 while some Soviet sources placed the number at 
600,000. 2 The guess of somewhere close to 250,000 Finns 
under arms in November 1939 is probably as close to an 
accurate number as is presently available.3 
The infantry armament on both sides was quite similiar. 
The reason for this is simple. In 1922 Finland and the Soviet 
Union signed an agreement which provided that Russia would 
supply small arms and ammunition to the new Republic of 
Finland in return for a Finnish guarantee that they would 
not seek arms purchases abroad.4 The reason for such an 
agreement seems to have been the fact that the Finns already 
possessed a large number of captured Russian weapons from 
their Civil War and the Soviet Government could thus prevent 
the rapid arming of Finland by any interested foreign power. 
This situation had its advantage during the Winter War for 
1T. Bentley Mott, "Service News and Gossip, 11 Army, 
Navy Journal (30 December 1939), p. 382 and Spravochnik Po 
Voorus·enniem Silem Belo-Finl andii (A List of the Armed 
Forces of ite-Finland Moscow: State Publications, RKKA, 
1940), pp. 31-34. 
2Ya. Il 1 inskii, Finlyandiya (Finland) (Moscow: 
Government Social-Economic Institute, 1940), p. 84. 
311 war on Land," Army, Navy Journal (2 December 1939), 
p. 328. 
4w. A. B. Smith and Joseph E. Smith, The Book of 
Rifles (Harrisburg, Pa.: Stackpole, 1945), pp. 171-172. 
the Finns were able to make immediate use of all captured 
Russi an weapons and ammunition. 1 
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Despite the small arms agreement, the Finnish army 
had some major deficiencies . While the Soviets had supplied 
rifles, machine guns and even some mortars along with the 
respective ammunition, such essential arms as antitank and 
antiaircraft guns plus field artillery had to come from 
other sources. For this reason the Finns were short of these 
items at the beginning of the conflict . 2 Even the Russian 
artillerymen noticed this deficiency and remarked upon the 
fact that the Finns were still utilizing such obsolete 
cannons as the 1887 Model 107-mm. Howitzer in their defense 
of the Karelian Isthmus.3 
On the other hand, there was considerable evidence 
that the Finnish Government had made some large arms purchases 
abroad. Such excellent weapons as Bofors antiaircraft guns 
from Sweden, World War I field artillery from Germany and 
various small arms from Scandinavian sources were part of 
the picture.4 One of the most serious deficiencies in 
Finnish small arms was the lack of a good automatic rifle, 
1Henry Vallotton, Finnland 1940; Was Ich Sah und 
Hoerte (Zurich: Verkehrsverlag, 1940}, p. 44. 
2William L. Shirer, The Challenge of Scandinavia 
(Boston: Little, Brown, 1955), pp. 330-331. 
3Bakaev, "Artilleriya Dal'nevo Deistviya" (Artillery 
in Indirect Action), Boi v Finlyandii (Moscow: Military 
Publishers, 1941), pp. 313-314. 
4.smith and Smith, pp. 173-174. 
apparently because of a shortage of this type of weapon in 
the Soviet arsenal during the nineteen twenties. When the 
Russians finally developed the Degyatov 1931 it was appar-
ently not covered by the 1922 agreement with the Finns. 
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This was partially overcome by the importation of the Swedish 
Automati c Rifle L-c1 and by the design and manufacture of the 
11 Suomi Submachine Gun. 112 Both these weapons were rugged and 
dependable but the "L-C" took the Swedish 7.62-mm. cartridge 
while the Submachine Gun used the 9-mm. 11 parabellum" pistol 
round , neither of which could be supplied from Russian 
sources. The Suomi Submachine Gun was extremely simple in 
design and operation and by arming their fast-moving ski 
troops with this rapid firing arm, the Finns combined speed 
wi th a heavy weight of close-range firepower to harass the 
enemy . The Soviets, it must be added, paid the Finns the 
compliment of stealing this design which is familiar to 
everyone as the "Russian Burp-Gun. 113 
The Red infantry was equipped with the basic small 
arms so familiar to students of World War II and the Korean 
conflict . The basic infantry weapon was still the Moisin 
7.62-rnm . Rifle 1891 and the shorter 1911 carbine version.4 
1Spravochnik Po Voorusjenniem Silarn Belo-Finlyandii, 
p . 76. 
2
Walter Harold Black Smith, Basic Manual of Military 
Small Arms (Harrisburg, Pa.: Military Service Publishing, 
1944), pp. 84-85. 
3rbid . -
With the 29 inches of barrel and a J.4-inch "toothpick" 
bayonet one can understand the prediliction of the Soviet 
commanders for the bayonet charge. 
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The basic rifle and machine gun bullet in Soviet 
service was the 7.62-mm. Moisin, copper-jacketed round which 
had a rimmed cartridge case. The use of rimmed rather than 
rimless rounds imposed some limitations on Soviet small arms. 
For instance, it is not possible to use a straight magazine 
for automatic weapons since the closely-packed shells might 
overlap and cause a misfire. As a result, the magazine of 
the Soviet automatic rifle, the Degyatov 1931, is a large, 
thin disk mounted on top of the weapon and thus presents a 
problem to carry around on the battlefield. 1 However, the 
simplicity of manufacture (tolerances on rimmed cartridge 
cases can be much lower than on rimless) and the resistance 
to damage and corrosion would recommend this type of round 
to the Russians. 
The basic heavy machine gun for both the Finns and 
the Soviets was the Russian Maxim Machine Gun 1906, a 
relatively heavy but reliable weapon which can be mounted 
on a tripod, wheels or skis. 2 This gun was utilized exten-
sively by both sides and it apparently was regarded as the 
basic infantry defense weapon. While there were larger 
12.7-mm. Vickers Machine Guns in the Finnish armament, these 
1~., pp. 251-252. 
2~., p. 243. 
seem to have been used mainly as antiaircraft weapons. 
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1 
Soviet artillery consisted of many types of guns 
ranging from the small, old-fashioned 76-mm. Howitzer, 
2 assigned to infantry regiments as a defensive piece, up 
through the 107-mm. regimental Howitzer to the 152-mm. 
divisional Howitzers. Larger artillery pieces were organized 
as separate battalions to be utilized as the Corps or 
Divisional Commanders directed. The Soviet record confirmed 
that many types of artillery were used for special missions 
during the Winter War. Especiallf strange, considering the 
nature of the topography, was the presence of such flat-
trajectory artillery pieces as the 122-mm. M-1931/37 (A-19) 
F'ield Gun3 which might have been of some utility on the 
broad open plains of southern and central Russia but were 
somewhat out of place in the heavy forests of Finland. 4 
1
spravochnik Po Voorusjenniem Belo-Finlyandii, p. 77. 
2
Tolmachev, "Vitelnost, Hladno.kroviye, Musjestvo" 
(Vigilence, Calmness, Valour), Boi v Finlyandii (Moscow: 
Military Publishers, 1941), p. 157. 
3The heavy weight of 15,692 pounds and the long barrel 
of 216 inches must have made this artillery piece very cum-
bersome in the thick brush and forests of Finland. Also its 
long range of some 22,747 yards and high muzzle velocity of 
2,625 feet per second did not allow its easy use in indirect 
fire so necessary in areas covered by dense woods. Identifica-
tion Handbook: Soviet Military Weapons and Equipment (Head-
quarters U.S. Army, Europe: Office of Chief of Staff, G-2 
Intelligence Division, 1954), pp. 77-78. Hereafter cited as 
Identification Handbook. 
¾lademar Axel Firsoff, Ski Tracks on the Battlefield 
(New York: A. s. Barnes, 1943), p. 125. 
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In mortars the Finns made use of the "stoksa" 76-mrn. 
and "tampella" 81-rnm. types for their infantry support along 
with whatever Russian material their armories contained. 1 
Despite this lack of uniformity, the Russian stories about 
the war leave no doubt that Finnish mortar fire was one of 
the principal problems faced by Soviet infantrymen and 
gunners . 2 The Red Army, on the other hand, possessed a 
complete line of efficient mortars from the small 52-mrn. 
company trench mortar, through the 82-rnm. battalion mortar 
up to the large 120-rnm. regimental support mortars. The 
Russi an tacticians apparently utilized mass mortar fire for 
everything from the support of ground attacks3 to clearing 
a line of retreat for an infantry patrol cut off by enemy 
fire.4 Evidently the Red Army had managed to bring the use 
of the trench mortar to a high degree of development. 
The Soviet armored forces which, according to one 
authority, consisted of some 5,375 tanks5 was organized into 
P. 77 
1SE_ravochnik Po Voorus.i enniem Silarri Belo-Finlyandii ' . 
2P . Lyashenko, "Domik na Tom Beregu" (The Little 
House on the Opposite Bank), Boi v Finlyandii (Moscow: 
Military Publishers , 1941), p. 167. 
3v. Bolousov, "Minomet--Groznoye Orusjiye 11 (The Mortar--
A Vicious Weapon), Boi v Finlyandii (Moscow: Military Pub-
lishers , 1941), pp. 173-176. 
4N. Blohin "Minomet Pomogli Razvedke" (The Mortar 
Helped the Scouts), Boi v Finlyandii (Moscow: Military Pub-
lishers , 1941), pp. 235-236. 
511 rnternational Military Survey: Russia; According 
to Poli sh Sources Quoted in the Taruc Journal," The Infantrx 
Journal (November-December, 1939), p. 595. 
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separate tank battalions attached or assigned to infantry 
divisions or corps commands, and separate armored brigades 
which were attached to army comrnands. 1 While there was a 
large number of tank models in Russian service, Soviet 
tracked armored vehicles tended to fall into two main types 
at this time. The light (10-11.5 ton) three-man tanks of 
the BT-3 and BT-5 designations, armed with a 37-mm . or 45-mm. 
gun seem to have made up the bulk of the armored detachments 
in the earlier stages of the attack. 2 Since such tanks seem 
to have been peculiarly vulnerable to Finnish antitank 
measures,3 before the later attacks on the Mannerheim Line 
there was a replacement of the lighter vehicles with the 
heavier T-28 medium tank of 31-33 tons, armed with a 76.2-mm. 
cannon and carrying a six-man crew. It was this tank which 
helped to smash the Summa defenses, the central defense 
position of the western sector of the Mannerheim Line, in 
February 1940.4 
1Ritter von Xylander, "Zurn Kriege der Sowjetunion 
gegen Finnland: Darstellung des Verlaufes des Feldzuges," 
Deutsche Wehr (10 May 1940), p. 274. 
2Nikolai Gregor'evich Andrononikov and W. D. 
Mostovenko, Die Roten Panzer (Munich: J.P. Lehmanns, 1963), 
pp. 96-98. 
3Edgar O'Ballance, The Red Arm: A Short Histor 
(New York: Praeger, 1964), p. 1 O; and K. Simonyan, Vsegda 
Pomogat Tovarishcham11 (Always Help Comrades), Boi v Finlyandii 
(Moscow: Military Publishers, 1941), pp. 96-98. 
4Andrononikov and Mostovenko, pp. 225-226. 
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Despite the variety in type and the large number of 
vehicles, there is a distinct impression from Soviet records 
that the Red Army, while recognizing the value of armor, 
never saw it--at least at this time--as the all-conquering 
offensive weapon that it became for the German Wehrmacht. 
One of the most important matters for consideration 
on the morning of 30 November 1939 was the nature and extent 
of the Finnish fortifications. Communist sources naturally 
make a great deal of the "Kirk-Mannerheim Line," the extreme 
strength of the forts and bunkers, and their large numbers. 
Indeed, Soviet writers have described the Finnish fortifica-
tions as being" ••• not at all inferior to that of the 
Maginot or Siegfried in Europe." 1 On the other hand, the 
Finns tended to downgrade both the strength and the number 
of their positions in the Line. Marshall Mannerheim, for 
instance, declared: 
Here, in a defense line about 88 miles long, 
were 66 concrete 'nests,' of which 44 built in the 
beginning of the twenties were out of date and also 
faultily constructed and placed . The remainder 
were modern but not strong enough to stand heavy 
gunfire . The recently constructed barbed-wire 
entanglements and tank-traps were of little value. 
Time had not permitted the building out of the 
position in depth and its foremost line generally 
merged with the principal defenses. 2 
On the other hand, the Soviets, mostly through their 
newspaper articles and books by pro-Communist writers, 
1"Trechnedel 1nie Itog Boevieh Deistvii v Finlyandii" 
(The Three-Week Summary of Battle Activity in Finland), 
Izvestiya, 23 December 1939, p. 1. 
2Mannerheim, p. 325. 
described the Mannerheim Line as the "third strongest 
military fortification in the world." 1 In more detail 
another author described these defenses and pointed out: 
There were three zones in this system. The 
forward zone of a depth varying from three to eight 
miles and consisting of concrete blockhouses and 
pillboxes, equipped with machine guns, antitank 
guns and field artillery, and guarded by barbed 
wire, antitank traps and land mines. 
The second zone, the main line of defense, was 
some 70 miles in length, and ran from its right on 
the coast fortress of Koivisto , across Lake Muolaa, 
then along the Vuoksi waterway and finishing with its 
left at the fortress of Taipale at the mouth of that 
river on Lake Ladoga. It was seven miles in depth 
except in the lake districts, where it narrowed to 
two miles. The fortifications of this sector were 
two-stories in depth , embedded in the ground and 
constructed of reinforced concrete and armored plate. 
Armed with heavy artillery, each f~rt was capable of 
independent defensive action ••• 
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This same author emphatically announced that the whole 
line "consisted of 350 two-story reinforced concrete under-
ground forts and 2,257 granite emplacements. 11 3 
Another pro-Soviet writer commented about the Finnish 
fortifications on the Karelian Isthmus as follows: 
This entire system of fortification was built 
on the Siegfried rather than the Maginot principle, 
i.e., as a deep belt of independent forts, designed 
to cushion the thrusts of the invader, and on the 
other hand, to give its garrisoning troops aid and 
1Israel Amter, The Truth about Finland (New York: New 
York State Committee, Communist Party, 1939), pp. 2-3. 
2Arthur Sanderson Hooper, Through Soviet Russia and 
the Finnish Campaign, 1940 (London: Privately Printed, 
1944), p. 98. 
3Arthur Sanderson Hooper, The Soviet Fighting Forces 
(London: Frederick Muller, 1941), p. 29. 
deep maneuvering space. It was a typical defensive-
offensive system as contrasted with the purely · 
defensive French system. It was intended not for 
defense only, but to serve as a 'retrenchment camp' 
for the concentration of an offensive force.l 
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It is interesting to note that later Soviet recollections 
modified these earlier descriptions. It is true that the 
Russians claimed to have captured 356 iron-concrete forts and 
2,425 wood-earth fire points2 but this is considerably 
lessened by the careful description of these defenses. The 
iron-concrete positions, for instance, were apparently con-
structed during two distinct periods: 1929-1937 and 1938-
1939. As Major General of the Engineers, A. Hrenov, further 
pointed out: 
Forts of the first period ordinarily were small, 
one-story structures with one to three machine gun 
posts without room for a garrison and almost without 
any interior divisions. Afterwards, many of these 
forts were modernized with layers of concrete and/or 
concrete and stone slabs and the installation of 
armored plates in the embrasures. 
The forts of the second period, called 'millions' 
by the Finns, (because they cost so much) were large 
permanent structures with four to six embrasures from 
which one to ten guns could fire, especially to the 
flanks. Such forts had full interior defenses and 
usually contained an iron-concrete room for forty to 
one hundred men--not only for the garrison of the 
fort but for the supporting troops as well ••• • 
The weak side of the Finnish fortifications were: 
poor quality of concrete in the buildings of the first 
period, overuse of concrete on flexible armor, the 
absence in the buildings of the first period of hard 
armor . 
1sergei Nicholas Kournakoff, Russia's Fighting Forces 
(New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1943), p. 126. 
2A. Hrenov, "Liniya Mannergeima" (The Mannerheim Line), 
Boi v Finlyandii (Moscow: Military Publishers, 1941), p. 15 . 
The strong qualities of these forts were the 
large number of embrasures which covered the frontal 
and immediate approaches and all the flanking 
approaches to the nearby iron-concrete forts and 
the tactical camouflage which permitted the forti-
fications to blend in with the locality and also 
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the saturation of the 'intervals' with small forts 
The strength of the basic defense area on the 
Karelian Isthmus can be demonstrated by the following 
figures: 194 iron-concrete forts and 805 wood-earth 
fire points (were) taken by the red Army in the 
battles for the Mannerheim Line . 
Thus the earlier claims of 350 two-story forts was 
modified. The number of iron-concrete positions totaled by 
the Kremlin's author at 356 rather than the Finnish figure 
of 200 may not have been as far off as might be expected. 
The Finns may have been referring to those forts taken by 
the Russians and not the whole belt of defenses on the 
Karelian Isthmus. Thus the Russian figure of 194 iron-
concrete positions taken can be said to be roughly equal 
with Mannerheim's estimate of 200 . Then, too, the Soviet 
total evidently included not only the so-called "Mannerheim 
Line" proper, but the Viborg defenses and the island 
artillery positions as well. 
Likewise it is apparent from General Hrenov's 
description quoted above that the iron-concrete forts 
possessed wide differences of structure and armament. It 
is especially noteworthy that he made no mention of artillery 
pieces as part of the weapons found in these iron-concrete 
positions although there may well have been some "gun 
1Ibid., pp. 10-11. 
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positionS" in the larger fortifications. The Russian record 
thus tends to confirm the Finnish contention that the 
11 iYiannerheim Line, 
11 
while undoubtedly the II third strongest 
fortified line in the world," (there was no other at that 
time) was not nearly as strong as the Siegfried or Maginot 
lines in western Europe . 
The attempts of Soviet apologists to present the 
Mannerheim Line as the key barrier to the Red Army's rapid 
penetration of southern and eastern Finland breaks down when 
one considers the rest of the Russo-Finnish border. Despite 
some vague attempts to construct a "wilderness line" from 
Sortavala through Joensinu and Nurmes to Ulea1 there is no 
reference in either Finnish or Soviet records about any 
regular system of defensive positions north of Lake Ladoga. 
The only exception to this was the use of the Finnish coastal 
artillery positions on Lake Ladoga islands to cover the coast 
road to Sortavala . The Finns obviously relied upon the 
paucity of roads and the trackless forests to form a barrier 
to invasion in the region north of Karelia. 
Thus the Finns with perhaps six divisions of regulars 
backed with something like twice their number of volunteers 
faced an initial Russian attack of at least twenty-six 
infantry divisions, four tank brigades and other supporting 
1Nikolai Fedorovich Kuz'min, Na Strasje Mirnovo 
Truda 1921-19 0 (Engaged in Peaceful W?r~, 1921-1940) 
oscow: ii ary Publication of the Ministry of Defense 
of the Union of SSR, 1959), p. 235. 
units. Since six or seven of the Soviet divisions were 
occupied in penetrating the eastern frontier, this left 
approximately nineteen divisions on the Karelian Isthmus 
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to attack the Mannerheim Line . 1 Even with the advantage of 
fortified lines, this was a substantial force to be contained 
by the armies of Finland . 
The Soviet superiority at sea and in the air was 
accepted from the start . However, the climatic condi tions 
to be expected in December over the Gulf of Finland could 
be expected to nullify a good part of this advantage until 
the colder winter temperatures could clear the skies .
2 
Thus the Soviet armies were dependent upon either a quick 
breakthrough on the Karelian Isthmus or a political upheaval 
within Finland, and perhaps both . From the Kremlin ' s view 
a long fight would be intolerable as this might give their 
capitalistic enemies in the west time to gather their forces 
and counterattack . For this reason there seems little doubt 
but that the Soviet troops, seamen and airmen poised on the 
Finnish borders, in their ships, and alongside their planes 
expected a swift attack, possibly aided by an internal 
revolt, to tumble the Helsinki "robbers , " and so complete 
the triumph of Soviet arms within a relatively short time. 
111 War on Land," Army, Navy Journal (9 March 1940), 
p. 639. 
2Frederick Wilhelm Borgman, "Der Sowjetische Luftkrieg 
Gegen Finnland, Part II," Deutsche Wehr (5 July 1940) , p . 394. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE FIRST FOUR DAYS AND THE EARLY 
SUCCESS OF THE RUSSIAN ATTACK 
(1 December 1939--4 December 1939) 
The Red Army advance which began without any formal 
declaration of war at 8:00 A.M. on 30 November 1939 moved 
swiftly forward and overcame the thin defenses of the Finnish 
border guards. Caught somewhat by surprise, 1 the Finnish 
Army could do little in the face of the sudden onslaught 
but retreat to less exposed defensive positions. 
The Red Army crossed the borders of Finland in five 
general areas. On the Arctic coast the 52nd Soviet Division 
of the 14th Army from Murmansk landed in the Metovski Fjord 
behind the Fischer Peninsula, marched overland to the south, 
crossed the border and outflanked the reinforced company of 
Finns in Petsamo, thus gaining the only warm-water port in 
Finland. 2 With reinforcements from the 104th Soviet Division, 
the Red Army quickly began the long advance down the Winter 
Road towards Kemi on the Swedish border. In a movement which 
Der Wtnterfeldzu: Krie in 
0 (Berlin: Alfred Metzner, 1942), 
2Borgman, Der Ueberfall, p. 91. 
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was apparently designed to provide flank support for the 
northern armies, the 122nd Soviet Division left Kandalaksha 
on the Murmansk Railroad, crossed the border and attacked 
the Finnish road system in the region of Salla. 
From Ukhta in the central sector the 163rd Soviet 
Division of the 9th Army began the long march through the 
wilderness aimed at the Finnish road-junction of Suomussalmi, 
the key to the easy route to the Finnish port of Oulu. A 
little later (1 December 1939) the 54th Soviet Division began 
an equally long move through the dense forests towards the 
railroad town of Nurmes on the Sortavala-Oulu line, with a 
secondary move towards Kuhmo to support the advance on 
Suomussalmi . 
In Finnish Karella, northeast of Lake Ladoga, the 
Russian 8th Army from its headquarters in Petrozavodsk began 
a two-pronged drive upon the Finnish defenses protecting the 
lumber town of Sortavala. To the north the 139th and 75th 
Soviet Divisions attacked along the Suojarvi-Tolvajarvi axis 
while at the same time the 18th Soviet Division moved along 
the road through Uomaa towards Pit.karanta and the 168th 
Soviet Division drove straight up the lake-shore road on 
the same area, towards Kitela. 
On the Karelian Isthmus the Russian 7th Army, the 
largest of the four attacking forces, began its movement 
towards the Mannerheim Line . This so-called "Maginot Line 
of the North 11 ran from the fortress town of Taipale on Lake 
Ladoga behind the Suranto-Vuoski Water System to the town of 
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Vuoksela. There it made a wide angle and crossed the Vuoksi 
System, ran along the a.xis of lakes Ayrapaa.rjarvi-Muolaanja.rvi, 
through the little town of Summa, on past the northern end 
of Lake Kuolemajarvi to the fortified pos1.tions a.round the 
port town of Koivisto. These defenses were protected from 
naval attack by the fortress island of Koivisto, just southwest 
of the town of the same name. The 11 Summa Lines," as this 
western portion of the Mannerheim Line became known, was 
reinforced by a belt of defensive works around the port city 
of Viipuri. While much of this area is open ground, it still 
was relatively easy to defend a.s long as the numerous rivers 
and swamps remained open. 
The units of the 7th Red Army moved out in two 
directions. The eastern units, the 150th. and 49th Soviet 
Divisions, pushed through a.nd came up against the Taipale 
and the Vuoksi Water System defenses by the )rd of December.
1 
The western units, the 123rd, 70th, 24th, 43rd, 90th and 142nd 
Soviet Divisions occupied the area of Pa.suri to Koivisto in 
the Principal attack on Viipuri. Since the heavily outnumbered 
Finns had immediately retreated back into their prepared 
positions, the Red Army during their first few days advanced 
against relatively light opposition. 
During this period the various Red Armies moved quite 
well and, considering the conditions of weather and roads, 
make good initial progress. At the same time, units of the 
1Ibid., p. 99. 
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Russian Baltic Fleet without opposition occupied the principal 
islands in the Gulf of Finland. On the Karelian Isthmus the 
major towns of Terioki, Muolla, Muurila and Ranti were quickly 
t aken with little or no fighting. Northeast of Lake Ladoga 
the towns of Salmi, Pitkaranta and Suojarvi also fell into 
the hands of the "liberators," as the Soviets called them-
selves. Equally impressive were the advances of the various 
units of the Russian 9th Army into central Finland with the 
rapid seizure of Salla, Suomussalmi and Kuhmo thus establishing 
positions from which it might eventually be able to drive 
completely across Finland. The 14th Army had, as well, 
accomplished its initial objective of seizing the ice-free 
por t of Petsamo and closing Finland off from any help it 
migh t have received from that quarter. On the whole, during 
this early period of the war, the Kremlin rulers could well 
have been satisfied with the success of their military 
campaign against the Finns. 
On the diplomatic front the Soviet leaders also appeared 
t o have scored impressive victories. On the first day of the 
war a group of old Finnish Communists, under their leader 
l t" i Otto Kuusinen, set up a provisional "Peoples' Governmen n 
. . 
the newly-taken gulf ... s ide resort town of Terio.ki. This new 
1otto Vilgelmovich Kuusinen (1881- ) From 1905 Kuusinen 
was a leader in the Finnish Social Democratic Party until 1918 
when he became the founder and leader of the Finnish Communist 
Party. He served as Secretary of the Executive Committee of 
the Communist International from 1921 to 1939. Exiled from 
Finland in 1930, he remained in Moscow and Leningrad until 
the beginning of the Winter War. 
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organization immediately proclaimed itself the legitimate 
political organ of the Finnish proletariat and called on the 
Finnish people to join their "Democratic Republic" in order 
to overthrow the "Helsinki robbers." The Soviet Government 
quickly recognized this new regime and concluded a treaty of 
peace and mutual aid with the "Peoples' Government." This 
treaty settled all the outstanding differences between Finland 
and the USSR on the basis of the terms proposed by the 
Russians during the November talks. As if to complement the 
Soviet move, the legitimate Finnish Government of Kayander-
Ekko in Helsinki fell and was replaced by the Ryti-Tanner 
cabinet. 1 This information was presented to the S.oviet people 
as evidence of the weakness of the bourgeoisie rulers of 
"White-Finland ." 
The only hitch which arose in the Kremlin's plans 
during this period was the successful effort of the Rutt-
Tanner Government to present their case before the League of 
Nations. This diplomatic setback, however, did not seem so 
important at the time for it appeared that the war was rapidly 
moving towards a conclusion and there was no assurance that 
the League would take any action.2 In such a case the Terioki 
"Peoples ' Government 11 would soon come to power in Helsinki. 
1The Finnish Government from 2 December 1939 to 27 March 
1940 was headed by Risto Ryti as Prime Minister , and Viano 
Tanner as Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
2Peggy M. Mulvihill, "The United States and the Russo-
Finnish War" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of 
Chicago, 1964), p. 210. 
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In spite of the growing sympathy for Finland in the west, the 
Rus sian leaders, sure of a swift victory, could safely i gnore 
bo t h a League of Nations censure and the frantic efforts of 
the F inns to re-establish diplomatic relations with the Soviet 
Union. Indeed, the situation in early December reflected the 
speedy success of Soviet plans. 
The establishment of the "Peoples' Government of 
F i nland" and the successful advances of the Red Army very 
mu ch dominated the news releases of this early period. Front 
page stories during the first four days either reported the 
declarations of the treaties with this "Peoples' Government" 
or printed long articles which applauded the efforts of the 
"Democratic Republic" to lead the Finnish working class out 
of the camp of 11 Black reaction." Other articles, especially 
those from foreign Communist and leftwing sources, supported 
the Soviet position and generally approved the Russian attack 
upon Finland. There were also many "editorials" which, as 
in previous periods, argued that the Finnish people had been 
very much suppressed by the "bad bourgeoisie rulers" and 
consequently were impatiently waiting to be "liberated" from 
t heir "capitalistic oppressors." Finally a major part of the 
news paper space was taken up with "eyewitness accounts" of 
the fighting in Finland by the correspondents of various 
Russian newspapers who had accompanied the Soviet forces on 
their invasion. Along with the ubiquitous reports of 
s old iers' and workers' meetings so common in the Communist 
press these were the principal types of news stories which 
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appeared during this early period of intense newspaper coverage 
concerning the fight against the "Finnish Whiteguards." 
The Russian press coverage of 1 December was severely 
restricted because that day (Friday) is a holiday for most 
~oviet newspapers. Only Pravda and Izvestiya were published. 
However, on the front pages of both of these appeared a stark 
communique from the Headquarters of the Leningrad Military 
District which officially reported the beginnings of hostil-
ities between the USSR and Finland. This announcement began 
by insisting that there had been further attacks by Finnish 
forces on Soviet frontier posts during the night of 29 November. 
As a result of these hostile demonstrations, the Red Army had 
crossed the Finnish borders "on the Karelian Isthmus and in 
several other areas" at 8:00 A.M. of 30 November 1939.
1 
After 
giving a detailed list of the towns and villages captured in 
the advance of Russian forces, the "operations report" 
announced that several scores of prisoners had been captured 
and aerial attacks had been launched against Viipuri and 
Helsinki. With this short communique the Winter War made its 
official appearance in the Russian press. 
The ttFinnish provocations" were, of course, merely an 
effort to substantiate the Soviet excuse that their troops 
were just "repelling a Finnish attack on the sacred mother-
land." On the other hand, the villages reported captured 
1"stolknoveniya Sovetskih Votsk s Fins.ktmt Vois.kyami" 
(The Encounter of Soviet and Finnish Troops), Izvestiya, 
p. 1. 
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seemed to have been quite accurate. The Red Army, tn this 
case, did not even claim the fall of Terioki ·on the western 
shore of the Karelian Isthmus although this area had been 
evacuated by the Finns as soon as the Russian 7th Army had 
crossed the border. This Soviet account of the events of 
29-30 November was a strange mixture of fact and fancy. The 
same was true of all Russian newspaper stories throughout the 
war. 
The "meetings reports" which appeared in the press on 
this day all supported the invasion of Finland as a necessity. 
A Russian worker explained the situation as follows: 
There comes an end to patience. The Finnish 
military has impertinently shot at our troops. It is 
necessary to teach these dogs a hard lesson so that 
others will not be encouraged to make an attempt on 
the city of Lenin. we will not be silent if anyone 
intercedes for these bandits. Behind the Red Army 
stands all the Soviet peoples. If necessary we, the 
old ones, will defend our nation. 1 
On the other hand, there was some surprise expressed in 
a number of these reports which evidently reflected the 
bewilderment of the Soviet people. One of these documents 
concerning the invasion follows: 
We have just received the news of the departure of 
units of the Red Army with joy and satisfaction. In 
confirmation of this during recent days I have been 
surprised by the conduct of the Finnish leaders. How 
could they have been drawn into this? ••• How ~ould 
they imagine that they could crush the Red Army? 
1 "Pr1shel Keneta Terpen1u" (Comes the End of Patience), 
Pravda, p. 1. 
211Finskiee Rabochiei i Krest'yane--Nashi Druz'ya" 
(The Finnish Workers and Peasants Are our Friends), Izvestiya, 
p. 1. 
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The only other article of interest on 1 December 
appeared in Pravda. On the second page of this day's issue 
a story appeared entitled, "An Announcement of the Central 
Committee of the Communist Party of Finland to the Working 
People of Finland." According to the Russian press this 
manifesto had been broadcast from the town of Terioki on 
JO November before the Red Army had occupied the area. 
1ndeed, this may have been one of the reasons why the 
II Q 
Perations Report" did not mention the fall of this town in 
its first communique. Soviet radio monitors, according to 
the news releases, had picked up this broadcast, translated 
it into Russian and passed it on to the newspapers. This 
devious channel may have accounted for the relatively obscure 
Position this proclamation occupied in the pages of Pravda 
on the first day of its publication. 
The announcement began with a review of recent Finnish 
hist0ry under the "oppressions" of "financial capital." 
Naturally the Central committee of the Finnish Communist 
Pa~ty came to the conclusion that the present Helsinki 
Government llcannot guard the national interests of Finland," 
a nd the reason was clear: The Helsinki Government merely 
ll i 
ncreased the power and wealth of the upper class while the 
families of the mobilized workers and small farmers were 
neglected in poverty. 111 
This dedicated group of Communists was quick to point 
1 F The Central Committee of the Communist Party of 
inland, Pravda, p. 1. 
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out that the question of turning Finland into a communist 
state could not be decided until all sections of the Finnish 
public could be consulted. Indeed, many comrades who hoped 
for an immediate change in Finland would have to wait. The 
Central Committee, following the policy of the Soviet Union, 
would never change their country's form of government unless 
they were called to do so by a "majority of the people."
1 
It was obvious that this assurance was included in order to 
allay the fears of small property owners in Finland who 
thought they might lose their land if the "Peoples' Government" 
should come to power. 
The above statement also contained a list of reforms 
to be enacted if and when the future "Democratic Republic of 
F inland" would be installed in Helsinki. Principally, these 
involved such items as the reduction of truces, rents and land 
payments for the working classes and the nationalization of 
all banks, businesses and factories, plus the redistribution 
of great estates among the "small and landless peasants" of 
the nation. The strange thing was that most of these reforms 
had already been enacted in Finland during the nineteen-
thirties.2 If the Russian people could believe this manifesto, 
they could only have concluded that the Finnish Government 
had been one of the most reactionary regimes in Europe. 
Probably the most important part of this "Declaration" 
' 
1 Ibid. 
2Walter C. Citrine, My Finnish Diary (New York: 
Books, 1940), p. 15. 
Penguin 
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in the minds of the Soviet civilians and soldiers, was the 
evaluation of the fighting potential of the Finnish nation as 
presented by these leaders of the "oppressed 11 working masses. 
The authors of this document assured their Russian readers 
that 11 ••• the government of the Finnish bourgeoisie does 
not have much support and the commander of the Finnish Army 
does not have much chance for success. 111 After all, everyone 
in Terioki was convinced that: 
••• the masses of Finland, with great enthusiasm 
will greet the victorious, invincible Red Army, .knowing 
that it comes into Finland not as a conqueror but as a 
friend, a liberator of our people. 2 
As evidence of the accuracy of this prediction, it was 
announced that "in certain parts of the country the people 
already have risen and proclaimed the creation of the 
Democratic Republic," while within the defending forces 
"units of the Finnish Army have already come over to the side 
of the new government "3 . . . 
Russian writers could say, therefore, that all the 
ear lier hopes of the Kremlin leaders for support of their 
actions among the Finnish population had been realized. The 
formation of a "Peoples' Government" attested to that, so ran 
the party line. The Finnish Communists obviously represented 
the feelings of the majority of working Finns. According to 
1The Central Committee of the Finnish Communist 




their "Declaration" this group readily admitted that the Red 
Army was the greatest army in the world, undivided by the 
abys s of class contradictions which always separated the 
1 
officers and men in the bourgeois armies of the west • With 
these factors on the side of the Soviet forces, there could 
be little doubt that the Red Army, supported by this new 
"p t f th eoples' Government," would sweep aside the remnan s O e 
"Whiteguard forces" and march triumphantly into Helsinki in 
a very short time. 
This idea of creating a "Peoples' Government" was a 
cardinal point of Russian strategy during the early part of 
the war. It was nothing new. The Soviet Government had set 
up similar puppet governments during their wars with Poland 
and their "liberation" of' outer J11Iongolia in 1920-1922. The 
liquidated Marshal Michael P. Tukhachevski2 had explained 
the principle behind such a move. He felt that such puppet 
regimes would facilitate the expected movement of the 
proletariat in an enemy nation into the ranks of the Red 
Army. He also pointed out that a military defeat of a 
capitalistic nation by a Communist Army would naturally 
hasten the inevitable revolution among the oppressed workers 
and thus bring closer the moment when Russia could deal with 
1rbtd. 
2
Michael Nikolayevich Tukhachevski (1893-1937) fought 
in the Civil Wars with considerable honor. He rose in the 
Red Army to be head of the General Staff but was charged with 
Trotskyism and conspiracy with foreign powers during the 
Stalin purges and executed in 1937. 
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new Communist-led regimes.l The acceptance of this principle 
by the Soviet leaders most probably accounted for the rapid 
emergence of the new Terioki regime. It would also account 
for the Russian attempt to make their "Peoples' Government" 
look like a spontaneous rising of the Finnish workers· against 
their reactionary leaders. 
The fact that this program ultimately was a failure 
can be laid to the difficulties that Stalin had in getting 
reliable information from his Finnish agents. His ambassador 
in Helsinki , Vladimir Derevianski, could not speak Finnish 
and the only other source of information was the exiled Finnish 
Communists, led by Otto Kuusinen, who had not been back to 
their homeland since 1934. This long absence would suggest, 
of course, that these leaders were probably totally unfamiliar 
with conditions in their nation and hardly in a position to 
evaluate correctly the feelings of even the "depressed working 
classes .'' All other news seems to have come from paid agents 
in Helsinki who naturally wished to paint as rosy a picture 
of Communist chances as possible. 2 
The immediate reasons for a puppet regime were many 
and varied. For one thing it would seem that the Soviet 
leaders wished to represent the situation in Finland as a 
1
Dimitri Fedotoff-White, The Growth of the Red Armx 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1944), p. 172. From 
M. P. Tukhachevs.ki, "Voina ka.k Problema Voorusjennoi Bor'bu" 
(War as a Problem of .Armed Battle), Great Soviet Encyclopedia 
XII (Moscow: 1928), p. 596. 
2Elliston, p. 196. 
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"typical" internal class war so that there would be no excuse 
for outside intervention. The Kremlin may have hoped, too, 
f or a real uprising on the part of the Finnish proletariat 
in favor of the "Peoples' Government." Lastly, Stalin may 
have been in need of a government in whose name he could 
"make chang es in the Finnish boundary which he could not 
publically accomplish by ukase from Moscow. 111 On the whole 
i t must be said that Russian leaders had good reasons for 
creating the Terio.ki puppet government. But, in the end, 
th is move probably hurt them much more than it helped. It 
al so demonstrated the rigid adherence to dogma which marred 
a goo d deal of the Kremlin's diplomatic efforts. 
The front pages of all Russian newspapers on 2 December 
were dominated by the "Declaration of the Finnish Communist 
Par ty" which had appeared the day before only in Pravda. 
Along with this "manifesto" appeared a very similar "Declara-
t i on" by the new provisional "Peoples' Government of 
F inland." This official statement of policy closely 
p aralleled the language of the party "manifesto" and called 
for the overthrow of the "Helsinki inciters of war" in even 
s tronger terms. It further assured the working people of 
F inland that the combined strength of the Red Army and the 
newly-formed "First Corps of the Peoples' Army" would swiftly 
se ttle these difficulties. The "First Corps of the Peoples' 
Army" would be the 11.kernal" for a future "Peoples' Army of 
1Dallin, pp. 135-136. 
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Finland 11 which would have the honor of raising the flag of 
the "Finnish Democratic Republic" over the presidential 
palace in Helsinkt . 1 
If there had been any doubt as to the objectives of 
this new 11 Peoples 1 Government, 11 Komsomolskaya Pravda cleared 
it up: 
••• its paramount problem is the overthrow of the 
government of the Finnish whiteguards, the destruction 
of its armed forces, the arrangement of peace and the 
guaranteeing of the independence and security of Finland 
through the establishment of solid, friendly relations 
with the Soviet Union.~ 
After a rather long list of promised reforms which, to 
no one's surprise, were almost word for word the same as 
those in the Central Committee's announcement of the previous 
day, the article concluded that the change in the Finnish 
bourgeoisie government from Kayander-Erkko to Rutt-Tanner 
was no improvement . As the leaders of the Terioki regime 
pointed out, the Rutt-Tanner cabinet "is as weakly supported 
by our people as was the government of Kayander" and 
therefore the only thing for the Finnish people to do was 
11 to drive the hangmen from Finland 
bankrupted governmental gangl"3 
• • • throw out the whole 
An article in~ on 2 December also delved deeply 
into the qualifications of the present "Whiteguard leaders." 
111Deklaratziya Narodnovo Pravitel'stva Finlyandii" 
(A Declaration of the Peoples' Government of Finland), 
Komsomolskaya Pravda, p. 1. 
2 Ibid . 
3rb td. 
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Naturally this review emphasized the close connections between 
such Finnish leaders as Mannerheim, Erkko, Kayander and Tanner 
with the western capitalists and their extreme hostility to 
the "peace-loving" Soviet Union. All these attitudes and 
connections only proved that these "gentlemen" were merely 
lackeys of the exploiters of the Finnish workers and peasants. 
Therefore, so this newspaper reasoned, these men have little 
or no support among the proletariat and so must fall before 
the manner-blows of the "armed forces of socialism. 111 
The reports from the many meetings still being held 
during the day reflected the feeling that there would be a 
quick victory over the enemy. If the workers of the USSR 
could believe their newspapers they would have been convinced 
of the fact. 
The best of the Finnish people are gathering around 
the Peoples' Government of Finland and are entering the 
First Finnish Corps. After the first Corps they will 
form a second, a third and so forth until the workers of 
Finland have wiped from the face of the earth the whole 
gang of warmongers w~o dance under the direction of 
foreign capitalists. 
From the tenor of the press reports on the success of 
the initial moves of the Red Army there was little reason for 
the average Russian to have any doubts about the war in 
Finland. 
• •• the Finnish corps, created from the 
revolting Finnish volunteers, with the help of the 
111 Bankrotstvo Gel'singforskih Zapravil" (The Bankrupted 
Helsinki Warmongers), 1'.!:l!.Q, p. 4. 
211 Prestupnyaya Kltka Kayandervo Budet Unichtosjeha" 
(The Criminal Clique of Kayander Will Be Destroyed), Izvestiya, 
p. 1. 
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fearless Red Army will sweep the Whiteguard Government 
of provokers away and with honor accomplish the task 
entrusted to the Peoples' Government--to carry the 1 banner of a free Finland into the city of Kelsinki . 
From a survey of the articles which appeared in 
Kr asnaya Zvezda the crucial question was this: what kind of 
war would the struggle against Finland be? In a report of 
one of the many soldiers' conferences which were being held 
a t this time, the Russian enlisted men were being assured 
that the "difficulty" on their "northwest borders" would be 
a relatively short, easy fight . In one conference, for 
example a young privatef by the name of Yaovlev, observed that 
i t was the young Finnish soldiers who were deserting to the 
Red army because "they have decided that they do not want to 
fight the powerful Red Army to satisfy the mad Finnish 
military. 113 To this statement an elder fellow-soldier, one 
Korchagin, replied: "This is good; with the defection of 
F innish soldiers they will not last two days under the blows 
of the Red Army; then this hostile mercenary Finnish Govern-
ment will fly to the devil. 114 
111Novaya Era v Sjizni Finskovo Naroda" (A New Era In 
the Life of the Finnish People ), Pravda, p . 2. 
2on 22 September 1935 officers' titles were reintroduced 
( in the Red Army), along with a regular system of promotions. 
Officers' titles were similar to those in European armies 
except that as yet, the title of "general" was not instituted 
nor was "soldier 1' reintroduced, the troops still being termed 
"Red Army man." Littleton B. Atkinson, Dual Command in the Red 
Army, 1918-1942 (Colorado Springs, Col.: The Air University, 
1950), p. 32. 
3K. Tokarev, "Demokraticheskaya Respublike Budet Drugom 
USSR" (The Democratic Republic Will Be the Friend of the USSR), 
Krasnaya Zvezda, p . 3. 
4Ibid. 
--~-- - - - ~ - - - ---- --- ~-- -- - -- -
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This same point was presented with even greater clarity 
by one private Sog adae v when he asked his unit commissar: 
"Well, do you think I will be able to take part in the battles 
f or the liberation of the Finnish people? If I send in a 
tr ansfer will they send me to one of the active units of the 
Leningrad Military District?" The commissar, one Dodyaev, 
r eplied: "It is doubtful. The Red Army will probably crush 
to powder the bandit gang of Whitefinns before you would 
arrive. If you expect to get there you must act at once, 
otherwise it will be too late. 111 
No doubt the Russian Soldier took much encouragement 
fr om the optimistic tone of the Soviet press concerning 
Finland on 2 December. In all probability the average 
Russian civilian also grew confident when he read the bold 
headlines that stalked across the pages of Stalin's main 
j ournals the very next day. For here for all to read were 
the terms of a "Peace Treaty" concluded on 2 December between 
the USSR and the "Democratic Republic of Finland." The terms 
of the peace were based upon the earlier Russian requests for 
naval bases and land settlements from Finland which had 
s talemated the November talks in Moscow. In return for these 
concessions the Kremlin transferred a large part of northeast 
Karelia to the new "Peoples ' Republic" and agreed to pay about 
4 20 million Finmarks for railroad property and leases involved 
1L. Valfouskii, "Za Tesnou Drusjbu s Finlyandskim 
Na r odom" (For Correct Friendship with the Finnish People), 
Krasnaya Zvezda, p. 3. 
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in the transfer. The soviets also promised to help the new 
government organize an army and to negotiate a trade treaty 
in the near future. 
This treaty in all likelihood intended to demonstrate 
that the "Peoples' Government of Finland" was a sovereign 
power and that the Soviet Union would treat it as such. 
There were indications, however, that the Kremlin leaders in 
Mos cow had a more realistic impression of the situation than 
migh t be indicated by the body of this treaty. The last 
paragraph pointed out that "the present agreement will be in 
force from the date of signature, depending upon ratification." 
It went on to add: "Both ratification acts will take place 
in perhaps briefer terms in the capital of Finland, the city 
of Helsinki. 111 In diplomatic language this meant that the 
treaty would not come into effect until that "bourgeoisie 
government" in Helsinki had been overcome and the "Terioki 
Reg ime" could act as the legitimate authority for all of 
Finland. 
Soldiers ' and workers' meetings of this day all 
supported the Treaty and predicted once more an early end of 
the "Helsinki robber-capitalists." The necessity for final 
ratification of the Peace Treaty in Helsinki was utilized to 
demonstrate that the days of the "Whitefinn gang" were coming 
to an end. As one comrade Ivanov announced: nThe important 
111 
Dogovor o Vzaimopomshchi i Drusjbe Mesjdu Sovetskim 
Souzom i F1nlyandskoi Demokraticheskoi Respublikoi 11 (The 
Treaty of Mutual Aid and Friendship Between the Soviet Union 
and the Finnish Democratic Republic), Izvestiya, p. 1. 
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point of the treaty is the declaration that both ratifying 
documents will be completed in the city of Helsinki ••• The 
day of the ratification of these documents," he went on to 
predict, "will come very soon. The Peoples' Army of Finland, 
supported by all the Finnish working people, will win with 
the aid of our Red Army. 111 
Other reports of such meetings also emphasized the 
theme of an early downfall for the government of the Finnish 
reactionaries . After all, how long could they resist when, 
as the stakhanovite-brigadier, comrade Artarnonova, remarked: 
"The workers and peasants of Finland welcome our Red Army 
with as much enthusiasm as did the workers of the Western 
Ukraine and Western White Russia." 2 
Other workers observed that "a unit of soldiers from 
the Finnish Army has already come over to the side of the 
113 new government, which is supported by the people. As a 
result the Russian people were all convinced "that the armed 
Finnish people and the Red Army will quickly destroy the 
incompetent Finnish generals."4 Nor was that all according 
1 "Nerushima Druzjba Mesjdu Sovetskim i Finskim Narodami" 
(Permanent Friendship between the Soviet and Finnish Peoples), 
Pravda, p . 2. 
2 "Novaya Pobeda Mudroi Politiki Mira" (The New Victory 
of Our Wise Peace Policy), Izvestiya, p. 1. 
311 sovetskii Souz--Velikii Drug Finlyandskovo Naroda" 
(The Soviet Union--the Great Friend of the Finnish People), 
~' p. 1. 
4 11 Sjelaem Uspehov Narodnomu Pravitel 1 stva" (We Wish 
Success to the Peoples' Government), Krasnaya Zvezda, p. 2. 
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to the Soviet press: 
The Finnish people were always our best friends and 
the present leaders of Finland have vainly tried to 
incite them against the Soviet Union. The mean provok ers 
of war have erred! On their heads has fallen the anger 
and indignation of the people.l 
In various "editorials" which appeared in the news-
papers of 3 December inequities of the "bourgeoisie rulers" 
of Finland were recounted in great detail. On the matter of 
national wealth it appeared that the "economic lackeys of 
the west" had consistently bled the Finnish people in order 
to enrich their capitalistic masters and thus held up the 
vital development of their nation. 2 From the standpoint of 
law, on the other hand, the history of Finland since 1918 
has been one of every sort of legal crime against the 
workers. The whole period evidently had been replete with 
injustice, illegal procedures and unjustified sentences 
against the "revolutionary proletariat" and its leaders. 3 
With all these stories of corruption and injustice it was no 
wonder that Soviet editors could conclude: 
During the past twenty years Finland was the 
plaything of imperialistic thieves, due to the fact 
that its reactionary bourgeoisie leaders, the hangmen 
of the Finnish people, did not want to rule alone. 
Opposed to everything, blind with class hatred towards 
the state of the Soviets, submissively acting at the 
1 "Privet Drusjestvennomu Finlyandskomu Narodu" (Welcome 
to the Friendly Finnish People), Komsomolskaya Pravda, p . 2. 
211Finlyandiya (Spravka)" (Finland (Information)), 
Komsomolskaya Pravda, p. 3. 
3A. Botkin, "Prestupleniya Belofinnskih Banditov" 
(The Crimes of the Whitefinn Bandits), Trud, p. 4 . . 
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orders of antisoviet capitalistic powers, they firmly 
created in Finland a dangerous focus of war.l 
Interesting reports which began their appearance in 
the Soviet press on 3 December came in a series of articles 
which, from their datelines, had been written by a number of 
correspondents traveling with the invading Red Army. These 
stories contain a good deal of description of the combat 
conditions and a little of the attitude of the soldiers, 
sailors and airmen ta.king part in the war. They also contain 
a good deal of flowery patriotic expostulations which were 
obviously designed to picture the Russian soldier as a fine, 
brave fellow who was determined to die in defense of his 
"beloved fatherland." Of course in most of these accounts 
the "cowardly Finns" are defeated and the Red Army, in spite 
of many difficulties, presses on to greater triumphs. 
A good example was the account of an aerial bombing 
mission over Finland on the first day of the war. After 
being addressed by their commissar who urged them to make 
every effort to defeat the forces of "international 
capitalism," the Red airmen leaped into their planes and 
roared into the sky. Despite heavy fog and rain over the 
Baltic, the bombers hit their targets and in a few minutes 
completely demolished them. They then returned to atrium-
phant welcome back at their base and immediately prepared 
for another raid. In this way the Finns were defeated and 
1L. Lyanonen, 11Likvidatziya Opasneishevo Ochaga 
Voinie 11 (The Liquidation of a Dangerous Focus of War), 
Izvestiya, p. 4. 
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the Red Air Force displayed its superiority over the enemy. 1 
Most of the front-line releases recounted the first 
hours of the ground attack into Finland. Many of these stories 
contained some very realistic pictures of the effective 
Finnish defense measures which plagued the Red Army during 
the initial period of the war . On one of these a senior 
political officer of a borderguard post, one comrade Pyantzev, 
evaluated the fighting methods of the Finnish defenders: 
r 
At night they creep into the lines and at daybreak 
return • ••• They do not fall into the eye, they hide 
like a werewolf in the bush ••• It tells you that the 
Whitefinns practice all the time to fight with bandit 
methods . They again and again, fire from tre2s, scatter in small groups, plant mines and booby traps . 
In yet another story about the early hours of the attack 
on 30 November, the defense presented an interesting scene: 
They (the Finns) had retreated, leav i ng in the 
straths, in the wood piles, in the very folds of the 
ground machine gunners and skillfully hidden snipers. 
The enemy, while retreating, left hundreds of mines and 
booby traps on the main roads covered by heaps of straw 
or snow, and in the quiet, solitary houses, on the 
shoulders of turnpikes, in sheds, in stables . Across 
the roads and foot paths were stretched tr~acherous 
wires and threads connected to explosives . J 
Of course the authors pointed out that in spite of all 
these difficulties the Red Army pressed on to new successes . 
Thus it can be said that 3 December was a day of continued 
victory for the Red Army, at least within the pages of the 
1
N. Mihailovski, "Glubokii Reid" (The Great Raid), 
Pravda, p. 2. 
2Nicholai Virta, "Perviei Tri Chasa" (The First Three 
Hours), Pravda, p. 2. 
3s. Dikovski and B. Levin, "Na Komandnom Punkte" (At 
the Command Point), Pravda, p. 2. 
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Soviet newspapers. Despite some accurate pictures of the 
s tubborn resistance of the Finns, the average Russian soldier 
or civilian could still imagine that this war would certainly 
end in a relatively short time. 
The "Winter War" continued to dominate the front pages 
of the Russian press on 4 December . Even articles from 
foreign sources, nor mally relegated to the back pages, 
appeared on page one. All of these stories supported the 
Soviet position and helped to give the impression that there 
was wide support both inside and outside Russia for their 
attack on the "Whitefinns." The principle stories of the 
4th concentrated on reviewing the events which led to the 
"present difficulties" and "proving" again that the Soviet 
Union and her puppet "Finnish Peoples' Government" actually 
had the support of the majority of the Finnish proletariat. 
As for the present "Helsinki reactionaries" the Kremlin 
news writers pointed out that they had "not for a minute 
ended the underground antisoviet activity which was a direct 
violation of the (1934 nonaggression) pact." There was also 
"the sending into the USSR of spies and diversionists, the 
provocative shooting at our border guards, the antisoviet 
intrigues in Geneva ' s halls and in the ministerial offices 
of any imperialistic nation." All this had "made a mockery 
l 
of the paper pact of nonaggression . " 
According to another article in Kras naya Zvezda, there 
p. 1. 
111 Istoricheskii Dogorov" ~ Historic Treaty), I zvestiya, 
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had always been considerable desire for war among the Finnish 
"military clique." It seemed that these "militaristic 
adventurers" in answer to critics who spoke of the difference 
in strength between Finland and the USSR "argued that a 
'slowing resistance' to the Soviet troops in time would cause 
changes in the international situation and Finland would gain 
foreign support." Thus "trusting in this 'support' the 
Finnish warmongers have provoked war with the Soviet Union. 111 
The Red press bosses in an article in Pravda editor-
ialized that despite all the hopes of the Finnish bourgeoisie 
government and its military leaders, their hour of doom was 
fast approaching: 
The strong blows of the Red Army in answer to the 
provocative incidents on the Soviet border has caused 
panic and confusion among the bankrupted politicians 
of the Finnish bourgeoisie. One government has tumbled, 
and the other is vainly reaching to their foreign 
patron-instigators. But in liberated Finland has 
arisen the voice of the real working people. The 
Government of the Finnish Democratic Republic has 
called all of its people to join with the Red Army to 
fight against the warmongers and suppressors of the 
Finnish people.2 
The "Peoples' Meetings" of the 4th roared with enthu-
siasm over the "Peace Treaty" and were confident of a 
relatively speedy victory over the "Finnish dogs of 
international capitalism." The Treaty with the Terio.ki 
111nrusjba i Mir" (Friendship and Peace), Krasnaya 
Zvezda, p. 1. 
211 Pakt o Vzaimopomoshchi i Drusjbe Mesjdu SSSR i 
Finlyands.koi Demokraticheskoi Respubli.koi" (The Pact of Mutual 
Aid and Friendship between the USSR and the Finnish Democratic 
Republic), Pravda, p. 1. 
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Government, according to one resolution in a workers' meeting 
"will liquidate still another focus of war which was lighted 
by the unlucky leaders of Finland: Kayander , Erkko, Tanner 
and others. 111 With the reported successes of the Red Army 
and the "First Finnish Corps" there obviously could have 
been no doubt that the ". • • treaty of mutual aid and 
friendship between the Soviet Union and the Finnish Democratic 
Republic will be ratified in the capital of Finland, the city 
2 of Helsinki, in a short time!" 
A soldier's speech reported in the army newspaper 
summed up the situation as it might well have appeared to the 
readers of Russian news releases: 
The crafty plans of the sick Finnish rulers have 
fallen like a house of cards. They aimed at a campaign 
of conquest against the USSR. The bandits have erred. 
The Finnish people have accepted the brotherly help of 
the Red Army and will destroy the Kayanders and Erkkos 
l lke mad dogs • 3 
As if to demonstrate the widespread international 
support for Soviet actions, stories from foreign sources 
which, of course, backed up the Communist version of the 
"Finnish incident" appeared on the front pages of the Red 
press. A good example of this support was a news release 
from the New York Daily worker which announced that an 
111 Istoriches.kii Dokument" (A Historic Document), 
Izvestiya, p. 1. 
211 Dokument Velichaishevo Mirolubiya" (A Document of 
Great Peacefulness),~' p. 1. 
3 11 Ischeznet Ochag Voinie Na Severozapadnieh Granitzah 
SSSR" (The Disappearance of a Focus of War from the North-
western Border of the USSR), Krasnaya Zvezda, p. 1. 
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organization known as the "Federation of Finnish Wor.kers" 
had acclaimed the "entrance of Soviet troops into Finland" 
since the USSR was only trying to "arrange such relations as 
is necessary between two countries which economically and 
geographically are as close as the USSR and Finland."1 
In another item of this sort George Bernard Shaw, in 
an interview, remarked that the Finns had acted foolishly in 
not accepting the Sovie t terms in November. He reasoned that 
the Russians had been worried because the Finns had acted not 
like a relatively weak neighbor but more like a potentially 
strong aggressor. Mr . Shaw then came to the rather strange 
conclusion that the United States must have promised to help 
the Finnish Government in their fight against the Soviet 
2 
Union. Strangely enough, from this time forward the Kremlin 
news bosses linked American business with those western 
capitalistic rulers whose encouragement had brought about the 
present "Finnish aggressions. 113 
111Finskie Rabochie N'u-Iorka o SSSR" (The Finnish 
Workers of New York about the USSR), Komsomolskaya Pravda, 
p. 4. 
2
"'Bernard Shaw • o Finsko-Sovetskih Otnosheniyah" 
( ' Bernard Shaw ' about the Finnish-Soviet Agreement), Izvestiya, 
p. 1. 
3 11Kto Oni?" (Who Are They?)., Trud, 14 December 1939, 
p. 2; "Imperialisticheskie Interesie v Finlyandii" (Impe-
rialistic Interests in Finland)., Krasnaya Zvezda, .26 December 
1939, p. 4; "Kto Pomogaet Jvlannergeimu?" (Who Helps Mannerheim?), 
Izvestiya, 6 January 1940, p. 4; "General Sikorski Speshit Na 
Pomoshch" (General Sikorsky Hurries to Help), Krasnaya Zvezda, 
12 January 1940, p. 4; The Observer., "Drusjba i Vragov Finskih 
Narodi" (The Friends and Enemies of the Finnish People) 
Komosmols.kaya Pravda, 10 February 1940, p. 4. 
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New items which came directly from the "Finnish 
Peoples' Government" provided another encouraging note for 
Soviet newspaper readers. In various meetings held in 
villages and towns of "liberated" Finland the citizens 
ratified their support for their "Democratic Republic." 
As an example of the determination to help their new 
government the inhabitants of the village of Karka called on 
"all the people who were involuntarily evacuated from certain 
villages by Finnish troops to return home. 111 The burghers of 
Terioki also pledged themselves to "support with all force 
the new Peoples' Government and help it in a short time 
destroy the power of the hateful government of Tanner and 
place in the territories of all Finland the Democratic Peoples' 
Republic. 112 
Apparently encouraged by the "enthusiastic support" of 
the local population, the soldiers of the "First Corps of the 
Finnish Peoples' Army" swore that they would not rest until 
they had: 
destroyed the remains of the ruling (group) of Kayander 
and the government of Tanner, who always sold and are 
still selling the interests of the Finnish people to 
foreign imperialists and, for their own satisfaction, 
has involved the Finnish people in a criminal war with 
the USSR.j 
111Naselenie Finlyandii Radost'u Vstrechaet Ves Ob 
Obrazovanii Narodnovo Pravitel 1 stva Finlyandii" (The Population 
of Finland Joyfully Greets the News of the Formation of the 
Peoples' Government of Finland), Izvestiya, p. 1. 
211 obshee Sobranie Grasjdan Goroda Terioki" (A General 
Session of the Burghers of the City of Terioki), Pravda, p. 1. 
311 Rezolutziya Pervovo Korpusa Narodnoi Armii Finlyandii" 
(A Resolution of the First Corps of the Peoples' Army of 
Finland), Krasnaya Zvezda, p. 1. 
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With the evidence of such enthusiasm on the part of the 
"fre edom-loving " Finns, led by Otto Kuusinen, there should not 
h ave been much doubt in the minds of the Soviet man-in-the-
s treet that the "liberating armies of socialism" would soon 
dr ive the "warmongers" out of Helsinki. 
To reinforce the impression that the "Whitefinns" were 
beaten and broken, there appeared in the Russian press a small 
item from the German Information Bureau in Riga: 
••• as received from Helsinki, the battle activity 
on the Soviet-Finnish front has weakened. The official 
organ ordered the urgent evacuation from Helsinki of all 
the civil population. The 11 Prime Minister" Ryti together 
with the whole "government" has left the capital to an 
unknown place. They say that the residence of the 
"government" has been transferred to Vasa. The diplomatic 
corps were given time to move to a small town near 
Helsinki. 1 
This was the type of news which would have made the 
Russian civilian and soldier feel that the war could be won on 
schedule. Of course it also agreed in manner and tone with 
the other news items of the past four days. 
Dispatches from correspondents at or near the front 
lines continued to receive prominent display. The Red Army 
was still advancing from victory to victory. Even the 
admittedly difficult terrain did not seem to present any 
2 
obstacle to the forward movement of Russian troops. In 
s p ite of the claims of Finnish military experts that the 
1 11 Pravitel'stvo Ryti Besjalo Iz Hel ' sinki 11 (The Govern-
ment of Ryti Has Fled from Helsinki), Pravda, p. 5. 
2 A. Parfenov and G. Men' shikov, 11 Sh.kval Voroshilovskih 
Zalpov" (The Storm of Voroshilov's Volleys), Krasnaya Zvezda, 
p . 2. 
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natural defenses of Finland, the lakes, swamps, forests and 
rivers would impede the advance of any army, one correspondent 
revealed that 11 our troops on the first day have demonstrated 
that for them there exists no barriers. Our tanks broke 
through wide gaps in the forests and overcame the marshes 
1 
of the enemy." 
On the other hard, other newspaper reporters were 
outraged by the "underhandedness" of the methods used by the 
"Whitefinns " to defend their country. These included floating 
logs bound by steel wire which were set in the narrow fjord 
above Petsamo to trap Red warships 2 and the construction of 
hidden fire points in apparently abandoned village houses. 
In the latter case when the Russian soldiers would enter 
these "uninhabited" areas "the Finnish Jaegars would shoot 
our troops in the back with explosive bullets. 113 
Other descriptions confirmed the "bandit-like methods" 
of the Finnish troops. For instance this report on the 
favorite tricks of the "White-bandits 11 : 
Finnish snipers at night would crawl into the thick 
forests like wolves, come up to the roads near our armies 
and with two or three bursts from a submachine gun try 
1An. Kalinen, "Utro Na Paresheike" (Morning on the 
Isthmus), Komsomolskaya Pravda, p. 2. 
2s . Akif'ev ands. Bronfman, "Reid Korablya 'Groza 111 
{The Voyage of the Ship "Groza"), Komsomolskaya Pravda, p. 2. 
3M . Gordon and G. Mishulovin, "Kovars tvo Vraga 11 ( The 
Craftiness of the Enemy), Izvestiya, p. 1. 
to spread panic among the columns in order to block 
the roads which supply our battle units. 1 
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This evaluation of the fighting methods of the small, 
but dedicated Finnish army has been confirmed by a former 
Soviet officer who served in the war. In part this officer 
had this to say: 
The Finns fought in small groups of quick, well-
trained skiers ••• They would suddenly appear in the 
rear and on the flanks of our troops. They were skilled 
night-fighters, attacking without firing a shot and 
using their na~ive knives to spread panic among the 
Soviet troops. 
In spite of the discrepancy concerning the weapons used, 
it is obvious that both witnesses were describing the same 
method of combat. This, in a way, confirms the accuracy of 
Soviet newspaper correspondents when they complained about 
conditions at the front. 
In spite of their criticism of "frankly diversionist 
tactics," the chief complaint of the Russian reporters was 
reserved for the manner in which the Finns had mined everything 
ahead of the Red Army advance. As in the stories of the day 
before, the defenders were berated . f'or putting mines in quiet 
places such as hayracks, small huts, summer homes and other 
shelters. 3 Even outdoors one apparently had to be very careful 
for almost any object could be connected to an explosive 
1R. Pavlen.ko, "Kovarnie Metodii Belofinnov" (The Tricky 
Methods of' the Whitefinns), Krasnaya Zvezda, p. 3. 
2G. I. Antonov, "The Red Army in the Finnish War: 
From the Soviet Side," Basil Henry Liddel-Hart (ed.), The 
Red Army (New York : Harcourt, Brace, 1956), p. 88. 
3Gordon and Mishulovin, loc. cit. 
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charge. One of the trickiest means that the "White-bandits" 
devised to "strike the Red Army man in the spine" was to 
11 mine the small village stores, calculating, it seems, that 
the soldiers of the Red Army would be caught on this bait. 111 
As to the effectiveness of Finnish mines there were 
two stories from Sov:tet correspondents which mentioned that, 
at least in one case, a tank had been put out of commission 
by a mine2 and in another, an armored train had .been blown 
up attempting to cross a railroad bridge on the Russo-Finnish 
border. 3 
The final items of some interest which appeared on the 
4 th were a series of "eyewitness" stories about the difficul-
ties of the Finnish civilians and soldiers in the war areas. 
All of these articles were found in the Red Army ' s own 
newspaper and they must have caused the Russian soldier to 
imagine that, in spite of the "bloody terror" of the 
Schutzcorps,4 the population of Finland would come over to 
the side of their "liberators" at the first opportunity. 
The observers who wrote about the "liberated" village s 
emphasized the point that the "Whitefinn gangs" had forcibly 
evacuated the inhabitants and had shot those who would not 
1 Pavlenko, loc. cit. 
2N. Rakovs.ki and N. Golshev, 'Musjestvo" (Courage), 
Komsomolskaya Pravda, p. 2. 
3v. Chernieshev, "Pogranichni.ki" (The Borderguards), 
Komsomolskaya Pravda, p. 2. 
4special reserve units of the Finnish Army trained to 
act as riot police as well as soldiers. 
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leave. In one Communist news release the peasants who had 
managed to remain behind characterized the Schutzcorps as: 
"butchers, the damned butchers. There is no other name for 
them" and, in order to get even with their "bourgeoisie 
oppressors" told of "changing the mines of the bandits to 
those paths that the Finns would have to use."1 With such 
an attitude on the part of these homeless Finns, there seems 
to have been little doubt that, as one Soviet correspondent 
reported: "The Finnish people are receiving the Red Army 
as their own liberators. 112 
As for the morale of the Finnish military prisoners, 
these men had been treated even worse than the civilians by 
their officers. Most of the prisoners interviewed by a Soviet 
reporter seemed to have been recently drafted and therefore 
were badly clothed and equipped for war. It seems that they 
were fed only once a day and if they objected, their officers 
beat them. They had not been told why they must go to war 
against the Soviet Union since their officers normally did not 
speak to them. The only instruction they received was an 
evening sermon by a "priest." The "priests 11 had told them 
that the Russian soldiers were barbarians and that they 
torture and even shoot their prisoners. Of course, now the 
1P. Nesterov ands. Solodovnikov, 11Vragi Svoevo Naroda 11 
(The Enemy of Our People), Krasnaya Zvezda, p. 2. 
2B. Korol, "Tzena Mannergeimovoi Klyatvi" (The Cost of 
the Mannerheim Oath), Krasnaya Zvezda, p. 2. 
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prisoners had discovered that all this was a lie and had lost 
all confidence in their former leaders. 1 
The insidious thing about these articles was the fact 
that they probably helped to convince many Russian soldiers 
that a large body of Finns would respond to an appeal such 
as: "leave the ranks of the Whitefinn Army! Come over with 
a weapon in hand to the Peoples' Army which ••• carries 
liberation and a happy life to the Finnish people!" 2 This 
erroneous reporting very likely led the average Soviet soldier 
to believe that whatever the difficulties of weather and 
terrain there could not be any real resistance from a popula-
tion which was separated from their leaders by such a wide 
gulf of class hatred. 
The triumphant picture presented by the Soviet press 
during these first four days of the Winter War was based upon 
Marxist-Leninist theory bolstered by an almost grotesque 
misinterpretation of the situation within Finland. The key 
impression gleaned from the pages of Russia's newspapers was 
that the Finnish people, opposed to the war policy of their 
political and military leaders, were prepared to join the 
"liberating armies" and sweep their "bourgeoisie government!! 
from the country. This assumption flew in the face of all 
1 A. Parfenov, "Beseda s Plenn iemi Fins.kimi Soldatami" 
(Conversations with Captured Finnish Soldiers ), Krasnaya 
Zvezda, p. 2. 
211 Plenniei Soldatie Prizievaut Svoih Tovarishchei 
Vatupat v Ryadie" (The Captured Soldiers Summon Their Comrades 
to Enter the Ranks of the Peoples' Army ), Krasnaya Zvezda, 
p. 2. 
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.known facts and was certainly not based upon actual conditions 
in Finland where the great majority of the population was 
resolutely prepared to defend their country against the threat 
of Soviet aggression. 
In considering the way Soviet writers reported the 
first few days of the Winter War, it would be well to remember 
that they had to use the information at their disposal and 
that they were compelled to make the "facts" come as close to 
the official line as possible. With these thoughts in mind, 
there may have been some reasons for their feeling of over-
confidence. After all, this early period was one of almost 
unbroken triumph for Soviet arms and diplomacy. The various 
Red Armies had not yet met any serious opposition, the Red 
Baltic Fleet had occupied the islands in the Gulf of Finland 
and had captured the only Finnish warm-water port, Petsamo. 
A number of exiled Finnish communists had erected a "Peoples' 
Government" at Teriokt which had called on the Finnish 
proletariat to rise up against their "bourgeoisie rulers. 11 
These Terio.ki leaders had begun to form an army of disgruntled 
Finns to aid the Russian forces and had signed a "Peace 
Treaty" with the Soviet Union which met all the Kremlin's 
demands for bases and border rectifications . 
Then, too, the Finnish Government in Helsinki had no 
allies, and with the oncoming winter would have all its Baltic 
ports closed. Because of the opposition of Nazi Germany there 
was little prospect that any real military aid from the west 
could reach the F inns in time to save them. The desperate 
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straits of the Helsinki. leaders were further heightened by 
the report that the government had fled from 1.ts capitol. 
In short, the facts indicated that the Russi.ans had made a 
very good start 1.n their campaign to reduce Finland to the 
status of a "sphere of influence" and the Kremlin-dominated 
newspapers merely reflected this confidence. With all this 
in mind 1.t 1.s easy to see why Soviet writers believed that 
victory over Finland would come 1.n a relatively short ti.me. 
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MAP III 
INITIAL ATTACKS OF THE SOVIET UNION ON THE 
KARELIAN ISTHMUS 
(30 November 1939--16 December 1939) 
This map shows the advance of various Soviet units 
during the first two weeks of the Winter War. There has 
been no effort to reproduce every tactical maneuver of the 
Red Army or the ~ed ~leet but ?n+y.the main lines of advance. 
Altho~gh the Soviet infantry di!isions ar~ marked as to their 
iocat~on on 16 December 1939, division units, especially 
armor, were rather freely transferred from one area of the 
front to another. 
No attempt has been made to locate the various Finnish 
field units. There was so much shifting of Finnish divisions 
and eve~ the ?etachment of ';!lits t? other fronts that it is 
imost impossible to determine their locations on the Karelian 
~stb.muc until the end of January 1940. 
An interesting point to be observed here was the 
~idespreaq nature of the Soviet attacks, all the way from 
ne side of the Isthmus to the other. This resulted in a 
~eak effort at important points and, as the map shows, in 
many regions ~he.Red ~rmy did not even succeed in breaking 
through the Finnish field forces to the main defenses of the 
Mannerheim Line. In areas such as Hoitinen {Summa) and 
Kelja-Taipale where Soviet forces did manage to contact the 
principal Finnish defense positions, they were decisively 
repulsed with heavy losses. 
The naval action here illustrated consisted of the 
movement of the naval expedition from Kronstadt on 30 Novem-
ber 1939 to occupy the Finnish islands in the Gulf of Finland. 
Since the regular bombardment of the coastal defenses in the 
Viborg area were not undertaken by the Soviet fleet until 
l8-19 December 1939, these maneuvers have not been included 
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THE FINNISH DEFENSES STIFFENED 
(5 December 1939--11 December 1939) 
The second week of the war in Finland saw a gradual 
change in the fortunes of the Red Army. It was during this 
period that the Kremlin leaders seem to have become fully 
aware of the extent of their problems and received their 
earliest indication that the Finnish defenses were not so 
contemptible as had been thought at first. For example, 
although the 52nd Soviet Infantry Division, reinforced by 
special armored elements, was successfully driving local 
defense forces ahead of it across the tundra from petsa.mo 
down the Winter Road towards Ivalo throughout this second 
week of fighting, already the extreme weather conditions had 
slowed their advance. 1 Likewise the efforts of the 122nd 
Soviet Infantry Division, some 300 kilometers further south, 
to break throu gh in support had also run into the twin 
problem of greater distance and a gradual increase in Finnish 
2 
resistance on their way from Salla to Pelkosinniemi. 
At Suomussalmi in central Finland the Red 163rd Infantry 
1Xylander (22 March 1940), P• 261. 
2Borgman, Der Ueberfall, P• 114. 
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Division had penetrated as far as the town by December. Once 
here, however, the increased Finnish resistance at the ferry-
p oint of Aarsaari at the entrance of Lake Haukipera had 
halted their drive. By 10-11 December the Finns, bringing 
their reinforcements up by way of their newly constructed 
Kontiomali-Taibalkoski railroad, had succeeded in stabilizing 
the situation in this area which was bad news to the Red Army 
men of the 163rd Division. 1 Along with this the hoped-for 
flanking move of the 54th Ukrainian Infantry Division at 
Kuhmo was also meeting with increased resistance during the 
2 same period. 
The promising Red Army advances in eastern Karelia 
which threatened to outflank the defenses of the Karelian 
Isthmus from the east were also slowly being contained during 
this crucial second week of combat. The at t acks of the 
soviet 155th, 139th and 75th Infantry Divisions which were 
aimed at the Ilomantsi-Tolvajarvi area were thrown back by a 
c ounterattack of the 9th Finnish Infantry Division3 and a 
great battle for the so-called Tolvajarvi ridges was shaping 
up as the Finns hurried all available reinforcements into 
the area.4 
1Mannerheim, p. 338. · 
2Borgman, Der Ueberfall, PP• 175-176. 
3Mannerheim, p. 338. 
4xylander (5 April 1940), P• 201. 
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To the south in eastern Karella the efforts of the 
Sovie t 18th Inf'antry Divis.ion to drive in upon Suislama f'rom 
Suojarvi was halted at Kollaa by 9 December in a really 
desperate Finnish defensive effort. 1 The attempts of the 
168th Soviet I nf'antry Division to drive in along the Lake 
Ladoga shore road during the same period was slowed by Finnish 
fil"e f 
rom the islands of Volamo and Mantsinsaari. This plus 
the narrow f'ront on d which the Russians operated force a 
slowd 2 
own when they reached Kitela. 
On the Karelian Isthmus the Soviet had arrived at the 
lllain def'ense s 8 f of the Mannerheim Line by .-10 December a ter 
cons1d 
erable resistance by the Finns. The Soviet 7th Army 
cormnitted the 49th Infantry Division (of Corps Grendal) in a 
conce t 
n rated attack, not on the central Summa Lines as 
e~Pected by the Finns, but upon the extreme eastern end of 
the M 3 
annerheim Line at Taipal e between 6-11 December. This 
attack 
was an abject failure for this division was afterwards 
l"eplaced by another for later attacks in this same sector.4 
'I'he 
Westward side of the line (Pasuri, Summa, Koivisto) was 
SUb. 
Jected to heavy artillery fire from land and sea plus 
loca.1 
attacks near Punnisjarvi but serious Soviet advances 
-------------l 
Palolampi, p 0 53. 
2 
Borgman, Der Ueberfall, P· 106. 
3 
l_bid o I P O 99 • 
4Mannerheim, P• 342. 
J 
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in thi s sector were delayed until after mid-December. 1 It 
would seem that the Soviet plan during this second week did 
not envisage a frontal smash against the main Summa Lines 
but a concerted effort to outflank the Mannerheim defenses 
through Sortavala and a general Russian advance through 
eastern Finland. 
On tbe diplomatic front the League of Nations on 9 
De c ember had, at the request of the Finnish Government, asked 
the Soviet Union to explain her conduc t in Finland. The 
Kreml in leaders refused because they said they could not 
rec ognize the "Helsinki regime" as the legitimate government 
of the Finns. The USSR now considered only the Terioki puppet 
gove rnment as the legal and sovereign head of the Finnish 
people. The League, after some consultation, called on all 
membe rs to aid the beleaguered Finns and condemned the Soviet 
Uni on for her aggressive actions. The Russian representatives 
the n promptly left the League of Nations and denounced its 
a c t ion. 2 No matter how much the USSR deprecated the support 
of the League members, this action proved to be a moral victory 





I bid., P• 343• 
2For an excellent review of the entire Sovie t position 
Potr Aleksevich Tisouskii, Liga Podzhigtelei Voiny 
League of the Warmongers) (Moscow: Government Litera-
Pub l ications, 1940). 
3w11liam L. Shirer, Berlin Diar The Journal of a 
Fore i n Correspondent, 1 3 -1 1 New York: Alfred A, Knopf, 
19 1, P• 2 3• 
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Although the Finnish ttdifficulty" more or less moved 
off the rront pages of most Russian newspapers during this 
secood week of the war, there was still many items about 
Finl~nd, her leaders and the con!'lict in general. The 
articles from foreign sources especially continued to express 
approval of the Soviet invasion. Most of these justified the 
attack with the trite observation that the Finns must have 
been preparing to invade Russia since Finland refused to 
accept the "reasonable" Soviet terms which had been presented 
duririg the Moscow talks. This refusal to "do business," plus 
the .many "border incidents," according to these writers, made 
necessary some action by the Red Army to safeguard the "state 
of' socialism11 and the "City of Lenin.tt As for the fear of 
Soviet aggression a g ainst the rest of Scandinavia, which had 
been expressed by some Swedish newspapers, this was labeled 
sheer lunacy by the left-wing foreign press, since there was 
no danger for these nations from such a "peace-loving" 
country as the USSR. Actually, they argued, it was the 
situation in Europe that made it necessary for Russia to 
defend itself from Finland. 1 This was, of course, merely 
the usual Soviet line dressed up in foreign clothes. 
In other articles from abroad the leaders of Finland 
were attacked with great bitterness. The Finnish workers in 
New York, for instance, described the commander of the Finnish 
1
"Turetzkii Sjurnalist o Finlyandii 11 (A Turkish 
Journalist about Finland), Pravda, 5 December 1939, p. 5. 
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Army, Marshall Mannerheim , as "high and fat, with his great 
belly he walks like a duck. His eyes are like the windows 
of a rubbish shop." This article went on to insist that, 
in reality, the laboring masses of Finland supported the 
Terioki "Peoples¥ Government" and the leaders of "'White 
Finland" actually had no influence among the working people. 1 
In the same newspaper, Komsomols.kaya Pravda, the 
Social-Democratic leader and Foreign Minister, Viano Tanner, 
was called a "Judas" to the working classes because he had 
"sold his nation to the capitalists . . . not for thirty 
shekels, but for five million Finmarks." The author then 
observed that Tanner would certainly not be so obliging as 
to hang himself like Judas but would soon have to be brought 
before a "Peoples' Tribunal" to answer for his crimes. 2 
It seemed strange that these two men, Mannerheim and 
Tanner, neither of whom was the formal head of the govern-
ment, should have been picked .out for such vilification by 
pro-Communist writers. It may well have meant, however, 
that these two were now recognized as the "strong men" of 
the Ryti Government. Certainly, from now on these two 
leaders were the main targets for most Communist attacks. 
The Russian war correspondents of Krasnaya Zvezda 
111 Gazet Deili Uorker o Sozdanii Narodnovo Pravitel 'stva 
v Finlyandii" (The Newspaper Daily Worker about the Formation 
of the Peoples ' Government in Finland), Komsomolskaya Pravda, 
5 December 1939, p. 4. 
2 Gennadi Fish, "Iuda Tanner" (The Judas Tanner), 
Komsomolskaya Pravda, p. 4. 
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moved closer to reality in their stories about the fighting 
on the various fronts. In one II eyewitness account, n for 
instance, a bomber pilot, Upsin, was hit in the hand by a 
bullet from a Finnish pursuit plane. According to the 
story he managed to bind up his painful wound and fly the 
machine safely back to its base. 1 In another description 
two Red Army men were seriously wounded while on patrol 
because they happened to stumble upon a Finnish fire point. 
Luckily, however, they were rescued by their heroic comrades 
"from the embrasures of a concealed Whitefinn fire point." 2 
In a third tale the grim side of the struggle became 
clear. It told about the fate of a captured Russian soldier 
who was tt questioned by the Whi tefinn 'rabble-butchers•' 11 
According to an old Finnish peasant woman who saw the whole 
scene, uThe soldier with the red star was hit with a ram.rod, 
stuck with a bayonet, had his belly ripped open while they 
demanded that he speak, but he was silent." After all this 
torture, she noted, 11 They then tied him with wire and put 
him into a burning house. The Red man died quietly. 113 
Whether this tale was true or not, it wa.s evident that 
Soviet reporters were putting a positive interpretation on 
1I. Riebakov, ttvozdieshnie Nalet" (Aerial Attack), 
Krasnaya Zvezda, 5 December 1939, P• 3° 
2 11 Tovarishcheskaya vzaimopomoshch" (Comradely Mutual 
Aid), Krasnaya Zvezda, p. 3. 
3L . Shmonin, "Mus je stvo i Otv age" (Courage and Daring), 
Krasnaya Zvezda, p. 3. 
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all matters pertaining to Red troops. But this was not all. 
The war had become much more brutal. 
Many other stories about the Finnish people and the 
Finnish soldiers might have led anyone who regularly read 
Soviet news releases to suppose that the population was 
cracking under the strain. In one article the author 
observed that the cowardly Mannerheim forces were ttfrightened 
at open battle with the Red Army." He told too how the 
Finnish soldiers eagerly used torture to force the evacua-
1 tion of the civil population. Here is the way the people 
who were left behind by the ttbrutal Schutzcorps" felt about 
their leaders: 
No, never will the Finnish people pardon the 
Kayander clique for all the evil which these lords 
or nothing have inflicted on an innocent people. 
Black memory, black curses w~ll the people use on 
these murders in rrockcoats. 
In yet another story about the sufferings or the 
civil population an old peasant couple who had refused to be 
evacuated by the Schutzcorps had their house burned to the 
ground and were forced to set mines by the officers. When 
the Russian reporter round them they were living in an old 
sewer pipe. 3 In this way, so the Soviet writers pointed out, 
did the Whitefinns treat their own peoplel 
1L. Los, "Zverstva Belofinnov" (The Brutality or the 
Whiterinns), Komsomolskaya Pravda, 5 December 1939, P· 4. 
2Ibid. 
3R. Bershadskii, "V Derevne Na Viborgskom Shosse11 ( In 
a Village on the Viborg Road), Krasnaya Zvezda, 5 December 
1939, P• 3• 
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In case the Russian reader imagined that the Finnish 
Army was still a factor to be feared, there was another 
account in Komsomolskaya Pravda about the morale of these 
"Mannerheim forces." The authors, in an interview with 
several captured Finnish reservists, discovered this state 
of affairs: 
None of them were convinced by the "martial 
airs," the "preparation for self-sacrifice, 11 the 
"natural hatred for the muscovite" which is at 
this very moment announced by means of radio, 
newspapers, posters and brochures of Mannerheim 
and Tanner. More than that, none of the soldiers 
know why they have been driven to war with the 
people of the Soviet Union.l 
With these unprepared Finnish reservists all sur-
rendering, it seems obvious that Soviet writers wished to 
give the impression that Finnish forces were rapidly falling 
apart under the "ham.mer-blows" of the Red Army and the First 
Corps of the "Peoples' Army. " This must have made strange 
reading to a Russian soldier who had been wounded trying to 
break through the Finnish lines in eastern Karella the day 
before. Nevertheless this continued to be the attitude of 
the Soviet press for some time. 
One of the most realistic descriptions of the diffi-
culties of movement in the wilds of Finland appeared 
throughout Russian newspapers on 8 December. Pravda, for 
example, pictured the central border of Finland as "a wild, 
rough place, cut by high hills, innumerable lakes and rivers. 
1s. Gurin and M. Edel, "Vstrechi" (Meetings), 
Komsomolskaya Pravda, 5 December 1939, p. 4. 
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There are no roads t 111 Of course the indomitable Red Army 
man, with his essential equipment on his back, the story 
continued, went right on nsurmounting the difficult ridges, 
g oing through the terrible mountain rivers and lakes, 
crossing the valleys which were continuously clogged by 
boulders and small bushes" to attack the Whitefinn positions. 
Naturally, this unit "from which the boastful Whitefinn 
warriors run like cowards" managed to carry out its battle 
assignment successfully. 2 (The story understandably failed 
to mention that probably at this very moment the same 
"heroic unit" had been stalled by those same "Whi tefinn 
cowards" in the forests of central Finland.) The descrip-
tion of this march was very convincing for it pictured the 
natural conditions in central Finland in precise detail. 
The analysis of the reaction of the "Whi tefinns," however, 
proved to be erroneous even while this article was being 
set up in print. 
Almost all the rest of the stories from Russian 
newspapers of 8 December concerned the popular support in 
Finland for the "Peoples' Government" and the difficulties 
of the nwhitefinns" in continuing the war against the 
"forces of liberation." A foreign news item pointed out 
that the reason the city of Helsinki had to be evacuated 
111 Geroicheskii Marsh" (An Heroic March), Pravda, 
p. 2. 
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was that the "bankrupted leaders hope their evacuation of' 
the population will lengthen the time bef'ore the rapproach-
ment of' the people with the Finnish "Peoples' Army and the 
Red Army. 111 
This misinterpretation of the Finnish "scorched-earthn 
policy was reinforced by the resolutions of the numerous 
"meetings of the citizens of liberated Finland" which were 
evidently taking place in many of the towns that lay behind 
the Red Army 's lines. According to these resolutions, the 
people of eastern Finland had joyfully greeted the news of 
the foundation of the "Peoples' Government of Finland" and 
the signing of the Treaty of Mutual Aid and Friendship 
between the "Peoples' Government" and the USSR. The enthu-
siastic welcome described in these stories demonstrated nthe 
real popularity of the new governmentn and expressed "the 
real feelings of the people. 112 
The government of Ryti-Tanner was described, of' 
course, as an u antipeople government• 11 11 It does not repre-
sent the Finnish people. It is an enemy of all the workers, 
a bankrupted gang of reactionary plutocrats and warmongers. 113 
111Prinuditel•naya Evakuatziya Naseleniya Iz Hel 1 sinkin 
(The Compulsory Evacuation of the Population from Helsinki), 
rzvestiya, P• 2. 
211 Finskii Narod Privetstvuet Svoe Pravitel I stvou (The 
Finnish People Welcome Their Peoples' Government), Izvestiya, 
p. 1. 
311 Sobraniya Gras jdan Goroda Petsamo" (A Meeting of 
the Citizens of Petsamo), Krasnaya Zvezda, p. 2. 
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These resolutions generally ended with instructions to the 
Finnish proletariat in uniform to turn their guns against 
the united enemies of their nation, against the "government 
of' bankers and foreign imperialists. 11 Sometimes this appeal 
was added: 11 Soldierst Come over to the side of the Peoples' 
Government of Finlandt 111 
As if to support these resolutions, the Soviet news-
papers printed numerous "eyewitness stories" of the atrocities 
of the "Whi tef inn bandits" in enforcing the e vacua ti on of the 
peasant population. In an article in Trud about the "liber-
ated" islands in the Gulf of' Finland it was observed that the 
peasants and fishermen who had managed to remain behind, had 
been left without food, and those that had been evacuated had 
been practically 11 kidnapped.n2 From the village of Parkino 
came another report of a nwhitefinn" officer who had become 
so enraged at the refusal of' the villagers to leave the area 
that he had shot one of the peasants as an example to the 
rest. 3 Basing their conclusions on these stories, it would 
have seemed natural to the average Russian reader that the 
Finnish peasants would join the "liberating armies" as soon 
as possible. 
2ttNa Osvobosjdennih Ostrovah" (In the Liberated 
Islands), Trud, p. 2. 
311 Belofinnie Ubivaut Krest 1 yan" (The Whitefinns 
Killing the Peasants), Krasnaya Zvezda, p. 2. 
are 
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On 9 December Soviet newspapers contained a minimum 
of articles concerning the Winter War. The only interesting 
news item was found in Krasnaya Zvezda, the army organ. In 
its "editorial" a Professor of Economics, one L. Ziman 
pres e nted a long, detailed analysis of the economic history 
of Finland under the Republic. As expected, his ideas 
f ollowed the typical party line. Finland had been trans-
formed into a "semi-feudal landlordism" which had destroyed 
the forests, checked the growth of industry, misused the 
natural resources and contributed to the unequal distribution 
of the population. The country had been changed into a 
private preserve for exploiters who kept the nation "in 
bond to the foreign capitalists." But all this would now be 
changed for the Finnish workers had created the Finnish 
"Peoples' Republic" in order to utilize properly their 
natural resources, free their productive power and raise 
their standard of living. In view of all this the professor 
advised the Finnish people to help the Red Army gain the 
1 
victory over their common enemy. 
More of the same blossomed from most journals on 10 
December. Again there were "resolutions" of the "freed'' 
citizens in favor of the ''Democratic Republic" and "eye-
witness accounts" of the brutality of the 11Whitefinn Bands." 
The "patriotic workers of liberated Finland" once more accused 
1L. Ziman, "Plodie Hozyainichaniya Finskii Marionetok" 
(The Fruits of the House.keeping of the Finnish Puppets), 
Krasnaya Zvezda, p. 3. 
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the ttwhiteguard bands of political adventurers" of ignoring 
the laboring people and provoking war 11 with our friend, the 
Soviet Union." 1 Moreover, this "band of landlords and 
capitalists" which "contrived a criminal war against the 
2 
USSRu now had "shamefully run from the capital." Therefore, 
these citizens announced in their meetings that they would 
"support again the created Peoples' Government under the 
leadership of Otto Kuusinen," for after all this government 
gave "protection and peace to the Finnish people. 113 
A new note was introduced in a resolution of the 
Russian Karelian collective of Kroshnozero. The inhabitants 
of this agricultural establishment announced that the 
"perpetual dream of the Finnish people for union with their 
national brothers, the Karelian people, had taken place." 
And just look at the results: "The present Finnish and Kare-
lian people will begin to live as one family. 114 This effort, 
of course, was merely a renewal of earlier attempts to bribe 
the Finns into accepting Soviet terms with the promise of 
the reunion of eastern Karella with Finland. 
111 Privetstvie Narodnomu Pravitel 1 stvu Finlyandii 11 
(The Support for the Peoples' Government of Finland), 
Izvestiya, p. 2. 
211 sobranie Sjitelei Ostrova Seiskaari 11 (A Meeting 
of the Inhabitants of the Island of Seiskaari), Krasnaya 
Zvezda, P• 2. 
3Ibid. 
411 Finskii i Kareltskii Narodie Budut Sjit Edinoi 
Sem' el" (The Finnish and Karelian Peoples Will Live as One 
Family), Pravda, p. 2. 
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As for the somewhat nebulous "Peoples' Army" Krasnaya 
Zvezda reported that it looked very good: "The equipment 
was splendid. The relations among the soldiers and com-
manders are f'ounded on good soldierly discipline, 11 and as a 
result "every soldier knows for what he fights." Therefore, 
the Red Army man was reassured that this new fighting force 
would soon be able to help him "eliminate the focus of' war 
in the Baltic. 111 
In the "eyewitness reports" of 10 December there were 
the usual accounts of "bourgeoisie brutality" which were 
such a familiar part of the newspaper accounts of this 
period. In one story a Finnish peasant who was sick of 
11 Schutzcorp methods" had stayed behind and helped the Russian 
engineers find the mines left behind by the retreating 
"Whi teguards." In spite of his evident confidence in the 
ultimate victory of' the Red armies, this "mine detector 11 
refused to allow the Soviet war correspondent to reveal his 
f'amily name. He did this because he said that he feared 
reprisals against his son in Helsinki. It seemed that by 
this time even pro-Russian Finns felt some doubt that the 
Soviet forces would "soon raise the b anne r of the Peoples' 
Republic over the capital of Finland. 112 
To heighten the impression of Finnish disintegration 
1 
"U Boitzov Narodnoi Armii Finlyandii 11 (By the 
Soldiers of the Peoples• Army), Krasnaya Zvezda, P• 2. 
2 Irii German, 11 Zabut, te Mou FamiliuL 11 ( Forget about 
My FamilyL), Krasnaya Zvezda, P• 2. 
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there were stories of Finnish soldiers who had either been 
captured or had deserted to the Russians. Most of these 
men, according to the news releases of Soviet reporters, were 
disgusted with conditions within Finland both in and out of 
the army. One Uho Hutsumen expressed the horror of the 
average Finnish soldier when ordered to destroy the small 
town of Suomussalmi in central Finland. According to 
Hutsumen, the inhabitants were evacuated by force, the 
domestic animals killed and, upon the approach of the Red 
Army, the houses were burned to the ground. As he pointed 
out, this was done "in order that the Red Army could not 
stop and feed itself. 11 Hutsumen, and perhaps a good number of 
cold, hungry and disappointed Russian soldiers, called down 
"endless curses on the Schutzcorp barbarians and on the 
criminal Firmish Government and its leaders .111 
In another article it was learned from a letter 
written to a wounded Finnish prisoner that the civilians in 
Finland were II forced by the war to work like horses while in 
h d n2 the army, not a day passes that someone is not punis e • 
On all sides, according to this Russian newspaper release, 
the Finnish proletariat, both in and out of the army, had 
long been disgusted with conditions brought about by the 
war. 
1uho Hutsumen, "Pis'mo Plennovo Finskovo Soldata" 
(A Letter of a Captured Finnish soldier), Pravda, P• 2. 
2nv Lazarete 11 (In a Hospital), Krasnaya Zvezda, 
P• 2. 
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In most of the Russian press on 11 December there was 
little mention of the Winter war outside of the foreign news 
items and the daily "Operations Reports." Besides one 
"editorial" in Trud which informed the reader that the 
capitalistic bosses of "White-Finland" had exploited the 
ne.tural resources of that nation for the past twenty years., 1 
there was no major news releases in the general press. 
On the other hand, Krasnaya Zvezda., the Red Army's 
newspaper, contained three 11 eyewitness reports" which described 
in great detail the reactions of the Finnish population to 
the triumphant advance of the Soviet armies. In the village 
of Hautavara, for instance., when the Russian soldiers gave 
the surviving peasants food and drink, these people looked 
upon them with astonishment for the perplexed villagers had 
been told that the Red Army was "terrible and cruel" and were 
surprised that it "had not looted homes or seized the cattle." 
According to the authors of this piece, a friendly attitude 
ensued between the Soviet troops and the local population 
which resulted in the enthusiastic welcome by the inhabitants 
of the news of the formation of a "Peoples • Government. 113 
In all cases., this "correct action" of the Red Army, in 
contrast to the "brutality" of the Schutzcorps, created a 
1 B. Mihailov, "Ograblenie Finlyandii Finansovim 
Kapitalomn (The Robbery of Finland by the Financial capital-
ists), Trud, po 2: 
2p. Ogin and S. Sapigo, "V Finskoi Derevne" ( In a 




feeling of friendship between the peasants and the citizen-
soldiers of the Soviet Union. 
This feeling even seemed to have penetrated the ranks 
of the Finnish Army. A prisoner, one private Ukannen, 
revealed that 0 of one hundred Finnish soldiers, hardly any 
can be found who want war with the Soviet Union, and these 
consist chiefly of the Schutzcorps and Jaegers," consequently, 
"the rest do not want to fight with the Red Army. 111 
Describing the conditions within the army, Ukannen con-
tinued: 
With the approach of units of the Red Army, we 
ran from our officers to the rear, nearer home. The 
officers forced us to fire, threatening to kill us 
but this had very little effect on the troops. This 
is why even the select units of the Schutzcorps have 
retreated in such panic and disorganization. The 
Finnish Army does not exist any more. It has fallen 
into ruin and has become of no fighting value. In 
the fore~ts exists only bands of Schutzcorps and 
Jaegers. 
This destruction of the main fighting elements of the 
Finnish Army so glibly announced by Private Ukannen was, to 
put it mildly, rather premature. Certainly, by the time this 
story appeared its conclusions may well have been disputed 
by Red Army men who had just been thrown back from Taipale, 
Haukiperi and the Tolvajarvi ridges by these same "bands of 
no fighting value." 
In all justice to the Russian reporters, however, it 
1P. Nesterov and s. Solodovnikov, 11Chelovek s Rusj'em" 
(Man with a Rifle), Krasnaya zvezda, P• 3. 
2Ibid. 
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should be mentioned that these stories were probably from the 
earlier period of combat, before the Red Army had come up to 
the principal Finnish defense lines. Indeed, even the Finnish 
reports make mention of the hurried evacuation of positions 
which might well have been held, due apparently to mistaken 
orders. 1 Then, too, mixed-up civilian and military with-
drawals before the initial Russian attacks in eastern Karelia 
2 
had many of the aspects of a breakup in the organization. 
Thus the careful reader cannot entirely dismiss even these 
apparently misleading accounts of the Russian advance into 
Finland. 
The final "eyewitness story" of this early period told 
of the experiences of one of many Finnish "volunteerstt who, 
according to the authors of this tale, were flocking to the 
banners of the "Peoples' Army" to help drive their 
"bourgeoisie oppressors" out of the country. This partic-
ular deserter-volunteer, one Matti Tolvonen, had evidently 
hidden in a cellar in Terioki on the first day of the war to 
await the arrival of the Red "liberators." When he came out 
of his hiding place he found that a newly-organized "Peoples• 
Government" had formed a "First Corps" to fight the "white-
bandit regime." Since Tolvonen had been a "Red Guard" during 
the civil war in Karelia in 1919, he naturally wished to 
1Mannerheim, PP• 327-328. 
2 Palolampi, p. 38. 
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destroy the capitalistic robbers who had kept him and his 
family in poverty for some twenty years. For these reasons 
he went immediately to the local military headquarters and 
enlisted to ."break the heads of all bourgeoisie, priests 
and landlords, •.• so that in Finland one can live as in 
the Soviet Union. 111 The impression derived from this story 
was that there was a widespread movement of Finnish deserters 
swelling the ranks of the "armed forces of the Democratic 
Republic" which would gladly join in the fight to sweep the 
2 
Ryti-Tanner Government into the "dustheap of history." 
A review of these past six days in the Russian press 
revealed several important points. In the first place the 
writers of these articles were reporting this war according 
to the tenants of Communist dogma. Any invasion of a 
capitalistic nation by a Communist army therefore naturally 
resulted in an "inevitable 11 uprising of the depressed 
proletariat. Thus it is understandable that Russian news-
paper reporters would recount events that would support this 
thesis. 
A second point, however, is that despite exaggerations, 
there was an unmistakable air of authenticity in the descrip-
tions of fighting conditions in Finland. Indeed, it would 
have been strange if soviet correspondents could not have 
1R. Bershadskii, p. Korzinkin and M. Lobanov, "V 
Narodnou Armiu" (In the Peoples ' Army), Krasnaya Zvezda, p. 3. 
2Ibid. 
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found some pro-Russian peasants and workers to substantiate 
their contentions about Finnish morale. Also, as has been 
demonstrated, the hurried initial retreat of the Finnish 
defensive forces did lend some substance to the idea that 
the enemy was reluctant to come to grips with the Red Army. 
A good many of these erroneous articles were probably just 
the result of 11 selectivett reporting, not exactly unknown 
to the present writer from his own experiences in the 
Korean War. 
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The illustrations on this map show the main outlines 
of the Red Army offensives of February--March 1940 which 
finally broke the right-center of the Mannerheim Line and 
virtually surrounded Viborg. The series of unit designations 
in the center of the map are the approximate locations of 
both the Finnish and Russian divisions as they were lined up 
in their positions at the beginning of February, before the 
Soviet attack began. The unit designations in the upper 
portion of the map show the approximate locations of the 
units at the end of the war. 
An interesting point in this diagram was the concentra-
tion of Soviet military effort in the western part of the 
Karelian Isthmus. Of like importance was the developing 
ability of Soviet military leaders to deploy such a heavy 
weight of men and machines because inland lakes, the rivers, 
and even the Gulf of Finland had frozen solid enough to bear 
the weight of armored vehicles. 
Only the main lines of the Soviet attacks are marked 
in red on this map. The tactical maneuvers on both sides 
were, of course, much . more complicated than might be indicated 
by the relatively simple lines on this diagram. Particularly, 
there was a great deal of lateral movement among the Soviet 
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DELAY AND DEFEAT--THE RED STEAMROLLER SLOWS DOWN 
(12 December 1939--30 January 1940) 
The middle two months of the Winter War saw little 
but frustration and defeat for the units of the Red Army. 
In the extreme north the 52nd Soviet Division continued its 
drive along the Winter Road south from the Petsamo area. 
By 19 December this unit had been "stabilized" along approx-
imately 100 kilometers of this road while the Finns tried 
their favorite tactic of spot flank attacks along Soviet 
lines of communication. 1 The Soviet then brought up the 
104th Division which on 23 December forced the Finnish 
defenders to fall back to a position just north of Ivalo. 2 
But bad weather and continued flank attacks by small Finnish 
ski units forced the Russians to a halt which lasted 
throughout the remainder of the war. 3 
In the Salla-Pelkoseiniemi area of southern Lapland 
the Soviet 122nd Division's attack towards Pelkosenniemi was 
1Borgman, Der Ueberfall, pp. 124-125. 
2Ibid., pp. 192-193. 
3Hudson Strode, Finland Forever (New York: Harcourt 
Brace, 1941), p. 399. 
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defeated and thrown back by an outflanking thrust on 18-19 
December, 1 while further Russian efforts towards Kemijoki 
were also crushed. 2 The 53rd Soviet Division, hurriedly 
brought up to reinforce the drive in this area was also 
smashed and both the remnants of the 122nd and the 53rd were 
forced to retreat into their defensive works at Salla by 
4 January. 3 Here this front stabilized until the end of the 
war despite the replacement of Finnish units with about seven 
thousand Swedish and Norwegian volunteers4 after 26 February 
to release Finnish units for the desperate combat on the 
Karelian Isthmus.5 
Just to the south of the Salla area the Soviet 163rd 
Division in Suomussalmi was cut off from its Uhtka base and 
gradually broken into fragments by reinforced Finnish 
battalions. By 27 December the remnants of this unit were 
in full retreat to Jurhisranta while the last remaining 
11 motti"6 at Hulkonniemi was broken by the 30th of that 
1Mannerheim, p. 341. 
2 Strode, p. 397. 
3Borgman, Der Ueberfall, pp. 186-187. 
4Robert Alexander Winston, Aces Wild (New York: 
Holiday House, 1941), p. 75. 
5Borgman, Der Ueberfall, p. 188. 
6Mottis are literally timber enclosures created by 
laying logs against two trees. Here they refer to the 
habit of the Finns of breaking the Red Army road columns 
into small segments in the deep forests of eastern Finland. 
See: "Motti Tactics," The Infantry Journal (January 1950), 
p. 8. 
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month. 1 The 44th Ukranian Guards Division which sought to 
s upport the 163rd by an advance to Suomussalmi from Raate 
due east of that town had also been halted, broken into 
"motti" and finally crushed by 7 January. This annihilation 
of the better part of two Soviet Divisions turned out to be 
one of the most complete victories of the war for the Finns. 2 
Further south in the Kuhmo sector the 54th Soviet 
Division, rein.forced by "odd" regiments from other units, 
continued to try to break Finnish resistance and cut the 
Oulu Railroad. From 21 December to 29 January continued 
Finnish flanking attacks broke the rear communications of 
the 54th and began the inevitable splitting of this unit 
into isolated "mottis." On 31 January a new reinforced 
Soviet ski battalion attempted to break through to the 
beleaguered "mottis" near Kemijarvi but failed. It was 
the first attempt at this sort of action by the Red A:Itmy 
in the Winter War.3 
In eastern Karelia the 139th Soviet Division which 
had been halted in the fierce fighting during the period 
from 10-12 December now came under direct attack by the 
reinforced Finnish defenders despite the presence of elements 
of the 75th Soviet Division in support and a new advance on 
1Mannerheim, p. 339. 
2 John Langdon-Davis, Finland, the First Total War 
(London: G. Rutledge and Sons, 1940), pp. 14-15. 
3Borgman, Der Ueberfall, p. 180. 
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Ilomantsi by the 15th Soviet Division. From 14-16 December 
continual Finnish attacks cleared the Tolvajarvi ridges and 
pushed the Russians back to their positions at Aittijoki 
where the front was stabilized for the rest of the war. 1 
At the Kolla-Uomaa blockade the Finns held out against 
increased Soviet pressure even when the Reds had been rein-
forced by units of the 75th, 56th, 46th and 128th Soviet 
Divisions. The tremendous defensive effort around the 
so-called "Red House" 2 was especially bloody and long-lasting. 
Indeed, this defensive effort has been termed the "Verdun of 
the Finnish War. 113 There was also no doubt that the success-
ful defense of this crucial position enabled the Finns to 
counter Soviet efforts to the south to seize the Sortavala 
positions.4 
In the southern sector of eastern Karelia the 18th 
Soviet Division, reinforced by the 34th Tank Battalion and 
the 168th Soviet Division which had succeeded in linking up 
with the 18th at Kitela were subjected to persistent and 
increasing Finnish attacks during December and January. 5 
By 20 January both Soviet Divisions had been halted and were 
1Mannerheim, pp. 336-337. 
2Palolampi, pp. 58-230. 
3sorgman, Der Ueberfall, p. 211. 
4Mannerheim, p. 347. 
5strode, pp. 406-407. 
being broken into "mottis. 111 On 21 January the Russian 
forces (principally the 20th Motorized Cavalry Division, 
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the 60th, 72nd and 155th In£antry Divisions plus a ski 
battalion) were engaged in a two-pronged effort to relieve 
the surrounded units. But up to the end of January these 
efforts were unsuccessful. 2 However, the tenacious defenses 
of the Soviet troops in their "mottis11 prevented the anni-
hilation of the major parts of the 168th right up to the end 
o~ the war. 3 On the other hand most of the 18th Division 
and all of the 34th Tank Battalion were crushed by the Firms 
in January ski attacks.4 
On the Karelian Isthmus the first Soviet moves after 
the mid-December period were a series of attacks from 14-18 
December by the Grendal Corps on the eastern anchor of the 
Mannerheim Line at Taipale. Despite the temporary success 
of Russian forces in crossing Lake Suvanto at Kelja on 
17 December, this area was soon cleared of Red units and 
further attacks on these positions during the 28th and 29th 
of the month were likewise unsuccessful.5 In the middle of 
the Isthmus attacks were next made on the Punnisjarvi lines 
1Borgman, Der Ueberfall, pp. 199-200. 
2 ~., pp. 201-202. 
3Marmerheim, p. 348. 
4Borgman, Der Ueberfall, pp. 208-209. 
5Mannerheim, p. 342. 
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on 14 and 15 December but with no permanent result. 1 Then 
the major Soviet effort shifted to the Summa area where 
three Red divisions made a concerted attempt to crack the 
center of the Mannerheim Line between the 17th and 20th of 
the month. These efforts, despite initial penetration of 
the fortified belt, resulted in further Russian failures 
and the loss of some fifty-eight tanks. 2 All the Soviet 
efforts at breaching these defenses were closely supported 
by continual heavy artillery barrages plus fleet and aerial 
bombardments of Koivistox.3 The failure of these moves was 
due partly to the strong defensive positions and the unfa-
vorable ground which restricted the maneuver area available 
for armor.4 
The Finns also mounted an attack of their own between 
Kuolemzjarvi and Muolaanjarvi on 23 December in an effort to 
split the Russian forces before the Summa lines. However, 
due to poor planning, a lack of material and numbers plus 
the thorough Soviet defensive measures, this penetration was 
ultimately unsuccessful. On the other hand, the Finns seem 
to have felt that their failure had some results because the 
Russians apparently suspended active operations for some time 
1Borgman, Der Ueberfall, p. 166. 
2Mannerheim, p. 343. 
3Borgman, Der Ueberfall, p. 169. 
4nwar on Land," Army, Navy Journal (30 December 1939), 
p. 388. 
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in the Summa sector. 1 Despite this evaluation, it was far 
more likely that Soviet military leaders suspended opera-
tions here because they wished to reorganize and re-evaluate 
their attempts to smash the main Finnish defenses. 
This conclusion can be reinforced by the fact that 
Soviet leadership made several significant changes in their 
military command during the early part of January. The 
Chairman of the Leningrad Military District, General Kirill 
Meretzkov, 2 was replaced in overall command by the appoint-
ment of Marshal Siemon Timoshenko3 to command the 7th Army 
with Boris Shaposbnikov4 as his Chief of Staff.5 The command 
of the 8th, 9th and 14th Armies was handed over to Marshal 
Gregory M. Stern, who previously had commanded the Soviet 
l 
Mannerhaim, pp. 344-345. 
2Kirill Afanas 1 evich Meretzkov (1897- }joined the Red 
Army in 1918, graduate of Frunze Military Academy and had 
long career as staff officer~ Originally commanded all the 
troops involved in the Finnish invasion until relieved in 
January 1940. 
3semion Konstantinovich Timoshenko (1895-} joined 
the Bolsheviks in the Civil War and after specialized military 
training in 1920 1 s was appointed commander of the Kiev 
Military District. Commanded the troops which entered Poland 
until called to command the 7th Army on the Karelian Isthmus 
in January 1940. 
4Boris Nikhailovich Shaposhnikov (1882-1945} orig-
inally a Tzarist Staff Officer who joined the Bolsheviks 
during the Civil War. Held positions as head of the Frunze 
Military Academy and the Voroshilov Military Academy. In 
the 1930 1 s became Chief of the General Staff and deputy 
peoples' commisar for defense. Appointed Chief of Staff 
of the 7th Army in January 1940. 
5Borgman, Der Ueberfall, pp. 216-217. 
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armies in eastern Siberia and was somewhat of a hero for his 
resistance to Japanese penetration into Mongolia.1 These 
changes were apparently made to obtain closer control and 
coordination among field units than had been possible when 
all operations were directed from the Headquarters of the 
Leningrad Military District. Then, too, the evident dis-
satisfaction with results so far in the war must have con-
stituted a major reason for the change in field commanders 
at this time. Certainly there was an air of reorganization 
with the appearance of the newly-appointed leaders. 
With the hardening of the ground and waterways in 
mid-January due to the continuation of clear, cold weather, 
operations reopened on the Karelian Isthmus. 2 The so-called 
"Voroshilov Offensive" which took place in the Summa and 
Pasuri areas from 22-30 January seems to have been a prelim-
inary to the great February attacks which would break the 
Mannerheim Line.3 The effect of these local moves and 
others at Taipale during the later period was to wear down 
the Finnish defenders and to help the Soviets to coordinate 
the activities of their various arms.4 
In the field of diplomacy the tide of events also 
seemed to turn against Soviet leaders. During December and 
1strode, p. 401. 
2Borgman, Der Ueberfall, p. 218. 
3~., p. 213. 
4Mannerheim, pp. 350-351. 
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Januartr the Russian 
~ Foreign Commissariat rebuffed all efforts 
by Finnish ~oreign Minister Tanner to re-establish some sort 
of contact with the Soviet Government. Even .Nazi Germany 
Was unable 
or unwilling to use her good offices to transmit 
diplomatic 
correspondence which might have permitted a 
.Peaceful 1 
settlement of the "Finnish difficulty." In the 
eyes of th 
e Communists the Kuusinen "Terioki regime" con-
tinued to be 
the legitimate government of the Finnish people 
th
roughout the first month and a half of the war. 2 This 
continued during the period under diseussion despite the 
"Very s 1~ 8 4 -evident fact that, as the President of Finland 
said 1n 
a speech: "Herr Kuusinen's power in Finland has 
ne~er . 
extended farther than the bayonets and bullets of the 
Red A. 
rmy, and it will not ·last one minute longer than the 
bayonets Which J surround him." 
On the other hard, the prompt action by the League 
or N 
attons in condemning the Soviet Union as an aggressor 
ao
d 
the calling on all member nations to aid the beleaguered 
Finns4 
. nullified much of the earlier diplomatic success of 
l 
Tanner, The Winter War, pp. 117-118. 
2 
Accou Max Jakobsen, The Diplomacy of t~e Winter War: An 
Fiar nt of' the Russo-Finnish War 1 -1. 0 (Cambridge: 
vard University Press, 1961 , pp. 169-170. 
3 
des Risto Heikki Ryti, stunden der Entscheidung; Reden 
~!lll!.§chen Staatspraesidenten Risto Ryti (Leipzig: .. 
Verlag, 1944)' p. 27. . 
the F 
4
teague of' Nations, 20th Assembl . l 
~)innish_Qovernment. Report of the Assembll 
, P. 10. 
the Soviet Government. Thus the continued resistance of the 
Finns might give the League powers time to organize aid for 
the valiant defenders of that little nation.1 Indeed, the 
temporary stalemate in combat during December and January 
resulted in consultation between Finland and the western 
Allies which looked towards the possibility of arms aid and 
troop reinforcement to bolster the tiring Finnish defenders. 2 
The obvious miscalculations of Soviet leaders rever-
berated upon the diplomatic situation. The initial diplomatic 
"blockade" which the Russians had thrown up around Finland 
could not last long without substantial military success by 
the Red Army. When the expected "swift victory over the 
forces of Finnish reaction" failed, the early advantage of 
Soviet diplomacy was lost and the Kremlin leaders were forced 
to truce a new tack before possible outside intervention might 
increase the danger to Leningrad. 3 
By early February a tentative link of communication 
between the Soviet and Finnish Foreign Offices had been 
established through the Soviet Ambassador to Sweden, Madame 
Alexandra Kollontai.4 While no serious negotiation was 
attempted during January, it was obviously a great breakthrough 
111 Service News and Gossip," Army, Navy Journal (16 
December 1939), p. 342. 
2Tanner, The Winter War, PP• 133-134. 
311What Russia is Reaching For," Business Week (9 
December .1939), p. 17. 
4Tanner, The Winter War, p. 125. 
for the Finns when the Kremlin consented to recognize the 
Helsinki Government as the legal ruler of Finland. From 
these rather small beginnings would come the later peace 
negotiations and the Treaty of Moscow which would end the 
Winter War. Of course the question of why the Kremlin 
leaders decided to make such a complete change about is 
still not entirely clear. Perhaps the best summation has 
been made by one authority on Russia who gave as his opinion 
that the move was: 
••• prompted not so much by direct considera-
tion of military strategy as by the general political 
situation in Europe ••• the war had lasted longer 
than expected and had placed in jeopardy Russia's 
entire foreign policy. The problem of the Balkans 
was awaiting a solution, and this could not be pos-
sibly solved so long as Russia was involved in war. 
What was more important, Moscow was receiving 
concrete information from London and Paris to the 
effect that the Allies were seriously considering 
coming to the aid of the Finns •••• Moscow began 
to realize that what was to have been a local war, 
lasting at most a week, was in danger of becoming 
a general European war against Russia. A big war 
in which Russia would have to fight on the side of 
Germany was something which Stalin did not relish. 1 
Here anyone who might look through the Russian 
newspapers of the period would discover that their coverage 
of the Winter War had been much reduced from the earlier 
period of the conflict. Except for the "Operations Reports 
of the Leningrad Military District" (printed in a small box) 
the "disturbances on Russia's northwestern frontiers 11 
remained virtually absent from the front pages of the Soviet 
1nallin, p. 182. 
press. Major articles which described the fighting, the 
character of the enemy forces and the Helsinki Government 
were greatly reduced in number. Only on those pages devoted 
to stories from foreign sources was there any continuous 
mention of the struggle to "free the Finnish workers and 
peasants from their bourgeoisie masters." It would seem that 
the Soviet leadership was by this time determined to focus 
the attention of their people on the more successful aspects 
of Russian news and forget the earlier hopes for a swift 
victory over the "bandit gangs of Mannerheim." 
The lessening of Soviet press efforts against the 
Finns might lead one to suppose that Russian leaders had 
changed their picture of the Finnish situation. A careful 
analysis of the articles which did appear concerning the 
Finnish problem, however, reveals that such was not the case. 
In a story on 12 December in Izvestiya a Soviet writer 
repeated all the old arguments concerning Finland and wound 
up by saying that after twenty years of "pacifistic and 
woman-like bourgeoisie democracy" the masses of Finland 
hoped for a long-awaited delivery "from the oppressive hand 
111 of the reactionary bourgeoisie. One also reads that the 
"bourgeoisie regime" of Finland had always opposed the 
l i beralism of the Finnish working people. 11 For twenty 
years the lor.ds of the Finnish plutocracy made sure unemploy-
ment, hunger, poverty and injustice would be the constant 
1E. Levin, "Konstitutziya Beloi Finlyandii" (The 
Constitution of White Finland), Izvestiya, p. 2 • . 
fellow-travelers of the Finnish workers." 1 
Izvestiya also supplied the following "editorial" 
picture of the "bearable" living conditions in wartime 
Finland: 
In the factories and plants a 10 hour working 
day has been instituted; on the shoulders of the 
workers is laid the burden of oppressive taxes (on 
coffee, sugar, watches, and so forth). Income 
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truces even on very small incomes, and in this case 
on the half-hungry wages of the workers has been 
raised to 20% although shortly before this there 
had already been an important increase in this tax. 
In the enterprises production had increased 
incredibly. The factory owners refuse to increase 
the workers' wages and compensation for overtime. 
The landlords throw out into the street the fami~ies 
of reservists who have been taken into the army. 
Of course the "Whitefinn Government," so the party 
line continued, concealed all this from the soldiers and 
workers by paying journalists to write stories of imaginary 
victories in the fighting with the Red Army. These mercenary 
"creaking ravens" of Mannerheim weaved their "restless lies" 
so well that even the "Munchausen adventures simply decay 
before the fairy tales which come from the pens of the 
Whitefinn scribblers and their fellow champions who are 
zealously executing the literary orders of baron Mannerheim."3 
1A. Makarov, "Pod Onetom Finskoi Plutokratii" (Under 
the Oppression of the Finnish Plutocrats), Krasnaya Zvezda, 
24 December 1939, p. 4. 
2A. Lisin, "Belaya Finlyandiya Pared Kontzom" (White 
Finland Approaches the End), Izvestiya, 27 December 1939, 
p. 4. 
3A. Lisin, "Besshabashoe Vran'e 1Literatorov 1 
Rabotaushchih Na Barona Mannergeima" (The Croaking Raven 
1Writers 1 of the Workers in Mannerheim's Barony), Krasnaya 
Zvezda, 30 December 1939, p. 4. 
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In this way the Finnish people were distracted from their 
plight and encouraged to fight against the "liberation 
forces of the state of socialism."1 Here was an oblique 
admission that the Russians were meeting opposition in 
Finland and the Finnish workers were not greeting their 
"red brothers" as liberators. 
A relatively new subject which appeared in the Soviet 
press during the latter part of December was the much 
repeated point that the "Whitefinns" were being supported 
in their "aggressions" by a combination of western impe.-
rialistic countries. This was particularly evident in a 
series of articles concerning the expulsion of the Soviet 
Union from the League of Nations. The decision of the 
League's "Committee of Thirteen" to ask the Red Army to 
withdraw from Finnish Territory or, failing that, to leave 
the League was represented by Pravda as a plot by the Anglo-
French imperialists to prevent a peaceful settlement of the 
Baltic problem. 2 On the other hand, the action of the 
League of Nations against the Soviet Union was described 
as a distinct advantage since henceforth the USSR would not 
be bound by the pact of the League and would have a free 
llE.!.£. 
211 Na Assamblie Ligi Natzii" (In the Assembly of the 
League of Nations), Pravda, 14 December 1939, p. 5. 
1 hand in solving its problems. This alleged connection 
between the western Allies and the 11 bankrupted Mannerheim 
clique" remained a mainstay of Communist press reporting 
throughout the remainder of the war. 
Most of the articles from foreign sources which 
appeared in the Russian press consisted of variations on 
this theme. Thus there was a report of a workers 1 meeting 
in Hyde Park, London, the purpose of which was to pledge 
support for the "peoples' Government of Finland11 and to 
p rotest against ~id to 11Wb.i te Finland11 b-y the so-called 
i mperialists. The action of the USSR, according to this 
report , was "directed at the liberation of the Finnish people 
and the destruction of the plans of the imperialists to 
employ Finland as a t-ype of armed camp for a war against 
the nation of socialism.112 
Another characteristic feature of the Soviet press 
during the middle period of the Winter War was its more 
realistic approach to conditions in Finland and the conflict 
in general. All of a sudden the Russian readers learned 
that the economic situation in Finland was not so bad as it 
had been previously reported. There were fewer references 
to foreign exploitation and the exhaustion of natural 
1 "Poslednii Resheni-ye Ligi Natzii 11 (The Last Decision 
of the League of Nations), Izvestiya, 16 .December 1939, p. 1 • 
. 
2
"Mitin~ Solidarnosti s Finl-yandskim Narodniem 
Pravitel 1 stvom (A Meeting of Solidarity with the Finnish 
Peoples' Government}, Krasnaya Zvezda, 12 December 1939, 
p. 4. 
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resources by local capitalists. Indeed, Ivan learned that 
Finland's economy after World War I continued to grow and 
prosper rather than decline. 1 
The purpose behind such an objective view becomes 
clear if one studies another story which appeared throughout 
the Soviet press on 23 December. This was a review of the 
previous three weeks of fighting as released by the Head-
quarters of the Leningrad Military District. This article 
showed that Soviet military leaders were desparately trying 
to excuse their failure to overcome the Finnish defenses 
during the three weeks since the Red Army had first entered 
Finland. The account denounced the foreign press which had 
intimated that the failure of the Red Army to conquer 
Finland quickly was due to the "lower fighting potential" 
of the Russian soldier. It then went on to announce that 
the natural conditions of Finland, the extensive fortifica-
tions on the Karelian Isthmus and the aid sent by the impe-
rialistic Anglo-French had created obstacles which made the 
"Mannerheim Lines" in no way inferior to those of the 
Siegfried Line in . Germany. 112 
After all, the review continued, the Anglo-French 
forces had not made as much progress against the German 
111Ekonomicheskiye Resurie Finlyandii" (The Economic 
Resources of Finland), Pravda, 27 December 1939, p. 6. 
2"Trehnedel 1 nie Itog Boevieh Deistvii v Finlyandii" 
(A Three-Week Summary of War Activity in Finland}, 
Izvestiya, p. 1. 
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fortifications in three months as the Red Army advance into 
the Mannerheim Line in three weeks. 1 It was therefore 
ridiculous for anyone to expect that the Red Army would 
overcome the Whitefinn resistance in one week. From this 
article it was obvious that the Russians had made a decision 
to stop downgrading "Whitefinn" defensive efforts and build 
up their power as an excuse for the poor showing of the 
Soviet troops during this period. From this time on, Russian 
newspapers time and again pointed out the natural and man-
made difficulties in overcoming Whitefinn resistance. 
On the other hand, as the press proceeded into the 
year 1940, it can be demonstrated that the Kremlin's basic 
line had not changed, just the predictions of a speedy end 
to the "focus of war in the Baltic." While Soviet journa-
lists desisted in their efforts to convince the Russian 
people that any large number of Finnish soldiers were joining 
the Red Army, they continued to describe the Helsinki Govern-
ment as the enemy and oppressor of the Finnish working 
classes. Evidently to excuse the failure of the expected 
"proletarian revolt" the Red "myth-makers" continued to 
make a case against the Finnish Government. Here is an 
account from~: 
The bankrupt clique of Helsingfors have 
managed to arrest thousands of Finnish citizens, 
have shot honest patriots who were not willing 
to spill their blood for the hated Mannerheim 
gangs. In the towns and villages of Finland the 
contemptible Mannerheim and Tanner kill the workers, 
burn houses, forcibly evacuate the peaceful inhabi-
tants. 1The fierce terror of the Whitefinns knows no bounds. 
The same line was found in Izvestiya.: 
Now the end approaches for these hangmen of the 
Finnish people. The historic declaration of the 
People's Government of Finland which announced the 
confiscation of the landlords' property and the 
parceling of it among the landless and the small-
holding peasants has been received with great 
enthusiasm. Against the whiteguard dictates of 
the Finnish plutocrats and against the colonial 
lords of the foreign imperialists ~ow will rise 
all the working people of Finland. 
148 
Of course in "liberated" Finland the people were no 
longer oppressed and frightened but had begun to elect 
committees to govern themselves and lead a life free from 
terror, according to one article. Food and clothing, which 
had been in short supply, appeared again on the shelves of 
the village stores. All this was compared to the relative 
austerity in "Mannerheim Finland.'') 
To be sure Russian writers made it very clear that 
the contrast between life under the "Democratic Republic of 
Finland'' and the "Whiteguard terror" was kept from the 
Finnish people. The Soviets charged that well-paid journal-
ists of both the bourgeoisie and Social-Democratic press in 
1 "zverstva Belofinnov" (The Brutality of the Whitefinns), 
Trud, 3 January 1940, p. 2 • . 
2B. Posnikov, "Krest'yanstvo v Beloi Finlyandii" (The 
Peasantry in White Finland), Izvestiya, 4 January 1940, p. 4. 
3suoyarvi, "V Vostochoi Finlyandii" . (In Eastern 
Finland), Komsomolskaya Pravda, 9 January .1940, p. 4. 
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Finland withheld the true facts from the Finnish people.1 
Worse than that, these same "scribblers firmly preached to 
the working masses of Finland the idea of the necessity of 
a continual fight with the historic enemy, the Russians and 
t heir assistants, the Finnish Communists. 112 
In the eyes of the Communist press apparatus all this 
mythology and "Munchausen-like" lying had not prevented the 
Finnish proletariat from learning the true facts. As late 
as 10 February an article in Komsomolskaya Pravda reported 
the following: 
The Finnish people have risen against the 
agents of the provokers of war from the clique of 
Mannerheim-Ryti-Tanner. The people of Finland 
have created a Democratic Republic. A Treaty of 
Mutual Aid and Friendship concluded by the young 
Democratic Republic with the great Soviet Union 
guarantees the growth of solid friendly relations 
between both nations. On the basis of this treaty 
the Finnish people will take determined measures 
to liquidate the Whitefinn focus of war.3 
From the above review it becomes apparent that the 
Red press mills were still operating under the ridiculous 
assumption that the Finnish working classes were burning to 
overthrow their bourgeois masters. The one necessary addi-
tion to this myth was the factor of "Whitefinn terror" which 
1R. Raskinen, "•Demokratiya 1 Palacha Mannergeima" 
(The 'Democracy' of the Hangman Mannerheim), Komsomolskaya 
Pravda, 26 January 1940, p. 2. 
2G. Tverskoi, "National 1nii Gnet v Beloi Finlyandii" 
(National Hatred in White Finland),~' 28 January 1940, . 
p. 2. 
3observer, "Sweden's Dilemma," Contemporary Review 
(April 1940), pp. 410-417. 
150 
prevented the proletariat from expressing its wishes. Evi-
dently the Soviet press felt it had to explain the failure 
of a popular uprising in Finland to the civilians and soldiers 
of their nation. 
In the field of military reporting, the Red A:rmy com-
muniques which still appeared on the front pages of all 
Russian newspapers, turned more and more to realistic 
accounts of the fighting in Finland. Since 26 December 
these "Operations Reports" had monotomously stated that 
"nothing of consequence had happened on any :front." This 
seemed especially strange during a period when the Red Army 
was losing men and material in central and southeastern 
Finland. However, this could be explained by the natural 
reluctance or the Russian military commanders to admit their 
:failures. In the "Operations Report" or 9 January the Red 
Army :Celt compelled to state that "on the Uhtinsk rront 
there were ini'antry clashes, as a result or which our units 
were withdrawn several kilometers to the east of Suomussalmi. 111 
With this cryptic line the Soviet High Command summed up the 
virtual destruction or the major parts or three divisions and 
the abandonment or its advance position some 50-100 kilo-
meters deep in central Finland. On the other hand, consi-
dering the usual exaggerations contained in the Soviet press, 
this report might be thought or as a model of candor and 
1"operativnaya Suodka, Staba Leningradskovo Voennovo 
Okruga" (The Operations Report or the Starr of the Leningrad 
Military District), Pravda, p. 1. 
1.51 
truthfulness. 
From this point during January the "Operations 
Reports" continued to announce that only minor patrol clashes 
and artillery duels were taking place on all fronts. From 
16 January, however, the Red Army communiques also ominously 
contained references to the unbroken activity of the Red 
Air Corps, which was symtomatic of the clear, cold weather 
conditions that prevailed for the remainder of this month. 1 
Finally, on 8 February came the first announcement of the 
renewed drive to break the Mannerheim Line. These "Opera-
tions Reports" which were issued daily until the end of the 
war, not only contained a detailed list of the towns and 
railroad stations captured but even the number and types 
of fortifications which had been seized. It would seem 
that this feature was added to bolster the Soviet claim 
that the so-called Mannerheim Line was indeed "extremely 
strong and the capture of such a fortified area was a 
1 i 112 g or ous success for Russian arms. 
One of the most unusual features of the January-
February period in the Russian press was the appearance of 
the so-called "Stories of the Heros of the Battle with the 
Whitefinns" which became a more-or-less regular part of 
each issue from 16 January to 18 February 1940. These 
1Kournakoff, p. 129. 
2Milton Howard, "Soviet Cracking of Mannerheim Line 
Startles Military Experts," New York Daily Worker, 27 Febru-
ary 1940, p. 1. 
152 
a r ticles recounted the heroic deeds of Re~ Army soldiers, 
sailors and airmen who had been awarded the medal "Hero of 
the Soviet Union" in early January. While the Russian .forces 
a lways won over the "cowardly whitebandits," the descriptions 
of battle action were very good and illustrate just what 
difficulties the Red Army, Fleet and Air Force encountered 
in their invasion of Finland.1 
In the first of these articles which appeared in 
Krasnaya Zvezda there were three heroes whose stories were 
told. One of them was a Second Lieutenant, one Nikolai 
Kichigin. When his tank was blown up by a mine he continued 
to fight the attacking nWhitefinns" with machine gun and 
g renades until ordered to the rear by the unit commissar 
because of his wounds. Another was an heroic artilleryman, 
one Grigorii Laptex, who valiantly defended his battery from 
the attacks of encircling Finnish forces. The last hero, 
one Ivan Komarov, merely took five prisoners and defended 
his position with machine gun fire. 2 
In still another of these interesting 11 hero stories" 
a driver, one Anatole Koida, found himself at a temporary 
headquarters of his unit. During the night this headquarters 
1 In determining -just what is true or false in the 
descriptions of combat one must rely on one's own experiences. 
Modern combat is approximately the same in any army and so 
this writer has had to depend on his own experience in this 
area to make a decision as to the truth or falsity of any 
account. 
211 Geroi Boev · s Finskoi Belogvardeishchnoi" (The 
Heroes of Battles with the Finnish Whiteguards), Krasnaxa 
gvezda, 26 January 1940, p. 1. 
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wa.s attacked by an enemy battalion on skis. The brave 
driver organized a defense and, aided by the fact that the 
Finns attacked the wrong buildings, was able to prevent the 
1 enemy force from capturing the area. In this way the 
"whiteguard" raiders were foiled and the staff of the unit 
saved. 
To demonstrate the persistence of the Russian soldier 
there was the instance of a tank crew that fought on in 
spite of the fact that the Finns had knocked out their 
vehicle with artillery fire. 2 Finally there was the case 
of the political officer one Kapustin who died leading the 
men of his unit in a desperate attack to break out of an 
attempted encirclement of Finnish Schutzcorp troops. 3 Here 
a.gain appeared the quality of stubborn courage and heroic 
efforts to continue the fight although the hero had been 
wounded three times. 
What is significant about all these tales was the 
difficulties encountered by these heroes in their many 
battles against the "Whitebandits." A careful reading 
reveals that here were records of tanks destroyed, units 
surrounded, staff sections a.ttac.ked by ski troopers and 
1L. Korobov, 11Shofer Koida" (The Driver Kolda), 
~omolskaya Pravda, 6 February 1940, p. 2. 
2M. Larchenko, "Ekipa.sj Odinovo Tanka. 11 (The Crew of 
One Tank), Pravda, 22 January 1940, p. 6. 
3G. Mo.kin and G. Ladiesev, "Geroi Sovetskovo Souza, 
Politruk Kapustin" (Hero of the Soviet Union, Political 
Officer Kapustin), Krasnaya Zvezda, 14 February 1940, p. 3. 
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artillery batteries having to fight off Finnish ski patrols. 
The articles were singularly realistic and demonstrate the 
difficulties faced by the Red Army in this war; the clinging 
snow, the bitter cold, the impenetrable forests, the deep 
swamps, the icy, unbridged rivers, the harsh terrain and 
the always present threat of encirclement by the lightly-
armed Finnish ski troopers. While the news value of these 
stories is self-evident, it can also be said that they 
presented a good picture of the combat conditions under 
which the Red Army operated in their early advance into 
Finland. 
Towards the end of this period a curious article 
appeared simultaneously on the foreign news pages of virtually 
every Russian newspaper. Previously stories from foreign 
sources which had concerned Finland were obviously written 
to convince the Soviet population that the workers of the 
world were supporting the "Democratic Republic of Finland" 
in its efforts to "liberate" the Finnish people, and to 
condemn the 11Whiteguard terror" which was preventing these 
same people from expressing their opposition to the "war-
mongering policy of the bankrupt clique of Helsingfors." 1 
1For good examples see: "Dakskiei Rabochiei Protiv 
Pomoshchi Finskim Belogvardeitzam" (The Danish Workers Are 
Against Aid to the Finnish Whiteguards), Izvestiya 17 
January 1940, p. 4. "Rasskazie Finskih Besjentzev~ (The 
Stories of Finnish Refugees, Pravda, 17 January 19~0, p. 5; 
and "Dvisieniei v SShA Protiv Pomoshchi Beloginnam' (The 
Movement in the USA Against Help to the Whitefinns), Trud, 
22 January 1940, p. 4. -
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This attitude had been relatively constant since the beginning 
of the Winter War. 
On 10 February, however, there appeared on the foreign 
news pages something new in the line of articles from Com-
munist groups outside the USSR. The article consisted of a 
letter sent to Finnish Foreign Minister Tanner by an old 
comrade, Mauri Ruem, who had evidently been a member of the 
Social-Democratic Party. In the letter the author berated 
Tanner for forgetting his old principles of the eternal 
battle against the bourgeois capitalists. Now, according 
to this "nonrevisionist" Marxist, Tanner himself had turned 
into a "capitalistic stooge." The author insisted that the 
"bourgeois" government was leading the Finnish workers into 
a bloody war against the Soviet Union which would result in 
the destruction of thousands of people who actually had no 
interest in such a slaughter. As a solution to this problem, 
this correspondent suggested that Tanner should "quickly 
leave the arena of history to cleanse the way for a more 
capable person," and thus help to heal the rift between the 
USSR and Finland.1 It was this last point that made the 
article so important. 
The Soviet press officials seemed to have permitted 
the release of this letter (which had actually been written 
before the outbreak of the war) as an effort towards 
111 0tkreitoie Pis'mo Tanneru Izvestnovo Finskovo 
Sotzial-Demokrata--Mauri Ruema" (An Open Letter to Tanner 
from a Famous Finnish Social-Democrat--Mauri Ruem), Pravda, 
p. 5. 
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conciliation. It opened the possibility of a negotiated 
Peace provided the present leaders of the Finnish Government 
would resign and a new government selected which would be 
more acceptable to the Soviet Union. While it does not seem 
:;o be much, this concession loomed large after the almost 
iron-clad insistence of the Russian leaders that there was 
no legitimate government of Finland except the Kuusinen 
~egime in Terioki. In short, the publication of this letter 
~as the first public indication that the Kremlin might be 
,rilling to negotiate with the same "bankrupt clique of 
Helsingfors" which they had so long denounced as the "illegal 
::::olonial regime of the western imperialists." 
These middle two months of the war reporting then 
emphasized the fact that in its own way the Soviet newspaper 
stories did respond to the conditions and events of the 
dinter War. As has been pointed out, the very fact that the 
press campaign against Finland was so abruptly reduced in 
mid-December showed that the Russian information chiefs were 
trying to becloud the earlier hopes of a swift victory over 
the 
11
Wh.iteguard Finns." As has been noted, the Mannerheim-
Ryti-Tanner Government was still described as an unpopular, 
reactionary regime supported only by the western imperialistic 
powers which wished to use Finland as a base to attack the 
Soviet Union. 1 While Moscow evidently still considered that 
1
Alter Brody and others, War and Peace in Finland; a 
Documented Survez (New York: Soviet Russia Today, 1940), 
pp. 10-11. 
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the Finnish proletariat would rise and throw off their 
bourgeois rulers, the failure of such an uprising to mate-
rialize was explained by the actions of the "Whitefinn 
terror" which prevented any activity by the workers. In 
this way the virtual abandonment of hopes for a working 
class revolt within Finland was presented to the Russian 
people. 
In connection with the suppression of Russian expecta-
tions for a leftist revolution among the "depressed laborers 
of Finland11 came the gradual fading-away of references to 
that 11 great" organization the "Peoples' Republic of Finland." 
In spite of the fact that the "Democratic Republic" led by 
Otto Kuusinen was still mentioned as the "liberating vehicle 
of the Finnish people" in almost every article about the war, 
there can be little doubt that the Soviet leaders had lost a 
good deal of faith in its usefulness. As proof of this, it 
can be pointed out that the so-called "Finnish Peoples' 
Army" was almost never mentioned in any part of the Russian 
press after mid-December. Even a letter supposedly written 
by a Finnish deserter, one F. Koitamo, on 15 December made 
no reference to the 11 First Corps of the Peoples' Army" which 
had so prominently :figured in the accounts of Finnish 
prisoners that had appeared the week before. 1 Likewise the 
"hero s t ories" of January and February contained no mention 
1P. Ogin ands. Sapigo, "Zapiski Finskovo Rezervista 
Koitamo" (The Letter of the Finnish Reservist Koitamo), 
Krasnaya Zvezda, p. 2. 
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of this ephemeral body of troops. With its "action arm" 
virtually ignored by Soviet press masters, there could be 
little question that the "Peoples' Government of Finland" 
had been relegated to the position of an almost discredited 
puppet regime, even in the eyes of its Kremlin overlords. 
In the reports of military action there was an imme-
diate cessation of articles which pictured the Finnish armed 
forces as poorly armed and badly led. This move was undoubt-
edly dictated by the failure of the Red Army to overcome the 
"small remnant of Schutzcorps and Jaegars" left after the 
"great victories" of early December. Indeed the Russian 
press bent over backwards in order to present the conflict 
as a grim struggle against a well-armed and well-trained 
enemy who was fighting desperately in opposition to the 
"liberating forces of socialism." For instance, by 23 
December Russian press bosses came to the interesting conclu-
sion that anyone who had expected a "Blitzkrieg" by the Red 
Army in Finland must have acted from desire to discredit the 
Soviet Union and her fighting forces. From this point on 
the war was presented as a different struggle. Grim pictures 
of the problems in overcoming Finnish resistance became the 
mainstay of the descriptions of personal experiences in 
combat. 
Finally the appearance of Mauri Ruem 1 s letter illus-
trated another change in Soviet tactics. As has been shown, 
this particular article was a public hint that the Russian 
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Commi ssariat for Foreign Affairs was now prepared to begin 
t.ent ative negotiations with the "bankrupted regime of 
Ryti - Tanner11 in spite of their continued support of Kuusinen's 
11 Peopl e s' Gover nment." From this one can see that Soviet 
n ewsp apers did, in thei r own way, respond to changes i n the 
flow of ev ents , 
CHAPTER VII 
THE SOVIET TRIUMPH--A LIMITED VICTORY 
(1 February 1940--12 March 1940) 
The last forty days of the Winter War finally saw the 
triumph of Soviet arms. The Russian steam-roller at last 
began to move forward. On 1 February there began an all-out 
drive to crack the "Summa lines" which had kept the Red 
forces out of Viborg for more than two months. The weather 
aided the Soviets for the average temperature for the middle 
of January had remained at about -30 degrees F. 1 This long 
cold spell froze the lakes, swamps and rivers of Finnish 
Karelia and now allowed the Red Army to advance over a broad 
front which previously had only been a sink-hole for men and 
equipment. 2 As a prominent German reporter stated: "Feb-
r uary, the month of the greatest cold was also the correct 
month for an offensive. 11 3 
The Soviets throughout January had reinforced their 
1Xylander, 3 May 1940, p. 258. 
2Fredrick Ege, 11 Ein Finnischer Armeefuehrer ueber den 
Finnisch-Russischen Kriege; General Ohquist ueber die 
Er.fahrwigen wid Lehren des Winterkrieges," Militaer 
Wochenblatt, 4 April 1940, p. 1660. 
3Borgman, Der Ueberfall, p. 219. 
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forces on the Karelian Isthmus. A new army, the 13th, was 
a dded to the force of the 7th Army under Marshal Timoshenko 
until there were approximately seven infantry divisions 
facing the western part of the Mannerheim Line with some 
fifteen divisions in reserve. 1 Far more ominous, however, 
was the fact that these troops were of better quality than 
the earlier Soviet units committed to the battle2 and the 
cooperation between the various arms was far superior to 
what it had been in the previous two months of combat. 3 
This was especially revealed in the preliminary offensives 
of early February with the formation of crack Soviet combat 
groups especially organized to reduce the larger iron-concrete 
fortifications of the Mannerheim Line.4 Then, too, the Red 
Army began to use their newly-developed T-26 heavy tank in 
considerable numbers.5 This tank was especially useful 
because it proved to be invulnerable to the lighter Finnish 
antitank weapons. 6 These vehicles plus the tremendous Soviet 
superiority in artillery, as a Finnish general reported: 
"s· 1 7 imp y ate the (fortified) lines up in February." 
1 Ege , p. 1661. 
2Ibid. -
3John Erickson, The Soviet Hi Command: A Militar -
Political Histor 1918~-~1~9~;.;;;.;"L~o~n~d~o~n=:i:.::...~S~t~.:::.:,;M~a~r~t~1~·n...:.;.-s~P=r=e~s~s~,..i1.. 
19 2, p. 9. 
4~., p. 550. 
5Andrononikov and Mostovenko, pp. 225-226. 
6Borgman, Der Ueberfall, p. 225. 
7Ege, p. 1662. 
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The preliminary attacks occupied the first eleven days 
of February 1940. The first major attempt at a breakthrough 
occurred on 6 February when three Soviet infantry divisions 
and one hundred tanks, in combination with an aerial attack 
by two hundred airplanes, began to probe for cracks in the 
Summa lines. 1 At the same time the 17th Soviet Division 
began to conduct the same type of operation near Punnusjarvi 
in the east . 2 In both cases lodgements were made in the 
Finnish defenses which could not be eliminated. 3 On 9 Feb-
ruary the 49th and 150th Soviet Divisions attacked the 
Taipale area and made some penetrations which also could not 
be wiped out by Finnish counterattacks.4 These successes 
set the stage for the next move of Marshal Timoshenko 1 s 
combined armies which were to be directed against the western 
end of the Mannerheim Line. 
On Sunday morning of 11 February the Red Army was 
poised with the 13th Army of five divisions at Antrea 
Junction , the 7th Army with nine divisions before Summa and 
Lahde plus two more divisions at Muula opposite Koivisto.5 
A usually reliable German reporter described the scene as 
1 Joose Olavi Hannula, Finland Fi ts for Home Faith 
and Country, 1939-1940 (Helsinki: Oy Suomen Kirja, 19 0, 
pp. 76-79. 
2 Borgman, Der Ueberfall, p. 223. 
3Mannerheim, p. 354. 
4Hannula, p . 81. 
5Erickson, p. 549. 
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f'ollows: 
At 8:30 hours some three hundred and twenty 
cannons plus hundreds of' mortars and light guns 
opened up on the whole f'ront .••• The tanks rolled 
f'orward with 100 meters between vehicles towing 
armored sleds containing 12 to 15 infantrymen. Other 
inf'antry f'ollowed in powered armored sleds .l 
As one Finnish soldier remembered that day: 
The attack was great and the artillery f'ire ter-
rif'ic. Over the f'ront came the tanks spitting bullets 
and shells. The trees were blasted by the explosions, 
the automatic weapons rolled, the shrapnel whirred, 
the shells droned while the dull thud of' the bombs 
resounded. Heaven and earth shivered. The infantry-
men in close f'ormatiQn moved into the breach. Good 
god! What a battle.~ 
The f'irst real break occurred east of Summa in the 
Lahde sector: "where the attack was more vigorous and better 
organized than any previous attack •••• this time the 
onslaught was concentrated and all branches of arms worked 
together. 11 3 By the 14th the whole Lahde area was lost.4 
With the entire Mannerheim Line now broken and all the 
Finnish troops worn down by the constant f'ighting,5 the 
Soviets began to push their way through to Viborg. A for-
tunate blizzard on 23 February allowed the Finns to withdraw 
1Borgman, Der Ueberfall, p. 226. 
2Viljo Saraja, Waffenbrueder In der Ori inalaus abe, 
Preis ekroent als Beste irklichkeitsdarstellun aus dem 
Finnisch-Russischen Winterkrie e 19 9 0 Leipzig: Paul 
Li st, 19 ~2 , p. 
3Hannula, loc. cit. 
4Mannerheim, pp. 355-356. 
5saraja, pp. 94-107. 
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most of their forces from various exposed positions1 but at 
best this was only a temporary respite. During the last 
part of February and the first days of March, despite the 
desperate and effective attacks of Finnish airplanes and 
coastal artillery, 2 the reinforced left wing of the Soviet 
7th Army managed to cross the ice of Viborg Gulf and effect 
a lodgement in the shore to the west of that city. 3 By this 
action they were able to cut the coastal supply road to 
Helsinki and threaten to surround all the men left on the 
Karelian Isthumus.4 By 12 March Viborg itself was virtually 
surrounded by Soviet forces although as the Finns so proudly 
maintain : "the flag still flew over Viborg castle on 13 
March 1940. 11 .5 
However, the Reds had not been inactive on other 
fronts while concentrating their efforts on the Karelian 
Isthmus. Simultaneously with their attacks across Viborg 
Gulf (4-9 March) the Red Army had also driven over the ice 
of the Gulf of Finland from Hogland to the Kotka-Vederlake 
1Mannerheim, p. 3.57. 
2Erickson, p. 5.51. 
3M. Mitrofanov, "V Snega Finlyandii" (In the Snows 
of Finland), Sergie Ivanovich Vashentsev (ed.), V Snega Fin-
l andii Raskazii Och erii i Ves ominani a Oochastnikov 
In the Snows of Finland. The Stories, Descriptions and 
Recollections of the Participants) (Moscow: State Publishing 
House of the Peoples' Literature, 1941), pp. 44-60. 
4Borgman, Der Ueberfall, pp. 235-236 • 
.5ohquist, p. 29. 
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coastal sector. Although these attacks had little immediate 
success due to coastal artillery and air raids1 on the 
exposed columns of Russian soldiers crossing the ice, yet 
they meant an even greater spread of the thin Finnish 
reserves and a more immediate threat to Helsinki than the 
imminent fall of Viborg . 2 
On other fronts the Red Army continued to be active 
throughout the last forty days of combat. On the Winter 
Road from Petsamo to Torino the Russians obtained reinforce-
ment in the shape of tanks and two battalions of ski troopers 
and during February drove the Finns further south to the 
Kohiseva line north of Ivalo.3 There were also limited 
moves in the Suomussalmi-Raati region which, however, came 
to nothing so far as any major advance was concerned .4 In 
the Kubrno area the Soviets utilized four freshly trained and 
organized ski battalions in order to break the 54th Soviet 
Division out of its "mottis" but with no success . 5 At the 
Kollaa barricade the Red Army leaders sent wave after wave 
of tanks, infantry and skiers to recover the trapped 168th 
1Eino Astera Luukkanen, Fighter over Finl and; the 
Memoirs of a Fif;ter Pilot, trans . by Mauno A. Salo (London: 
Macdonald , 1963 , pp. 69-70 . 
2
Mannerheim, pp . 362-363 . 
3Ha.nnula, p . 98. 
4rbid., p . 96. 
5Firsoff, p. 132. 
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Soviet Division but again with virtually no gains.
1 
Along 
the northeast shore of Lake Ladoga, however, a combined 
reinforcement of Red sailors, soldiers and marines was 
rinally able to reduce the islands of Mantsi and Volamo 
which enabled the Soviet forces to move up the lake-shore 
road towards Sortavala. 2 Thus both Viborg and the eastern 
Karelian defenses were being squeezed between massive Soviet 
drives. 
In the diplomatic area the Soviets could also congrat-
ulate themselves on an important success. In a public 
statement on 16 February the Swedish Prime Minister, Christian 
Hansson, announced that Sweden would remain strictly neutral 
in the Russo-Finnish Conflict and, more importantly, would 
not permit the transport of armed foreign military units 
across her territory.3 This policy blocked any possibility 
of larger scale Allied troop reinforcements from reaching 
Finland. A glance at the map will show that the only 
practical routes of travel for any organized military units 
would have to be across Swedish territory at some point.4 
1 Palolampi, pp . 176-228. 
2P . I. Zvonkov, V Boya Protiv Belofinnov na Baltikye, 
Voina, 1939-1940 (In Battle against the Whitefinns in the 
Baltic, War 1939-1940) (Moscow: State Publishing, 1941), 
p. 34. 
3Tanner, The Winter War, p. 161 . 
4Tanner, "We Are Too Small," Current History (April 
1940), p. 10; and "The Situation,'' The Nineteenth Century 
and After (March 1940), p. 265. 
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The reason for Sweden's attitude has engendered all 
sorts of speculation. The most common explanation was that 
the Germans had threatened to attack Sweden if she permitted 
any Allied troops to enter her territory. 1 However important 
this factor was (and the Germans denied that such an overt 
threat was ever made), 2 there was also more than a suspicion 
that Allied aid was likely to be too little and too late 
anyway. 3 To this was added the natural caution of the Swedes 
over the discrepancy in manpower between the whole of Scan-
dinavia and the Soviet Union.4 
Whatever the reason, this Swedish attitude virtually 
ended all practical hopes of large-scale aid in the near 
future despite the promises of Allied representatives in 
Finland.5 Fortunately for the Finns, delusory negotiations 
with Moscow had been going on since 6 February through the 
Soviet ambassadress in Stockholm, Madam Kollontai. 6 On 20 
February the Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs, V. M. 
1Marquis W. Childs, 11 SWeden: Her Tragic Dilemma," 
Current History (April 1940), p. 16. 
2Documents on German Forei 
VIII: The War Years Se tember 
(Washington: Government Printing 
3Mannerheim, p. 382. 
0 
35 to 
4 11 Russia's Men of Fighting Age Outnumber Finland's 
1, 11 Science News Letter, XXXVI (April 1940), p. 406. 
5Tanner, The Winter War, p. 208. 
6Ibid., pp. 147-151. 
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Molotov, spoke to the Swedish Minister to Russia, Per Vilhelm 
Gustav Assarsen, about the need for peace in the north and 
for the first time specific terms were mentioned. 1 These 
terms included all that the Russians had asked for in the 
origina l negotiations of October-November 1939 plus the 
cession of all eastern Karelia. 2 Despite continued Finnish 
efforts to secure some commitment on Allied intervention3 the 
military situation in March was, in the opinion of Marshal 
Mannerheim, too grave to take a chance on either an early 
thaw or the possibility of some sort of Franco-British expe-
dition which might break the Russian blockade.4 This opinion 
seems to have settled the problem and so negotiations began 
on 8 March 1940, were concluded on the 11th and the resultant 
treaty was ratified, despite considerable opposition, by the 
Finnish Government on the 12th. 
The Treaty of Moscow called for the leasing of Hanko 
Cape and the islands for five kilometers around it as a naval 
base for the Soviet Union. The major islands in the Gulf of 
Finland were also ceded to Russia to protect the sea lanes 
to Leningrad. In eastern Karelia the line of "Peter the 
Great 11 was restored.5 with the area of Viborg, Sortavala and 
1Hannula, p. 128. 
20hquist, p. 29. 
3Tanner, The Winter War, p. 196. 
4 Mannerheim, p. 387. 
5Hannula, p. 129. 
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Suojarvi passing into Soviet hands. Likewise the area of 
Salla in north-central Finland and the Hibachi (Fischer) 
Peninsula east of Petsamo also were retained by the Russians. 
In return Petsamo was given back to Finland although the 
rights of transit for Soviet citizens to Norway were reaf-
firmed. Another important item was the necessity of the 
Finns to cooperate with the Russians in building a railroad 
across Finland between Kandalaska and Kemijarvi to facilitate 
trade between the Soviet Union and Sweden. Probably the most 
important item for future relations between the two comba-
tants was the pledge that neither would make any alliances 
or enter into any coalition which might be judged to be 
1 
directed against the other. 
It would seem that the Finns and their western sup-
porters were stunned by the Peace of Moscow although the 
negotiations had been reported for some time. 2 It was 
apparent that the "harsh demands" of the Russians, especially 
as regards the land cession in Karelia, was the item which 
caused the most consternation.3 For the most part many Finns 
seemed to have considered that: "even if Viipuri (Viborg) 
111 Mirnie Dogovor Mesjdu Souzom Sovetskih 
Sotzia.listicheskih Respubliki i Finlyandskoi Respublikoi" 
(The Peace Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics and the Finnish Republic), Pravda, 13 March 1940, 
p. 1. 
2Harold Callender, "Sweden Mediating in Finnish War; 
With Reds Asking All of Karelia; Finns Weigh Truce,"~ 
York Times, 7 March 1940, p. 1. 
3Luukkanen, p. 74; and Palolarnpi, pp. 231-232. 
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fell ••• the reds would still be only 50 miles from the 
Russian border. They are still a long way from Helsinki • . . 
In April the ice would break and the spring thaws would 
incapacitate the motorized units (of the Red Army)." 1 There 
was also a general feeling that the Russians had obtained 
much more territory than they had been able to conquer with 
their vaunted "invincible" Red Army . 2 All this was further 
heightened by the difficulties attendant upon the mass 
migration of almost the total Finnish population from the 
ceded areas.3 
On the other hand, there was some feeling of relief 
among the Finns.4 It was said: "Finland is (now) like a 
man with his toes cut off, he doesn't get around as well as 
he did before, but he still gets around. 11 5 Another observer 
pointed out: "still the peace terms did not seem to be 
those that would be imposed upon a small, defeated country 
by an overwhelmingly strong conqueror; these terms were too 
lenient. 116 Indeed, even in defeat there was some pride in 
1strode, p. 413. 
2Joseph I. Malloy, "Russo-Finnish War Ends," Catholic 
World (April 1940), p. 110; and Tanner, The Winter War, 
p. 251. 
3Palolampi, pp. 242-243. 
4Tanner, The Winter War, pp. 251-252; and Hannula, 
p. 142. 
511 soviet Victory Boon to Reich," Business Week (23 March 
1940), p. 54. 
6winston, p. 113. 
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the long and difficult defense against overwhelming odds. 
There was also some gain, according to one Finnish observer: 
The pessimism in regard to defense (against the 
USSR), which had been apparent in many Finnish 
quarters before the war, the conception that it was 
hopeless to attempt resistance, had vanished and 
been replaced by the conviction that Finland can be 
defended if sufficient sacrifices are made in time 
on preparations for defense. 
Another encouraging note was the Soviet abandonment 
of the "Democratic Republic of Finland" as the only legitimate 
government of the nation. The fate of this first Soviet 
effort at establishing a popular puppet government was as 
follows: 
Kuusinen (or any of his ministers) was not 
consulted during the Russo-Finnish peace conference 
nor invited to it. After the peace was concluded 
he was appointed editor of a small provincial news-
paper. Four weeks later, on July 10, he was ~lected 
president of the new Karelo-Finnish Republic. 
Thus ended the government which had been described by 
the Soviets as the "unanimous choice of the working people of 
Finland . 113 
As to the results of the war in relation to the Soviet 
Union this is an even more complicated problem. In the face 
of the Red Army's military difficulties there was certainly 
a loss of some prestige,4 especially on the part of their 
1Hannula, p. 144. 
2nallin, p. 194. 
3 11 Privetstvie Narodnomu Pravitel'stva Finlyandii." 
4Albert Parry, The Russian Cavalcade: A Military 
Record (New York: Washburn, 1944), p. 199. 
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German friends. 1 However, there is some evidence that the 
German Army already had a low opinion of the Red Army's 
capabilities and these were merely confirmed by the events 
of December 1939--January 1940. 2 
On the other hand, from both Finnish and western 
sources came reports that the Russian soldier was not nearly 
as poor as some of his detractors might imply. 3 For the 
most these sources blamed their apparent inferiority upon 
poor leadership, especially in units above the battalion 
level.4 Almost all the critics of the Russian performance 
noted that the Soviet forces in the latter part of the war 
were far better trained, equipped and le~ then during the 
.first two months.5 As one of them said: "So much had the 
Russians learned during the conflict that we seemed (in 
February) to be .fighting an entirely different enemy. 116 
Thus, perhaps, it was true that the early defeats in Finland 
did at least provide a foundation on which the Red Army could 
strengthen its higher leadership, tactics and equipment and 
bring its faults into .focus.? 
p. 22. 
1Laserson, p. 14. 
2Erickson, p. 548. 
3Langdon-Davis, p. 28; and Eliot, "Red Steam-Roller?" 
4citrine, p. 130; and "War on Land," Army, Navy 
Journal (9 March 1940), p. 639• 
5vallotton, p. 22; and Borgman, Der Ueberfall, p. 220. 
6Luukkanen, p. 62. 
?Erickson, p. 557; and O'Ballance, p. 155. 
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The tone of the Russian newspaper articles during 
February and March 1940 reflected the growing assurance that 
victory over the "Whitefinns" was just a matter of time. For 
the most part the few stories concerning the war which 
appeared during this period lost their semi hysterical ranting 
about the "leaders of the bankrupt Helsingfors regime" and 
began instead to laud the accomplishments of the Red Army in 
cracking the "great Mannerheim fortifications . " The "news 
from foreign sources" also began to praise the success of 
Russian arms but still continued their old program of damning 
the "vfui tefinns," emitting threats against those western 
nations who were "aiding the bloody Mannerheim clique," and 
applauding the "Democratic Republic of Finl and . " 1 
The Russian newspapers of 18 February carried two 
stories which concerned the diplomatic situation between 
Finland and Sweden . The Finns had been trying to persuade 
the Swedes either to support Finland with armed forces or to 
allow foreign "volunteer expeditions" to cross Sweden on their 
way to the fighting fronts. The first article in the Soviet 
press was Swedish Premier Hanssen's answer to the Finnish 
proposal. The gist of this announcement , which was released 
111 Kto Pomogaet Mannergeimu?" (Who Helps Mannerheim?), 
Pravda, 16 February 1940, p . 5; "Inostrannaya Pechat o 
Polosjenii v Belo-Finlyandii" (The Foreign Press about the 
Situation in White - Finland) , Krasnaya Zvezda , 21 February 
1940, p. 4; "Norvesjskii Sjurnalist o Deistvijah Krasnoi 
Armii" (A Norwegian Journalist about the Activities of the 
Red Army), Trud , 23 February 1940, p. 2; "Trudrashchieisya 
Anglii Poddersjivaut Politiku Sovetskovo Souza {The Workers 
of' England Support the Policy of the Soviet Union), Izvestiya, 
28 February 1940, p. 2. 
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on 16 February, was that the Swedish Government would under 
no circumstances join the war against the Soviet Union or 
allow the transport of foreign armed forces across Swedish 
territory. 1 
In the other article published on this day the above 
statement was carefully analysed. An editorial in~ 
pointed out that the important part of the Stockholm policy 
statement was the refusal of the Swedes to permit the passage 
of western troops through Sweden. This, so the article 
reasoned, would certainly limit any military aid to the 
"Whitefinns" from the "imperialists." This Soviet analysis 
correctly observed that the neutrality policy of the Swedes 
was a notable diplomatic victory for the Soviet Union since 
the Finns now had almost no hope of direct military inter-
vention from the Allied Powers. 2 
On the 19th and 20th of this month two articles from 
TASS appeared in the Soviet press. These warned the Russian 
people that the warmongers of both Sweden and Norway were 
trying to force a change in the neutralist policies of their 
nations and force them into the camp of the imperialist 
111 zayavleniei Shvedskovo Prem'era" (A Statement of the 
Swedish Premier), Izvestiya, p. 4. 
211 0tkaz Shvetzii v Okazanii Voennoi Pomoshchi Belo-
finnam" (The Refusal of Sweden to Give War Aid to the 
Whitefinns), Trud, p. 2. 
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powers . 1 While these articles may have been printed to inform 
the Soviet people about the drift of international affairs, 
it was far more likely that they were published as a warning 
to the Scandinavian nations not to abandon their policy of 
neutrality in the face of possible Soviet retaliation. Here 
was indicated again that the Kremlin still feared, as it had 
in the past, the possibility of intervention by France and 
England. 
By 23 February the Red Army was evidently confident 
enough of final victory to release a satirical article con-
cerning the extent of Finnish "victories" as reported by the 
"Correspondents of the Associated and United Press." With 
well-written overstatements and exaggerations, this account 
attempted to demolish the tales of Finnish military supe-
riority which apparently had seeped even into Russia itself. 
Although the military methods of the Finns were exaggerated 
for satirical purposes, some of the descriptions such as 
encirclement , snipers, freezing, mine laying and "scorched 
earth" were all too well known to the men of the Red Army 
who had been fighting in the frigid wastes of eastern 
Finland . The fact that such effective fighting methods 
could be laughed at by a story in the Red Army's own 
111 Nasjim Podsjigatelei Voinie na Shvetziu" (The 
Pressure of the Warmongers in Sweden), and "Provokatzionnaya 
Deyatel 'nost Podsjigatelei Voinie v Norvegii" (The Provoking 
Activities of the Warmongers in Norway), Pravda, 19 February 
1940 ' p. .5. 
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newspaper was a demonstration of the confidence felt by the 
Kr emlin leaders in the ultimate victory of Soviet arms. 
Indeed, it was an admission as well that the Finns had been 
a tough and resourceful antagonist. 1 
Russian leaders were painfully aware of this--as aware 
too that the future might bring rurther difficulties for the 
Soviets from the so-called "western imperialists" or even 
from some other source. Thus the Russian press at the virtual 
end of the "Finnish difficulty" pointed to potential aggres-
sors or invaders of the "holy state of socialism." Witness, 
ror example, a lengthy article in Komsomolskaya Pravda which 
appeared on 24 February. Here is found the antisoviet inten-
tions of the western Allies (England and France) unfolding 
before the eyes of the young citizens of the USSR. As a 
point of interest, however, during this philippic against 
the "imperialist west" it was pointed out that the Russian 
people and their government "are ready to join in an alliance 
with any fellow-traveler if he is ready to go in our direc-
tion; and we are ready to separate from any partner if he 
pulls us to the side of the road. 112 It may well be that the 
author intended this explanation as a justirication for the 
Ribbentrop-Molotov pact (there was evidence of confusion 
111 Pobeda Putem Otstupleniya" (Victory through Retreat), 
Krasnaya Zvezda, p. 4. 
2A. Galin, "Mesjdunarodnie Karakter Finlyandskih 
Sobietii" (The International Character of the Finnish Dif-
ficulties), Komsomolskaya Pravda, pp. 3-4. 
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among the Russian people at this sudden reversal of policy 
in August 1939); 1 but it could have also been taken as an 
indication that the alliance with Germany would last only so 
long as the Soviet leaders felt it to be in their best inter-
ests. Then, too, the "article as a whole appeared to have 
been written primarily for internal consumption in an endeavor 
to persuade the Soviet people that the Red Army was not 
fighting Finland alone but rather the united forces of world 
reaction. 112 
Another important point in this particular article was 
the elaboration of the reasons behind the antisoviet actions 
of the Allied Powers. With some truth, the author explained 
that the "capitalistic exploiters" feared the possible 
revolutionary conditions which would follow the end of the 
European war. If the Soviet Union were untouched by the 
conflict, so the story ran, there was a good chance that 
revolutionary Communism would spread throughout the war-torn 
continent. Therefore it was imperative, in the eyes of the 
Allies, that Communist Russia must be involved in the hol-
ocaust or European civilization might go down in the inev-
itable post-war revolutions.3 This observation was not too 
far out of line. Certainly this fear of a general proletarian 
1sontag and Beddie, pp. 88-89. 
2Lawrence A. Steinhardt, State Department Telegram 
#210, 24 February 1940. 
3Galin, loc. cit . 
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revolution, supported by a strong USSR, did haunt the dreams 
of some western leaders. 1 
For the most part Soviet news stories in this last 
period of the war did not compare in length or intensity with 
those during the first part of the conflict. Many items 
11 from foreign sources" congratulated the Red Army on its 
"glorious accomplishments in breaking the Mannerheim forti-
fications ."2 Other articles from the same sources, which 
were largely made up of resolutions from various workers' 
meetings, revealed that large numbers of foreign proletarians 
were against aid to "Mannerheim Finland. 11 3 On the other 
hand, the press coverage of the events of the Winter War 
1 Ja.kobsen, p. 48. 
2 see: 11 Germanskaya Pechat Ob Uspehah Krasnoi Armii" 
(The German Press about the Successes of the Red Army), 
Komsomolskaya Pravda, 6 March 1940, p. 4; 11 Inostrannaya 
Pecha£ Ob Ospehah Krasnoi Armii Na Karel'skom Peresheike" 
(The Foreign Press about the Successes of the Red Army on 
the Karelian Isthmus), Trud, 1 March 1940, p. 2; "Bolgarskaya 
Pechat Ob Uspehah KrasnoIArmii v Finlyandii" (The Bulgarian 
Press about the Successes of the Red Army in Finland), 
Izvestiya, 5 March 1940, p. 2; and "Eliot o Porasjenii 
Belofinnov Na Karel 1 skom Perosheike" (Eliot about the Posi-
tion of the Whitefinns on the Karelian Isthmus), Krasnaya 
Zvezda , 5 March 1940, p. 4. 
3"Amerikanskii Narod Protiv Pomoshchi Belo-Finlyandii" 
(The American Peoples Are Against Help to White-Finland), 
Pravda , 1 March 1940'1 p. 5; "Trudyashchieisya Anglii Protiv 
Pomoshchi Belofinnom' (English Workers Are Against Help to 
the Whitefinns), Izvestita, 8 March 1940, p . 4; "Norvesjskie 
Rabochie Protiv VoilieffNorwegian Workers Are Against War), 
Krasnaya Zvezda, 9 March 1940, p. 4; and "Rabochaya Pechat 
Skandinavii Razoblachaet Podsjigateliei Voinie" (The 
Scandinavian Labor Press Unmasks the Provokers of War), 
Trud, 5 March 1940, p. 2. 
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during these last days was extremely light. One would never 
guess from the Soviet news releases that there was any 
serious fighting taking place on the vulnerable northwest 
border of the nation. 
There is yet one more series of articles to be examined 
before this period of the Winter War is left behind . These 
were the "Operations Reports of the Leningrad Military 
District" which frequently were the only items concerning 
the military situation that appeared on the front pages of 
the Russian press during the final month of the war . As has 
been mentioned, these official communiques began to record 
the Red Army's advance through the Mannerheim Line in early 
February. The reason why some of these "Operations Reports" 
should be examined here is the fact that some western writers 
have called their accuracy into serious question. 
It must be admitted that these communiques did exag -
gerate the numbers and strength of fortifications taken, the 
numbers of Finnish airplanes destroyed and, in a few instances, 
even the amount of material seized and prisoners captured . 
On the other hand , when Soviet military authorities claimed 
the occupation of towns and villages by name, a careful check 
of available sources reveals that these reports were almost 
always accurate . A factor that might tend to throw doubt 
on this observation was the refusal of the Red Army (possibly 
for perfectly good military reasons ) to admit that they had 
been forced to retreat from some of their advance positions. 
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A good example of the accusation of inaccuracy leveled 
at the "Operations Reports" is found in the best contemporary 
English-language description of the Winter War, John Langdon-
Davis' book Finland , the First Total War. In this work the 
author specifically challenged the validity of the Russian 
military communiques on two occasions. The first of these 
was the charge that "the Russians announced the capture by 
storm of Koivisto many days before the Finns made their 
strategic retreat from the island." 1 The most accurate 
Finnish record, found in the memoirs of Marshal Mannerheim, 
stated that the withdrawal from the island-fortress took 
place during a heavy blizzard on the early morning of 23 
February . 2 Utilizing this statement as a basis, the two 
"Operations Reports" which contain reference to Koivisto 
should be re-examined. 
The "Operations Report of 19 February announced: 
"We took the city and fort of Koivisto (B,jorki) and swept 
the enemy from the peninsula." This may well have been the 
"f'alse report" referred to by Langdon-Davis. If a map of 
the area in question is examined , however, it can be noted 
that there was a town of Koivisto located on a peninsula 
across the channel from the island-fortress of the same 
name . The Soviet communique obviously referred to this 
area and not to the island opposite it. If any further proof 
1Langdon-Davis , p. 46. 
2Mannerheim, pp. 356-357 . 
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was needed that the Red Army had not claimed the fall of the 
great island-fort , this was supplied by the "Operations 
Report" of 23 February which stated that "on this day our 
units in battle took the great ferro - concrete position on 
the island of Koivisto (B.jorki) . " 1 
The "capture in battle" announcement agrees completely 
with the facts as presented by Marshal Mannerheim concerning 
the complete evacuation of Koivisto on the 23rd . No doubt 
the Soviet forces immediately occupied the empty positions . 
While the inference in the Russian report that the place was 
captured by storm may be criticised, there can be no doubt 
that in the matter of the time of occupation of the great 
island-fort the Red Army ' s communique was entirely accurate . 2 
The second of Langdon-Davis ' indictments of the Red 
Army's battle reports concer ned the occupation of Viborg 
(Viipuri) . He implied that the Russian headquarters claimed 
the capture of the port city many times but , in actual fact, 
the Finns retai ned possession of the center of Viborg until 
the end of the war . 3 
1The "Operations Report" appeared daily in a small 
block on the front pages of Russian newspapers throughout the 
war. The communiques were always dated for the day before 
and covered all reports of combat in Finland . 
2As a matter of fact it may well have been a bad 
translation that led Mr • .John Langdon-Davis i nt o this mistake . 
The Russian word for peni nsul a is ¥ol' o strov (literally half-
island) so that a slipshod transla i on of the "Operations 
Report" for the 19th may have left the impression that the 
Soviets were claiming the capture of the island rath er than 
the city and peninsula opposite it . 
3Langdon-Davis, l oc. cit . 
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A careful reading of every 11 0perations Report 11 from 
28 February (when Viborg is first mentioned) to the end of 
hostilities reveals that the Leningrad Military District 
never proclaimed the fall of the city . Suburban areas were 
reported occupied and Viborg itself was almost completely 
surrounded but not once was there an announcement of the 
total surrender of the entire u r ban area . Here again one 
can only conclude that the Russian communiques were either 
misunderstood or poorly translated for the western journalists 
in Helsinki. 
On 13 March 1940 the front page of Pravda , the only 
newspaper published on that day, was suddenly filled with 
articles about the situation in Finland . This extensive 
coverage was, of course, occasioned by the announcement of 
the Treaty of Moscow which ended the Winter War. The prin-
cipal story contained the terms of the peace treaty. Other 
stories which appeared the next day throughout the Soviet 
press hailed the treaty as the final solution to the problem 
of the defense of Leningrad and a "great document which 
would insure the peace of the Baltic area. 111 
The text of the Treaty of Moscow contained all the 
old demands of the Soviet Government . The Russians received 
almost all of Finnish Karelia which solved the problem of the 
defense of Leningrad from land attack . In central Finland 
1 "Mir Mesjdu SSSR i Finlyandiei" (Peace between the 
USSR and Finland), Krasnaya Zvezda, 14 March 1940, p. 1. 
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almost all of the Maan mountains passed into Soviet hands. 
The northern port of Petsamo was returned to the Finns but 
the Hibachi (Fischer) Peninsula was "returned" to the USSR. 
Hanko Cape with its surrounding islands was "temporarily" 
leased to the Soviet Union as a naval base. When these 
territories were occupied by Red forces it became obvious 
that almost all the geographic and man-made defenses of 
Finland were in the hands of the Kremlin. 
The desire of the Soviet leaders to prevent the pos-
sible use of Finland as a "base for attack upon the nation 
of socialism" could be further verified by a study of para-
graphs 6 and 7 of the Treaty of Moscow. Paragraph 6 provided 
that the Soviet Union would have free access rights across 
Petsamo province to Norway. Even more dangerous was the 
right given to the Russians in paragraph 7 to build and 
maintain a railroad across central Finland from Kandalaksha 
to Kemijarvi . While both these provisions can be explained 
by a desire for better commercial relations between the 
Soviet Union and the Scandinavian countries, these rights-
of-ways, combined with the loss of the Maan mountains, would 
open all of central Finland to any new invasion by the Red 
Army . 
The intentions of the Russian victors were further 
indicated by paragraph 3 which prohibited either party from 
joining any 11 coalition of nations which might be judged 
detrimental to the other. 111 This, in effect, allowed the 
Soviet Government to have a virtual veto over any attempt 
by Finland to ally herself with any other nation, a right 
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which the Kremlin leaders were not slow to exercise.
2 
Prohibited from forming defensive alliances and with their 
only natural defenses in the hands of the Red forces, the 
Finns found themselves well within the Russian sphere of 
influence and, as subsequent events were to show, very much 
under the thumb of the Soviet leaders. 3 
The "meetings reports" which on 14 March occupied a 
major part of Soviet newspaper space, were properly enthu-
siastic about this "victory for the wise Stalin policy of 
peace." In at least one story the author enumerated all the 
economic riches of the Viborg district which had now been 
11 returned11 to "mother Russia. 11 4 Other articles congratulated 
the Soviet military forces on their victory. After all, they 
pointed out, the Red Army "for the first time in history 
conquered a ferro-concrete defense under harsh natural 
1 "Mirnie Dogovor Mesjdu Souzom Sovetskih 
Sotzialisticheskih Respublik i Finlyandskoi Respublikoi" 
(The Peace Treaty between the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics and the Finnish Republic),~' 14 March 1940, 
p. 1. 
2Tanner, The Winter War, pp. 260-261. 
3navid Hinshaw, Heroic Finland (New York: G. P. 
Putnam's Sons, 1952), pp. 202-206. 
4L. Ziman, "Vieborg" (Viborg), Krasnaya Zvezda, p. 4. 
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conditions. 111 "In a rapid campaign," another story eulogized, 
"it swept from its path all obstacles and destroyed enemy 
defenses comparable to those before which the armies of 
E 1 d d F h b h lt d f , th II 2 ng an an ranee ave een a e or six mon s. 
In all this welter of self-congratulation there 
remained a note of caution. In spite of the "great victory11 
over the Finnish "menace," the Soviet people "intend still 
more to continue military and political preparations" so 
that "at any moment we will be ready with Voroshilov's 
volleys to destroy any enemy who might dare to disturb the 
quiet of the Soviet peoples. 11 3 This feeling of continued 
danger was probably best summarized by a foreman of the 
Kositskovo plant, one comrade Vaselov: 
Political peace is now completed in a peace 
treaty with Finland that forms the remaining 
guarantee a.gs.inst the attacks of any power on our 
northwest borders. However, we should not for a 
moment forget about capitalistic encroachments. 
The international situation is very complicated. 
At any moment we must be prepared to oppose and 
repul~e any enemy war threat, from wherever it may 
come.Ll-
111 Demonstratziya Nesokrushimoi Silie Sovetskovo Zouza" 
(A Demonstration of the Firm Force of the Soviet Union), 
Trud, p. 2. 
2 11 viesokoe Dostoinstvo Sovetskoi Stranie 11 (The High 
Merit of the Soviet Nation), Pravda, p. 2. 
3 11 s Voodushevleniem Prohodyat Mitingi i S0braniya11 
(With Enthusiasm Are Held Meetings and Rallies), Krasnaya 
Zvezda, p. 3. 
411 Bezopasnost Goroda Lenina Obespechena" (The Safety 
of Lenin 's City is Guaranteed), Izvestiya, p. 3. 
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This f'ear of' 11 attack 11 may well have been in response 
to possible Allied invasion of' the Baku oil f'ields 1 but it 
was much more likely that the Kremlin leaders had their eyes 
on the open plains to the west. Certainly, Nazi Germany was 
in a much better position to 11 encroach" upon the borders of' 
the 11 state of' socialism" af'ter the Winter War than were the 
western powers. 
By the end of' March the peace treaty with Finland 
had become "back- page news" in the Russian press . However, 
the Russian Government obviously f'elt that this late war 
had to be explained and justif'ied f'or posterity . On 29 March 
V. M. Molotov , in a speech bef'ore the Supreme Soviet, f'inally 
brought the event into proper Communist perspective . 
To begin with, according to the Soviet Commissar f'or 
Foreign Af'f'airs, the Red Army had achieved a great victory 
over a determined enemy, bad weather and many natural and 
man-made obstacles. While the Soviet Union had lost some 
soldiers, the Finns had lost even more and in the end the 
Kremlin was able to acquire the needed land and bases to 
make the northwest f'rontier secure . Actually, there would 
have been no trouble had not the Finnish leaders been 
encouraged to threaten Leningrad by their masters, the 
capitalistic bosses of' the western nations. In Molotov's 
view the ratif'ication of the peace treaty brought all trouble 
1 Hooper, Through Soviet Russia and the Finnish 
Campaign, 1940, p. 99. 
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to an end. The Helsinki War Government of Ryti-Tanner had 
resigned and the Peoples ' Democratic Republic in Terioki, 
having no further purpose, had also quietly dissolved itself. 
Thus an era of peace and good relations between Helsinki and 
Mos cow, based upon the "wise Stalin peace policy" had replaced 
the atmosphere of suspicion and intrigue that for so long 
prevailed in the Baltic. 1 
With this speech all questions about the Winter War 
were settled as far as the Communist world was concerned. 
Russian arms had won a glorious victory and the "wretched 
Whitefinns" had been taught a bitter lesson. Despite the 
newspaper efforts of early December, the Kuusinen "Peoples' 
Government" was casually tossed aside when its founders had 
no further use of it. 
1v. M. Molotov, "Doklad o Vneshnei Politike 
Pravitel 'stva, 11 Krasnaya Zvezda, 30 March 1940, pp. 1-2. 
In English translation, see: V. M. Molotov, Soviet Foreign 
Polic : The Meanin of the War in Finland (New York: 
Workers ' Library Publishers, 1940. 
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MAP V 
FINLAND AFTER THE PEACE OF MOSCOW 
This map shows the changes in land area which followed 
the ratification of the Treaty of Moscow by Finland and the 
Soviet Union on 13 March 1940. From the map it can be seen 
that the Finns lost land in five principal areas; the Hibachi 
Peninsula above Petsamo Fjord, the eastern Saala district 
(opposite Kandalaska), eastern Karelia including the town of 
Sortavala and Viborg, the islands in the Gulf of Finland, and 
Hanko Peninsula in extreme southwestern Finland. 
One of the important points to note about this peace 
settlement as revealed by the map was the manner in which 
the Soviet Union now controlled access to Finland by sea. 
Russian artillery and naval forces on the Hibachi Peninsula 
completely dominated the entrance to Petsamo Fjord. In 
central and northern Finland the Soviets could utilize their 
new railroad from Kandalasha to Kemi (had they completed it 
in time), as an all-weather supply route for their forces 
in an area where travel is limited to "winter roads." With 
this enormous advantage the Red Army could have driven across 
Finland, seized Kemi, and blocked any land transportation 
between Finland and Norway or Sweden. 
The Soviet position in eastern Karella, of course, 
gave them an excellent position from which to threaten 
southern Finland, while the Gulf islands enabled the Red 
Fleet to maneuver along the length of the north coast of 
the Gulf. The leasing of Hanko Cape as a naval base enabled 
the Soviet naval forces to block the mouth of the Gulf and, 
in conjunction with bases in the Baltic States, dominate the 
upper Baltic. If help came to Finland from the west, by land 
or by sea, the Soviets were, as can be observed, in an 
excellent position to prevent it. 
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THE RED AR1Y IN THE RUSSI.AN REGO RDS OF 
THE WINTER WAR 
The vast majority of Soviet accounts of individual 
experiences during the Russo-Finnish War dealt with the 
advance on the Karelian Isthmus. Since the purpose of 
this chapter is to examine the changes which took place 
in the Red Arrrry as reflected in these personal memoirs and 
stories, perforce our sources will limit us largely to the 
attacks which led eventually to the breaking of the 
Mannerheim Line. 
The 8oviet forces which were poised along the Finnish 
frontier on the Karelian Isthmus on 30 November comprised 
the 7th Arrrry under Klementi Sjakovlev. This consisted of 
. . 
twelve infantry divisions, three tank brigades and a motor-
ized corps, all organized into two combat corps. The 
Fifteenth Corps of five infantry divisions and two tank 
brigades was to strike along the western roads through Summa 
and envelop Viborg. The Nineteenth Corps of three infantry 
divisions and the Xth motorized corps was to move on the 
eastern roads to put pressure on the Vuoksi Water System, 
especially Taipale to spread the Finnish defenders out and 
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thus insure the success of the western wing of the 7th Army. 1 
An examination of a map of the Karelian Isthmus 
reveals that there are only three main transportation routes 
through the area. Of course the coastal highway and railroad 
through the town of Koivisto might be considered a fourth 
route but until the waters of the Gulf of Finland freeze 
solidly, the positions there could be so isolated from the 
main lines of advance as to make them virtually worthless. 
Thus it can be safely said that the Soviet advance during 
the early stages of the war on the Karelian Isthmus as it 
moved forward spread out like the fingers on a hand in 
search of a soft spot in the Finnish defenses. 
The ~oviet forces marched along their approach routes 
against minimal opposition and by the second week in December 
had come up against the so-called Mannerheim Line. Repeated 
attacks on this line, as we have seen, failed to dent it 
and so by the end of December the Red Army•s offensive had 
. 
ground to a halt before the system of earth-wood and iron-
concrete fire positions which comprised the principal 
defenses on the Karelian Isthmus. 
As a reader peruses the Soviet material about the 
early phase of the war, he is struck by the generally 
easygoing attitude of the officers and men both in their 
preparations for the attack and in their initial movements 
after crossing the Finnish border. For instance, one of the 
1Borgman, Der Ueberfalls, p. 65. 
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most heroic battalion commanders, Captain Nikolai Stepanovich 
Ugrumov, began his attack upon a Finnish position near the 
frontier without knowing anything about the terrain over 
which his unit had to move. He won a bridgehead over the 
sestru River (which marked the Sevier-Finnish border in the 
western sector of the Karelian Isthmus) and pursued the enemy 
for eight kilometers without regard for his open flanks. 
As a result his scouts soon discovered that "the battalion 
was surrounded by a strong enemy force.nl -The heroic action 
~ 
of the story consisted of a number of men making their 
perilous way back through the encircling Finns to regimental 
headquarters for help. (Incidently, another article about 
Captain Ugrumov contained a remark which must have galled 
the Soviet veterans of the Finnish war. It stated: "The 
Whitefinns feel safe only in concrete pillboxes. In an open 
fight they could not bear the rough, strong attacks of the 
Red soldiers.") 2 
-In order to study further the initial period of the 
Kremlin attack on the Karelian Isthmus, it is useful to 
. . 
follow the actions of the ttheroic° Captain Ugrumov because 
- ~ 
his unit was one of the few which can be definitely located 
in both time and position from internal evidence. It would 
seem that this 11 able" battalion commander led one of the 
1A. Molchanov and G. Mishulovin, "Komandir 
Geroicheskovo Batal•ona" (The Commander of a Heroic Battalion), 
Izvestiya, 27 January 1940, p. 2. 
~ . 
vl. Stavskii, "Kapitan Ugrumovu (Captain Ugrumov), 
Krasnaya Zvezda, 26 January 1940, p. J. 
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initial attack groups which crossed the Finnish border in 
the vicinity of the Sestru River mouth. His mission, 
according to these accounts, was to drive along the shore 
road and, if possible, to seize the resort town of Terioki. 
Since the objective was only some twenty kilometers away 
from the jumpoff position and could be approached by both 
a highway and a railroad line, this does not seem to have 
been beyond the capabilities of a crack infantry battalion, 
reinforced by a platoon of tanks. 1 
The Finns possessed, according to Soviet reconnaissance, 
a bicycle company, a cavalry squadron and .some armored cars 
in this area. A reinforced battalion should have had little 
difficulty forcing its way through an enemy force rated, at 
best, as about two companies of special service troops. For 
this reason the fussian soldiers were feeling relatively 
confident as they set out on that wet cold {but for that 
latitude, relatively warm) morning of the 30 November 1939, 
especially since they had just witnessed the tremendous 
opening artillery barrage which prepared the way. 2 
,From the very beginning, as we have seen, there seemed 
to be several difficulties. The author tells it this way: 
Suddenly, from under the pines and birches, 
from the hills c1.•acked shots. The Fourth Company 
1v1. Stavskii, 11 Geroi Sovetskovo Souza, N. Ugrumovn 
(Hero of the 8oviet Union, N. Ugrumov), Boi v Finlyandii ~ 
(Moscow: Military Publishers, 1941), p. 57. 
2 Ibid., p. 58. 
dr•opped down. The commander, Lieutenant Muhamedayanov, 
looked at the battalion commande r with a question, 
Captain Ugrumov Hpoko: 
'! 1~he t .roops will rise. Return l:;o the
11
task, move 
to the :t>ight, reconnoit e r, find the enamy 0 · 
.~s a matter of .fact the Russians recovered well. One 
section itn..Y?J.·8diate ly moved into the forest and apparently 
drove the Finns away. on the other hand, it is a little 
3 trange that ·t;his unit, 0omposed of the crack ·t;roops of the 
L e ningrad Military llistrict, had had so little experience 
that they mus ·t; turn to the battalion commander .for ordor.s in 
a sittrn.tion whieh any well-trained company commander should 
have b~ f t bl ,.,on able to handle with a mini.mum o · rou r:3. 
It is also interesting to note Captain Ugrumov's 
conclusions drawn from his first contact wit~h the .Finns: 
''The ennmy is operating in small groups. He wants us to 
becomo tired. ltJell, I am stronger· than he, and so I shall 
not tire 1 ii 2 If true this was not too bad an interpretation 
. -
of the situation on the road to Terioki. 
Just how "elusiV('} and tre acherous'• an enemy ·t;hey w13r<=J 
ra<· ·· ng ···' Ji 0" was soon discovered by the batt;alion before many 
minu:i:;8s had passed. The story cont:i.nues: 
In the f'rontier set ·tlemant of Luptahartiya Privates 
Churimov and Aitvinenko, upon being f'ired on fl ... om a 
t:t>ench, sp1 ... ang at it .from both sides. However, the 
Whitef'inn sniper was able to escape ••• The privates 
saw in the t .rench a smart of':Cicer' s coat ,oind a leather 
pouch for documents. They jumped .. int;o t.he trench. 
---·--------·---
1 Ibid --· 
2Ibid. 
19.5 
At once there was a great roar from treacherous 
Whi t0.f inn ·wires. 
Captain Ugrumov ••• called on the telephone 
to ••• watch out for mines underfoot.l 
Despite all these problems, the battalion apparently 
moved well, if somewhat cautiously, along the shore road 
towards Terioki. Then news arrived that the bridge across 
the t:,estru River had collapsed and reinf'orcements would be 
delayed . Instead of remaining where he was, Captain Ugrumov 
elected to continue his advance. He further decided to 
accompany a cavalry patrol in an effort to locate the principal 
Finnish defense positions . This patrol, however, quickly ran 
into an ambush which killed the cavalry commander and almost 
despatched Captain Ugrumov as well. 2 
'l'his whole incident was indicative of the apparent 
.Russian lack of concern for elemental security during the 
first few hours of the war in Finland. If Captain Ugrumov 
had possessed a reliable staff organization, he would not 
have had to accompany the cavalry patrol. Likewise, even 
elementary tactical lessons should have taught him that a 
cavalry patrol, by the very nature of its operation in wooded 
country, was liable to ambush. Added to this, the nature of 
the terrain severly limited the ability of cavalry to locate 
potential Finnish defense positions hidden in the thick 
underbrush . 
1Ibid. 
2 ~ • ., p • .59. 
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Af'ter accomplishing his initial objective which was 
to cut the railroad near Kukkola, the battalion continued 
its advance towards Terioki . During this advance Captain 
Ugrumov, after overcoming some minor resistance, remarked: 
0 They certainly know how to use camouf'lage t Well, we must 
learn! 11 1 a little later he observed the destruction of' an 
earth-wood bunker by mortar f'ire and began to tt1ook with 
great respect upon the mortars and the mortarm;n . 0 2 
-Again it seems strange that a battalion commander 
would not have had any idea of' Finnish capabilities in a 
def'ensive position. Also, to be surprised at the capabilities 
of' his own mortars was very strange in an army which, since 
its earliest period, had made great use of' this particular 
weapon . However, more troubles were in store f'or this tlheroic 
unit 11 bei'ore Terioki could be secured. 
In the last surge towards their objective, the battalion 
discovered that the Finns were somewhere ahead in some strength 
and apparently still had artillery (mortars?) in operation. 
' ~lso, as the story related: ••• no reinf'orcements had 
arrived, no tanks or artillery were to be seen either. It 
was now I.400 hours and the troops had not eaten since 
morning.3 However, Captain Ugrumov elected to push on 
1.JJ2l.g, . , pp . 60_ 61. 
2~. 
3Ibid . , p. 62. 
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against an enemy whose whereabouts he did not know, with no 
visible support on his right flank (his left rested on the 
Gulf of Finland) and with no tanks or artillery immediately 
present to back him up if he met a major obstacle. Fortu-
nately, when his battalion became bogged down under Finnish 
fire in a minefield outside Terioki, he was saved by the 
unexpected approach of another Red battalion. The troops 
were finally able to move around the minefield and into 
Terioki itself. After most of the town had been secured, 
their assigned tank platoon finally showed up. They had 
come along the railroad embankment into Terioki, out of 
touch with the battalion and too late to take much part in 
the fight for the town. 1 
The later period of the "Ugrumov storyu also has some 
.. 
interesting aspects. For instance, the good Captain's 
impetuosity arose again when he had to cross the Vistroi 
River near Herma on the Muulaa road. When an engineer officer 
who was to bridge the river came up to ·him, Urgumov asked: 
nHow long will it take you to rebuild the bridge? 0 
'!A day ••• i~. 
"You can go to the regimental commander. I don't 
need you. I will not wait, even for one day. ••2 
Later in this same operation, the author noted: 
11 Captain Urgumov insisted that the commanders be sure of their 
1.:D219,., p. 65. 
2 b·d .L J. ., p. 66 • 
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orders so that a man might know what he was to do and could 
master his responsibilities we11. 11 l 
On the other hand, the Captain's eagerness to close 
with the enemy had at least one bad effect. It seems that 
the battalion, after crossing the river, pushed too far 
ahead of the other Soviet units and the Finns were able to 
cut in behind it and almost surround the heroic troops. 
Fortunately, it would appear that Captain Ugrumov was able 
t o place his men on the defensive and hold out against all 
the "Whitefinn" attacks. As a result of this heroic work, 
2 
Nikolai Stepanovich was promoted to regimental commander. 
This whole episode, if acceptable as totally valid, 
reflected the Russian urge to advance at all costs, even 
risking the chances of encirclement. This type of maneuver 
demonstrated the defects in unit leadership so apparent 
during the month of December, when the Finns were so easily 
able to surround Red Army units deep within the forests of 
eastern Finland and even on the relatively open Karelian 
Isthmus. 
Another interesting account from the same general 
source dealt with the experiences of the previously mentioned 
tank unit which had been assigned to Captain Ugrumov 1 s 
battalion. There were several interesting details in this 
recollection. First, according to the tank commander, it 
would appear that after the initial border crossing Captain 
1 Ibid. -
2.1!2i£., pp. 68-69. 
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Ugrumov assigned the tanks to guard his flanks, a strange 
position for armored vehicles even in the deep woods. !n 
explanation for this particular maneuver came from this 
somewhat criptic comment: nwe did not slow the infantry 
down. 1• 1 Apparently the good ·captain feared that the armored 
vehicles under his command would not be able to keep up· with 
his fast-moving foot soldiers and thus he wished to be free 
of these encumberances on his swift thrust towards Terioki. 
1l1he second account confirmed the events of the advance 
on Terioki as recounted in the first story when it told of 
the tanks having approached the town along the railroad 
embankment (to avoid possible mines). However, according to 
this recollection, the vehicles approached the seaside resort 
while it was being occupied by the infantry and were instru-
mental in consolidating the area. 2 On the other hand, the 
first story made it reasonably clear that the tanks arrived 
after the major part of Terioki had been cleared of the enemy, 
although they were extremely helpful in beating off a later 
Finnish counter-attack.3 However, this may well have been a 
mix.up so common to battle recollections in every war. 
'l1he rather bad military habit of Captain Ugrumov• s 
1A. . Ivanovich, "Zapiski Tankista 11 (Diary of a Tanker), 
Boi v Finlxandii (Moscow: Military Publishers, 1941), p. 73. 
·2~ .. , p. 69. 
3stavskii, "Geroi Sovetskovo Souza, N. Ugrumov, 11 
p . 6.5. 
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battalion in advancing without waiting for the support of 
armored units or artillery was noted in this same article. 1 
While there is no hint of direct criticism, this misuse of 
armored strength seems very strange, even for the Red Arrrry. 
Either the tanks were not very effective or there just was 
not good coordination between the two arms. Very likely 
there was a little bit of both during the early phase of 
operations . 
From another account the pattern of Finnish tactics 
against tank-infantry combination was revealed. As one 
"Hero of the Soviet Union" recalled: 
~ 
Often the Whitefinns would allow our tanks to go 
ahead, not firing; but as soon as our infantry 
appeared they would open fire from machine guns and 
submachine guns. Not once was our crew forced to 
turn back to take a passed enemy fire point and help 
defend the infantry.Z 
This is an interesting observation for apparently 
the event noted in the last lines above was the exception 
rather than the rule during these early days on the Karelian 
Isthmus . It should also be noted that despite great heroism 
and skill of the above-mentioned tank crew their vehicle was 
knocked out and the members of the crew killed when they got 
too far ahead (some fifteen kilometers) of their own infantry. 3 
1Ivanovich, p. 75. 
2x . Simonyan, ttvoega Pomogat Tovarishchaml 11 (Always 
Help ConJl>adesl), Boi v Finlyandii (Moscow: Military 
Publishers, 1~41), p. 96. . . 
3 ' Ibid., pp. 96-97. 
Almost certainly this was the result of extremely poor 
tank-infantry coordination and was indicative of the 
defective command relationship recounted above. 
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This theme of being outflanked and/or surrounded 
ran through the Russian record of the early stages of the 
Winter War. In most of the accounts the Red Army units 
got; into these situations because of their impetuous efforts 
to catch the retreating enemy. Typical was the experiences 
of Pavel Porosenko who advanced with his patrol into a 
F innish defense position on the night of 3 December 1939. 
after knocking out three Finnish artillery pieces and 
destroying several enemy machine guns, his commander was 
wounded. Pavel then took command of the patrol and held out 
against the surrounding Finns until reinforcements arrived. 
After ten hours of defending his posit ion with twenty-four 
men against seven hundred of the enemy, he reported to his 
connnander with a creased helmet and an overcoat with six 
bullet holes in it. 1 
Even a female doctor, one Valentine p,1ushch, managed 
to get into this act. It seems she was at the front as a 
battalion physician and had to take over a command responsi-
bilityo 11 It appeared that the enemy was on our flank. Then 
it seemed that he was nowhere, 02 she related. However, 
lt). Bank, 11 Pulemetchik Pavel Porosenkov" (Machine Gunner 
~avel Porosenkov) 1 Izvestiya, 11 February 19401 p. 2 . 
2P. Pavlenko, 11 Valentina Plushch0 (Valentine Plushch), 
Pravda, 9 February 1940, p. 2. 
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according to the rest of the story, the unit soon formed a 
de f ensive position and Dr. Plushch was able to function as 
h i . . 1 a p ys cian once again. 
In yet another recollection, a whole company was 
surrounded on 9 December 1939 while trying to make a river 
crossing. As the situation developed, however, "To retreat 
·-was not possible. The enemy lay on all sides. One hundred 
men were resolved to die but not surrender. 112 Encouraged 
-by their political officer, Atanas 1 evich Ershov, the men 
dug in and apparently held out until relieved. This reaction 
t o being surrounded was characteristic of all the Russian 
material concerning the early part of the war. This material 
confirms various Finnish testimony about; the Red Army's swift 
creation of defensive protection in response to sudden flank 
and rear attacks, even by lightly-armed ski troops.3 In 
other words, Soviet units made almost no attempt to retreat. 
They stood their ground and fought. 
Another story recounts the attacks of the "Whitefinns" 
on field artillery battery. Of course the attack was a 
f ailure because a heroic wireman wiped out the enemy machine 
gun crews and, utilizing their weapons, cut the 11 bandit-gang11 
down from the rear.4 In another recollection wifh a similar 
1Ibid. 
2N. Krus jkov, "Odin Iz Mnohig S1avneh11 ( One of the Many 
Honored Ones), Pravda, 7 February 1940, p. 2. 
-%1annerheim, p. 378; Vallotten, p. 87; and Hannula, p. 52. 
4r • .t\.ntzelovich, 11 Pyotr Losev" (Peter Losev), ~' 
15 February 1940, p. 4. -
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script, the field artillery pieces, in this case 122-mm. 
(5 inch) cannons, were 11 operated like rifles 11 so that the 
- ~ 
artillerymen managed to drive the three hundred attacking 
Finns away. 1 
The interesting thing about this last accoun·b was 
the fact that a 122-mm. artillery piece which has a range of 
2-5 miles should have been located a considerable distance 
behind the lines. However, this battery position was 
organized and dug in for just such an attack as it ultimately 
repulsed . 2 It was quite apparent that the penetration of 
Finnish attack groups was not unexpected even in the rearmost 
areas of the Red Army. What probably was unexpected was 
the successful defense of such a position by unsupported 
artillerymen. 3 
These articles and recollections did not, of course, 
include any direct criticism of either the government or the 
Red Army. In such a monolithic state this cannot be expected. 
However, certain critical 11 evaluations" were often included 
' ~ 
in otherwise laudatory hero stories and memoirs. A short 
examination of these critical elements in the great mass of 
Rus s ian material can be instructive in determining just what 
1G. Leptov, Sjarkaya Shoalka" (A. Hot Skinnish) Boi v 
Finlyandii (Moscow: Military Publishe!•s, 1941), p. 248. 
2Ibid., pp. 245-246. 
3other examples of this same story can be found in: 
.u. Margulis, 11 Pryanoi Navodkoi" (JJirect Fire), Komsomols kaya 
P·ravda, 20 January 1940, p. J; .. S • . Vashentzev, "Tri Svyazustau 
(Three Wireman), Krasnaya Zvezda, 2 February 1940, Po 4. 
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went wrong during the early period of this war. 
One of the earliest of these critical comments occurred 
in an article which appeared through the Soviet press during 
late uecember 1939. The "Three Week Summary of the Warn was, 
as has been shown, a major revision of Soviet expectations. 
The phrase 11 0nly ignorant people or those openly hostile to 
-the Red Arrrry could have expected to overcome the Finnish 
Army in one week111 indicated the spirit of criticism for 
-earlier statements that this would be a short campaign. 
Although nominally a blast at 0 foreign military writersu, 
-
it was equally a left-handed rap at the previous estimations 
found in the Russian press itself which had expected a rapid 
fall of the 11Mannerheim gangtt during the first week of the 
~ 
war . It is for this type of material that the reader must 
be especially alert, and it is here that the Russian writers 
were able to express some resentment and strike a few feeble 
blows of critical analysis in an otherwise heavily controlled 
informa.tion media. 
In the matter of training the main deficiences seem 
to have been in the field of tank-infantry coordination and 
the use of ski troops. The accounts of the earliest attacks 
on the Karelian Isthnru.s exposed the lack of coordination 
between armol' and infantry. At least one observer noticed 
that the tanks consistently outran the infantry during the 
111 Trednedel' niei Itog Boevieh veistviu v Filyandii, 11 
12£. llio 
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1 first days of the attack. That this sometimes caused 
difficulty was recorded by one writer when he told how one 
battalion commander had lost contact with his regiment and: 
••• had fallen into a fire trap under enemy 
machine gun fire and had had to organize a perimeter 
defense. The help of the tanks had been expected 
by him. The sudden reappearance of the tanks ended 
the enemy. success .2 
Another story, concerning a river crossing, told of 
a different lack of coordination: 
Lieutenant Preobrasjenski's platoon located 
two fords. The infantry could- cross but the 
artillery and tanks would have stuck in the mud ••• 
The regimental commander ••• decided to continue 
the attack without tanks or artillery. The 
battalion moved ahead and the tanks and artillery 
remained behind. 
The tank crews were alarmed that the battalion 
had gone ahead without the tanks. Shots were heard 
in the direction of the Ino Station ••• The 
infantry must be supported. The tanks soon cx•ossed 
the river by another route. . 
The tanks returned to their assembly point at 
the bridge ••• as shells came in from all sides. 
It was supposed that the enemy, passing the forward 
infantry, had decided to counterattack the rear.3 
as further evidence of the lack of cooperation betwe e n 
Rus s ian infantry and armor read this account by Division 
1Nikolai Tihonov, "Pervii Dyenn (First Day), s. I. 
Vas he ntsev (ed.), V Snega ,Finlyandii (Mos cow: State 
Publishing House of the Peoples' Literature, 1941), p. 75. 
2K. Kulik, "Zahvet Karvalie--Lentulie--Kirki Kivennapi 11 
(The Areas of Karvali--Lintula--Kirk Kivennapi), Boi v 
~inlyandii (Moscow: Military Publishers, 1941), p . 44. 
-'Ivanovich, 11 Zapiski Tankista,u pp. 75-76. 
commander V. N. Kashuga: 
The infantry started out ahead of the tanks 
in the initial attack . We had to overtake them to 
act · together. However, this was only in the 
beginning. Soon this weakness was corrected and 
we kept up with the infantry . l 
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Ono can see that this weakness was prevalent within 
the Red Army. Indeed, through the opening phases of the 
action Division Commander V . N. Kashuga had to move about 
the battlefield continually to insure good communication 
betvrnen the armored elements and the infantry forces . 2 
In the matter of the use of ski troops in the Winter 
War, the Russian record reveals some rather sharp, indirect 
criticism. One author commented succintly about the use of 
skiers in the beginning of the Finnish campaign: 0 we have 
not remembered the earlier traditions of the use of skis 
during the period of the heroic struggle with the Whitefinns. 11 3 
Was there, in fact, any evidence, aside from numerous 
incidents from battle stories, which might help to sub-
sta.ntiate the Red army ' s lack of' preparation in ski warfare? 
r 
It is perhaps fortunate that we have two recollections which 
could lead to no other assumption . In the first story a 
member of the 70th Soviet Infantry Division, which occupied 
1..; . Marshak and A . Tvardovskii, 11 Geroi i Evo Mat" (A 
Heto and His Mother),~ . I . vashestsev (ed . ), V snega , 
Finlyandii (Moscow: State Publishing House . of _th.e Peoples ' 
Literature, 1941), .. PP ~ 114-115 . 
2Ibid . , pp . 115-116 . 
Jr . Colomo nnikov, uLies j nik Boetz" ( Ski Soldier), 
Komsomolskaya Pravda, 9 February 1940, p . 3o 
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the extreme left of the Karelian front throughout January, 
February and March of 1940, recalled that after the division 
had been on the line for a month: 
••• skis were issued •••• We put them on •••• 
I could see that my friends were r .eluctant and 
puzzled; they did not seem to understand the 
nature of skis . 
11 1 will tell you a secret, boys,u said Punin, 
"I have never been on skis." ~ 
11 Why do you suppose that the Finns are so good 
on skis?" said the Company Commander. urt is 
because ,they are raised up under winter ~conditions, 
and we, who are city people, if we take part in 
winter sports, do it on ice skates, and we have 
forgotten about skis . However, we must now 
concentrate on them. 0 1 
In yet another account the difficulties encountered 
in training the Red Army man to handle his skis properly 
was underscored: 
In between the fighting the men improved their 
skill on skis . Comrade Mirovonski insisted that he 
could do better in the snow without them. 
11 ti kis are difficult, we can get the Whitefinns 
without them. Why must we practice?" 
0ne evening I was dispatched with Mironovski on 
a patrol. An hour had not yet passed when, breathing 
hard, the red, robust soldier was asking for mercy. 
11 But how can you fire, comrade cornmander? 11 
ult is difficult to hit the enemy While standil'.)g, 
but lying down with skis is im.possible. 0 
I then taught him how to handle them. 
~kis are very necessary on patrol, in action 
and on the roads.Z 
This testimony tends to confirm the belief that at 
1Mitrofanov, 11 V snega Finlyandii, 0 pp. 15-16. 
2B. Tib.arev, ii zapishi Sapera" (an ~Engineer's Diary), 
8 . I. Vashentsev (ed.), V Snega Finlyandii (Moscow: 
state Publishing House of the Peoples ' Literature, 
1941), . p . 322 . . 
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least the majority of Leningrad troops had had little 
. 
civilian experience with skis during the early part of the 
war. This lack of ski training in the Red Army units 
engaged in Finland should, therefore, not surprise us for 
of t he twenty-eight infantry divisions identified as having 
bee n used in the war, some fifteen were from the Leningrad 
a r•eas, and of these some five were from inside the city 
itself. 1 If all these were as poorly prepared for ski 
warfare as the 70th Soviet Division, then it would have 
bee n small wonder that the average Red Army man not only had 
no s kis until late in the conflict but was relatively un-
trained in their use . However, there is some evidence that 
even during the campaign the .Russians did make up for lost 
t ime . A pro-Finnish writer observed: 
•• • skiing in the Soviet Army, after the 1939-40 
war in Finland • •• became the subject for inter-
national ridicule; which, however, was only partly 
justified and has certainly been greatly overdone. 2 
on the other hand, t here would seem to be little doubt 
f r om an examination of Soviet records that the Red military 
comma nders made every effort to acquaint their troops with 
skis and their uses in the latter part of the war . Stories 
appear ed in the Soviet records of the Winter War which 
glorified the activities of the ski troopers as scouts3 and 
1Horgma n, ~er Ueberfa l ls, pp . 305-306. 
2¥irsoff, p . 93. 
JA . Beziemenski , 0 Molodesj v Boyahu (The Young Man in 
act ion), s. I. Vashentsev (ed . ), V Snega Rinlyandii (Moscow: 
State Publishing House of the peoples • Literature, 1941), 
PP . 201-20.5. ~ . 
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in their ability to make telling blows behind enemy lines, 
or merely establish communications between units which had 
become temporarily isolated from one another. 1 
However effective this training was for the continued 
Russian military operations, the Soviet records also 
indicate that Finnish ski troopers managed to attack wagon 
trains, 2 artillery positions,3 and staff headquarters.4 
As the war progressed the Russian skiers seemed (at least in 
Soviet documents) to gain experience for in a later article 
a Finnish scouting detachment on skis was trailed and 
destroyed by a Russian ski patrol.5 There would seem to be 
little doubt that the Soviet military leadership worked 
throughout the conflict to train their men in the use of 
skis. 6 
Another point which stands out in the Russian accounts 
of the Russo-Finnish campaign was the rapid development of 
1G. Zavarin, "Na Liesjah" ( On Skis), Boi v Finlyandii 
(Moscow: Military Publishers, 1941), pp. 355-356. 
2z. Hiren, "Mladskii Komandir Skochnyagin" (Corporal 
Skochnyagin), Krasnaya Zvezda, 28 January 1940, p. 2. 
3.Antzelovich, loc. cit. 
4 Korobov, p. 2. 
5v. Vavashkin, "Liesjnie Otryad" (Ski Patrol) 
Boi v Finl~andii (Moscow: Military Publishers, 1941~, 
pp. 366-36. 
6P. Pavlenko, "Geroicheskii 81-i Polk" (The Heroic 
81st Regiment), Krasnaya Zvezda, 27 January 1940, p. 4; and 
M. Vistinetskii, 11 Mladshii Leitenant Bogatierev" (Second 
Lieutenant Bogatierev), Krasnaya Zvezda, 29 January 1940, 
p. 2. 
scouting and patrolling techniques in the Red A.rrny. As 
most of the early combat recollections reveal, the Soviet 
attacks on the Karelian Isthmus seem to have had no good 
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idea of what the enemy might have prepared for them when 
they penetrated into the lakes, swamps and forests of eastern 
Finland . As we have seen, such a 11 heroic0 battalion 
- -commander as Captain Ugrumov continually pushed ahead with 
no real conception of what kind of opposition he might run 
into at any moment. 1 Also many of the articles and memoirs 
of the earlier battle contacts contained such phrases as 
"which of the enemy fire points were real and which were 
false, this was the real problem, 02 1•our artillery had a 
- -
particularly difficult problem for the enemy was located in 
a thick forest with everything under cover and so observations 
could not be carried out, tt3 and 0 all future operations nrust 
be caref'ully planned and based upon reconnaissance. 114 
-At least one recollection was, f'or a Russian account, 
relatively bitter about the lack of intelligent direction 
11VJ.olchanov and Michulovin, loc, cit. 
2s. S. Dsjigrei, ttpoddersjali Svou Pehotu11 (We 
t:>upported Our Infantry), .. Boi v Finlyandii (Moscow: .Military 
Publishers , 1941), pp. 133~134. 
3N. ;)hvankov, 11 Geroi Sovetskovo Souza, Leitenant Boll 
shakov11 (Hero of the Soviet Union, Lieutenant Bol' shakov), ~ 
Krasnaya Zvezda, 30 J~nuary 1940, P• 2. 
4A. Fedunin., 1'Fereprava Cherez Reku Taipalen-Ioki0 
(The Crossing of' the _Taipalen-Ioki River), Boi v Finlyandii 
(Moscow: Military Publishers, 1941), p. 99 .• 
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ot: a 11 heroic advance." This was the attack of 17-19 December 
~ . 
1939 on the Railroad Station at Punnus to split the very 
center o:f the "Mannerheim Line 0 which ran across the Karelian 
., - . 
Isthmus. Evidently the Soviet forces, tanks, artillery and 
infantry, having crossed the ttBezimyanni (Unknown) River," 
had advanced into a triangle formed by Lake Punnus-jarvi to 
the west, a railroad to the east and the river to the south. 
A single patrol was sent out to uncover the enemy and 
returned with only three out of the eighteen men and the 
news that the Russian units were in grave danger of being 
cut off from their lines by Finnish infantry and an armored 
train. Although the Soviet troops were able to withstand 
the encircling attacks of the Finns through the swift movement 
of their armor, it was obvious from the general tone o:f the 
s tory that there had been a definite :failure o:f the staff to 
plan the attack on the basis of careful and sound 
reconnaissance. 1 
~\s even 1110re disasterous example of' the lack of Russian 
reconnaissance in the earlier phases of the war was the 
initial large-scale Soviet attack upon the 11Hotinen Knot ,t• 
the central posit ion o:f the so-called ttsumm; Lines. 11 The 
... ... . 
ear ly combat patrols had apparently contented themselves 
with the breaking of lanes through the barbed wire and tank 
obstacles leading into the :fortified areas. It was obvious 
that thes e patrols had done an inadequate job in locating 
1G. Radkov, "V Tiel Protivnika0 (In the Enemy 's Rear) 
Boi v F inlyandii (Moscow: ~ilitary Eublishers, 1941), pp. l~ o-: 
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all of' the hidden Finnish machine gun and artillery positions 
on and about the dominant hill 65 .5. In typical Gung-Ho 
fashion the ~oviet tank-infantry teams then rushed through 
·the gaps in the wire and tank -'parapets ll to attack the first 
. 
line of' enemy def'enses . The Finns throughout the preliminary 
patrol actions had concealed their principal defensive 
po;.; itions from Russian observation. Thus when the soviet 
units had been thoroughly committed, the Russian observer 
ruefully admitted: 
••• it was then when the two Russian 
battalions had reached hill 65 .5 that the enemy 
brought into action all the fire power of the 
defensive area, all the machine guns, mortars and 
artilleryo Bullets squealed as, with a rattling 
sound, they tore into the ditch and from there 
into the parapets . 
we were in an iron-clad defense . The way out 
was covered by enemy cross-fire . a trap ! The 
defenders were firing on prearranged lanes, . so there 
was no escape route • •• the enemy was firing 
rapidly but not one fir•e point could be seen • • • 
All were well covered and camou.f'laged . The fire 
was devilish. The regiment rolled back across the 
strath and through the grove ("Zubov") to its 
departing positions . We left one-and-one-half 
companies in the trencheso Then twilight came . 
Hardly had we begun to make any effort to remove 
the men from the trenches when the deadly cross-
fire from the invisible fire points blocked the 
exits ••• Only after five days of eff'ort were 
we able to bring the troops from this area . l 
'l'his notable failure, along with other l"eports, led 
to a distinct effort by the tioviet army leaders to improve 
the quality of reconnaissance in the Red Army. Whereas the 
1.t' . Matoshin, 11 Pervie lJni Pered Liniei Mannergeim.a11 
(The First Days Before the Mannerheim Line), Boi v Finlyandii 
(Moscow: MilitaJ:>y Publishers, 1941}, PPo 260':"261. 
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earliest newspaper stories and memoirs had told about heroic 
artillerymen, tankers and infantry commanders, about halfway 
through the conflict the reconnaissance scout began to 
appear as a heroic figure . In these articles and memoirs 
he was described as a super-soldier who could overcome great 
obstacles to accomplish his mission of seeking out and 
sometimes even destroying enemy positions. The Soviet scout 
not only had to locate the enemy but also helped to clear 
roads and evacuate wounded as part of his duties. 1 In order 
to attract the enemy's attention and thus uncover the hidden 
-
fire points, false machine gun positions and cover fire 
were used. 2 The scouts also interviewed local Finnish peasants 
to di;:;cover the 11 inconspicuous paths 0 to the en~my forts. 3 
~ 
In one account; a heroic .Russian scout even camouflaged 
himself in white and literally 11 s wamn his way across an open., 
snow-covered field to observe the strength of a Finnish unit.4 
This need for specialized reconnaissance work in the 
thick woods and complicated water course of the Karelian 
1E. Smorkalov, 11 Vozvedchik Berendeev" ( The Scout 
Berendeev) ., _Krasnaya zxezda, 30 January 1940, p. 2; and 
A. ::;urkov., ·• .Razvedchik Vasiltev" . (The ~cout Vasil'ev), 
Krasnaya ~vezda., 27 January 1940, P• 4. 
2T. biechev, ii .Penaya .Ra.zvedka" (The First Patrol), 
Boi v Finlxandi~ {Mos~ow: Military Publishers, 1941), pp. 107-1 
3T • ..;iechev, 11 v R.azvedka" (on· Patrol)., Komsomolskaya 
Pravda , 4 February 1940, p. 3. ~ 
4v. ·.[l•enkov., ''Korosjnik Alekseevu (The ~cout Alexiev)., 
Krasnaya ~vez da, 17 February 1940, p. 2 • . ~
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Is thmus was soon recognized. One decorated Soviet commander 
remembere d his experiences as follows: 
.uuring t;he battles for the Mannerheim Line:, 
I as ke d to form a special unit of scouts which 
would be all volunteers ••• Here I organized 
my men as battle experience had shown. The 
section was divided into three groups •••• 
the 1 holding group• was basic, it was ••• to 
obtain information; the 'diversion group• diverted 
the enemy's attention to _ itself in order_. to insure 
the success of the 'holding group 1 ; and the tcover 
group' covered the first two groups with its - fire. 
As a result we began to get valuable information 
and losses began to drop.l 
It should be noted that while this organization was 
very good:, it only involved one unit and was obviously 
intended to correct earlier mistakes in Soviet scouting and 
patrolling. It is impossible to discover how far this system 
spread throughout the Russian forces on the Karelian Isthmus 
but probably something very like this was undertaken in all 
Red a rmy units which had had scouting problems. 
It is interesting to observe other suggestions made 
by a previous author for the improvement of scouting and 
patrolling by the Red Army: 
Now ••• to the .equipment of the soldier-scout. 
When we crossed the border, we were overloaded. 
~n every rucksack there were, for instance, two 
pairs of reserve underwear, a kettle and messgear. 
why did we need all this? At that time it was 
necessary for a scout to ,possess only five grenades 
for a patrol. Actually a scout should drop his 
rucksack and carry a satchel of grenades. 
He should also have no less than fifty to 
s ixty rounds of ammunition, and the good scout 
191. Ulyanov, HlJoros jnik0 ( The Scout), Boi v Finlyandii 
(Mos cow: Military Publishers, 194l), pp. 149-150. 
'Will have to one h no less than one hundred and twenty 
because ~ndr ed and f U:ty shells , , , , This 1s 
days • I f s cout may be in act ion for two . or tbree 
can onl you use all your cartridges, then you 
Y snap your teetht 
are 
0
i~~olvers are needed by the scouts, Knives 
With Fi~g~tory, of course; we all armed ourselves 
, nish knives • 
.&:pe • Felt cially important to the scout are his skis, 
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to:t>Jnent fboots do not suit the scout, They are a 
chance tater they are wet and you will have no 
night 
O 
dry them. vay after day, night after 
boots' your feet can get cold from th• frozen felt 
boots 'w · !hpers onallY provided myself with leather 
two Pail. feet and soles of rubber, You then wear 
in a st~l of woolen stockings--and wrap the feet further 
as thong/ of linen--and the feet will stay as dry 
Th they were in an oven. scouti ere are other necessities to remember about 
into 
1
~· Fresh bread will not do, It congeals 
frozen •.and you cannot melt it, Also sausage when 
. A Will spoil as will fruit preserves. 
J.t Willgood food is galeti, chocolate and eye bread; 
for a not become tasteless, Rations are a necessity 
days r!~out, he should possess not less than tbre• 
everyth·ions , , , A good scout should carcy 
ing he might neea.l 
sc matter what changes were made 1n the Red Army's No 
O'U.ti"'!l' ~a~ . . tr
0
~ patrolling procedures, there was little doubt 
SU.bs le equent articles that th• Finnish defenses, at 
ast 1 
b 
n. the s i t e~ urnrna region, were thoroughly invest ga ed 
-l. OJ:>e the · le attacks of early February 1940, Th• soviet 
aael:'sh1 . Oft p also became much more familiar with the tactics 
he p• irur· h •ut is defenders, As on• Russian observer pointed 
about t "ll!all he Finns and their patrols, "theY operated in 
~b.ese gronps and are armed 1argelY with. submachine guns' 
. scouts ~e~th move on skis , , , and presu111'1blY selected bad 
SJ:> f or their openings,2 /IS a reference to $oviet 
I 
1Ib· ~., P lr!O 




~ing Gi i\.ks elrov "Oznakonueni• s Taktiloi Protivnika" 
•cow: ~~uainted'with the Enem:r•s Tactics), ~oi v Finl.yandii 
J.litary Publishers, 1941), .P· 
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scouting problems the author pointed out the following 
concerning the enemy: 
In wooded areas that were hard to survey, 
they left hundreds of rifle and submachine 
gunners called 1 cuckoos 1 who fired from the 
trees . Their task was, ~with unexpected flashes 
of fire, to panic the advancing troops ••• 
from the flanks and rear. Behind stones, 
which were located all about, were emplacements 
for Finnish machine gunners and cannons. 
These stones also served as cover for the 
submachine gunners as well. In the ravines 
they concealed mortar positions.l 
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As for the Finnish tactics in the relatively fixed 
positions of the Mannerheim Lines: 
••• at the first round o.f artillery they 
would abandon their defensive positions •• • , 
but as soon as our artillery began to fire on 
deeper targets, the Finns again would return 
to their places and direct a hurricane of 
fire at the advancing troops. 2 
'l1he Red Army leadership was apparently aware o.f these 
problems for they republished several captured Finnish 
tactical manuals in Russian to distribute among their own 
troops . 3 Likewise, to penetrate the Finnish defensive 
positions so-called "blockading groups" were organized. 
These troops, operating as individual patrol units, would 
slip into the forti.fied zones, locate the main defensive 
positions and, if possible, carry out demolitions to destroy 
them or clear the way through the obstacles for larger 
1.Ibido 
2:i:bid . 
jibid., p. 270 . 
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at tacking columns. 1 Apparently the success of the first of 
these groups was contagious for other units were hastily 
organized among the many divisions of the Red Army along 
the Karelian front. 2 
However, one may doubt that complete reliability of 
Soviet accounts of the Winter War, there would seem to be 
little doubt that the Red Army .in February had much better 
information about the Mannerheim Line than they had had in 
. 
December of the previous year. l)espite continued Finnish 
efforts to cut off and destroy these ublockading groups, 11 3 
' ~ 
the sheer number of these patrols must have meant that the 
Soviets were becoming more skillful at scouting and patrolling 
under the pressure of necessity. 
The fact that the Soviet military leaders throughout 
late December, January and early February were gathering 
more information about the Finnish fortifications on the 
Karel ian Isthmus did not mean that they had solved the 
problems of breaking through these defenses. The large 
number of positions, their careful concealment and the large 
number of' interlocking roads and trenches meant that any 
damage caused by the "blockading groups 0 was not likely to 
1a. Kosenko, 11Troge otvasjnieh0 (The Three Brave Men), 
Boi v Finlyandii (Moscow: Military P~blishe~s, 1941), 
pp. 272-277. 
c::'..P . Hebenck, 11 Iz Boevoi .Praktiki Razvedchika 11 (From 
the Combat Practices ~of the Scouts)~ Boi V Finlnandii 
(Moscow: Military Publishers, 1941J, pp. 280-2 2. 
3rbia ., p. 282 . 
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be fatal to the defense in any particular sector. 1 Something 
must be done to destroy the larger concrete fortifications 
located by the '' blockading groupsn but which were too massive 
for them to damage or destroy by themselves. Massed 
artillery barrages would not do for multiplicity of exploding 
shells would make accurate observation almost impossible and 
would also tend to obscure the amount of damage done to any 
specif ic target. Then, too, as we have seen, the majority 
of Finnish positions apparently had no artillery emplace-
ments so that all the artillery fire on the forts themselves 
would not prevent prompt counter-battery fire on Russian 
positions which would be directed from even parti~lly wrecked 
positions . (It should also be noted that the scarcity of 
artillery fortifications in the Mannerheim Line made absurd 
the claim that massed Russian artillery "dr~-fire" could 
"knock the Finn 's artillery out of its d;licate ali.gnment,") 2 
The Soviet problem was very basic: how to keep a constant 
rain of accurate fire on a major fort until it could be 
reduced to rubble in the face of possible Finnish counter-
battery fire .3 
It had been obvious from the first that tanks, while 
excellent for knocking out earth-wood machine gun positions 
1r· · d -2.1..... •, p. 280. 
2Parry, p. 239 . 
Yv. Yakovlev, 11 Pryamoi Navodkoi po Dotam11 (Direct Fire 
on the Forts), Boi v Finlyandii (Moscow: Military Publishers, 
1941)' p.' 310 . 
1.,. 
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and trenches, could not be expected to destroy iron-concrete 
fortifications . Thus the major role would be in the hands 
of the artillery. For the most part, the artillery must 
depend upon careful scouting to locate the . principal 
positions . 1 Then a pinpoint barrage would be called in to 
uncover the earth around the cupolas and walls. 2 After the 
major portions of the fort had been exposed, a heavy 
artillery piece, usually a 152-mm. or even a 203-mm howitzer 
TrJould be moved into position directly opposite the target, 
frequently within two or three hundred meters.3 Often the 
sound of the emplacement of such a heavy gun had to be 
masked by renewed artillery fire on the Finns. The danger 
of such a location for heavy guns was emphasized by the fact 
that the gun crews had to be volunteers.4 After the gun 
had been emplaced--usually during the night--the men had 
to wait until morning to begin their fire . As one Red Army 
artilleryman remembered it: 
Exactly at 0800 hours our gun opened fire ••• 
We were unlucky. The first shell struck an empty 
tank which had been knocked out the day before. 
1P. Burmistrov, 11 Art illeristie-Ra.zvedchiki11 (.Artillery-
men-scouts), Bo~ v Finlyandii (Moscow: Military Publishers, 
1941), pp. 297-300. 
2
4\ . Kirpichnikov, "Uho k Zemle1' ( Ear to the Ground), 
Boi x Finlzandii (Moscow: Military ~ublishers, 1941), pp. 
302-303. 
3p . Leont rev, "Sokrushenie .uomov" (Broken Houses), 
Bo~ v Finlyand11- (Moscow: Milital"Y Publishers, 1941), p. 340. 
4Yakovlev , pp. 318~319. 
The tank caught fire and a thick smoke came from 
it which tended to conceal the fort in front of 
us. It seemed that we might have to move to a 
new positiont ••• Suddenly the wind shifted, 
the smoke blew away and the fort could be seen. 
We fired a second round. Again it struck short. 
I noticed that after each round our gun settled 
a bit more into the ground. In order to brace 
it, we drove wooden stakes into the ground which, 
along with the braceplates, prevented any backward 
movement. 
The fort began to fire at us from its machine 
guns and cannon. It became necessary to cease 
fire and take cover. The shells exploded almost in 
our cover trencho All . of us were covered with 
dirt •••• However, the gun was unharmed and no 
one was killed. 
vfuen the firing had almost stopped I gave the 
command: "To the gunt 0 
The gun had been. covered by the dir•t. We soon 
cleaned it from the barrel and breach. Everything 
was in order. 
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The Finns again opened fire but their shells 
landed inaccurately and we continued to fire. After 
twenty shells had struck home, a steel cupola flew 
off the fort. 
we sent several more shells into the middle of 
the fort. 
There was a breach in the middle of the fort. 
The left wall began there. On the left side was 
another hole. 
By the seventeenth shell the fort had been 
destroyed.l 
The gun crews which became efficient at this sort of 
thing were soon very much in demand all along the Ma:rmerheim 
Line. It was very likely that this sort of activity was 
responsible for the crushing of the Finnish strong-points 
in preparation for the general advance on Viborg that 
occupied the Red Army in the period between the 1-5 February 
1940. 
There was other activity in the Russian lines in 
1Leonttev, pp. 341-342. 
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preparation for the February d1•ive according to another 
participant . After the most thorough reconnaissance, 
infantry-engineer attack groups, supported by artillery, 
would penetrate the outer perimeters of the fortifications. 
In one of these stories a group surrounded the Finnish fort 
number 45 (nicknamed uMillionni0 ) after a costly struggle 
and held off the inevitable Finnish counterattacks. To 
prevent the Finns from ever using the fort; again, they filled 
the embrasures with dirt and snow (evidently enemy personnel 
were still inside the structure). Af'ter the engineers 
arrived with their explosives , the fort was demolished piece 
by piece while the supporting defensive positions were kept 
covered by Russian heavy tanks. This whole adventure vJas 
notable because , for the first time in the mass of Soviet 
memoirs, the infantry, tanks, artillery and engineers were 
shown to be working together in a single attack--in other 
words coordinated warfare. 1 
Another indication of the thorough preparation for 
the intended drive against the Mannerheim Line was the 
extensive training given the attacking troops. One officer 
remembered this aspect of the Winter War as follows: 
The preparations to attack caused a move on 
the part of the 123rd Rifle Division. About three 
kilometers f'rom the front lines a u defensive area 1• 
was established, which, in truth, ~eproduced the plan 
of the enemy defensive dispositions. ~oldiers learned 
1M. S1povich, Hpadenie Pervieh Domov Hotinenau (The 
Fall of the First Buildings at Hotinen), Boi. v Filxandii 
(Moscow : Military Publishers, 1941), pp. 283-291. 
about the parapets and barbed wire, and how to 
storm the forts. They were organized into 
'interlocking groups . ' Artillerymen and 
antitank gunners learned to fire directly with 
their guns, everywhere it was necessary to f:ee 
the infantry from enellIY' fire. Tankers practiced 
their battle maneuvers with the infantry, and 
carried the 'interlocking groups' up to the 
model forts in armored sleds hooked to the tanks . 
Captain Soroka the battalion commander, 
insisted on individ~al combat training •• • • 
Everyone must .be sharp-eyed and fearless in 
battle, and be able to understand the plans. 
Captain Soroka placed great emphasis on 
the mutual aid of sections in action. The most 
difficulty was with the artillery. The . wheels 
of their guns would sink into the deep snow . 
It took great effort to pull them out and operate 
the guns close behind the infantry. Foreseeing 
these difficulties •• • Captain ~oroka beforehand 
prepared several sharpshooter squads to aid the 
artilleryrne n. 
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Three times we staged an attack against the 
enemy's defensive area. Realizing the gravity 
of their responsibilities in the fighting to come, 
the troops and commanders of the units worked on 
their actions in earnest, not letting up for a 
minute. The shouts of 11 hui"ray" would resound •••• 
when the red banner rose over the wooden models 
of the enemy's forts . ~oroka 1s eyes shone when 
the sections, supporting one another, systematically 
broke into the tranches, masterfully overcame the 
wire, the parapets and other obstructions.l 
With such preparations as these and the great 
adva.ntage in numbers, it was small wonder that the Red Army 
was finally able to break the Finnish defenses during the 
last month of combat in the Winter War. One cannot possibly 
miss the stress placed in this account or the cooperation of 
all branches of the Red Army in their task of reducing the 
Mannerheim Line. 
1A. Volovin, "Perea sturmom" (Before the Storm), 
Boi v Finl[andii (Mos~ow: Military Publishers, 1941), 
pp. 383-38. 
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Soviet records deal with many of the more obvious 
inadequacies of the Red Army in its attacks on the Karelian 
Isthmus and its penetration of the Mannerheim Line. The 
lack of coordination between the three major combat arms 
so apparent in the first days of the war was corrected 
during the months of LJecember and January . The lack of 
information too about the enemy ' s positions and the repeated 
penetration of Russian lines by Finnish skiers was overcome 
with the development of better scouting and patrolling 
techniques and the greatly increased use of skis by the 
.Red Arrrry . Thus it would appear that the Mannerhe im Line 
was broken by the use of combined infantry-tank-engineer 
teams supported by close artillery fire . The artillery also 
evidently received the perilous mission of . bringing their 
heavy guns close to some of the larger Finnish iron-concrete 
posit ions and reducing them with direct fire. Al most 
certainly the Soviet units of the 7th Army on the Karelian 
Isthmus were better coordinated and professionalized by 
their experiences in this campaign. 
It is interesting to note that the one type of 
combat experience which made practically no appearance in 
the Soviet record was the futile attempts of several 
Russian infantry divisions to penetrate the forest roads 
and trails of eastern Finland. Apparently the Red Arrrry 
either learned no great lesson from their extensive defeats 
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in these areas or chos e not to emphasize this facet of the 
Winter War. It was also noteworthy that Russian efforts to 
r enew this type of penetration during the Second World War 
in the Repola District near the end of 1944 had the same 
results as thei r e ar l ier efforts in 1939-1940. 1 
1 11 Motti 11actics, 11 p. 12 . 
CHAPTER IX 
THE NAVAL WAR BETWEEN FINLAND AND RUSSIA 
(30 November 1939--12 March 1940) 
In most works about the Russo-Finnish War very little 
mention is made of the naval campaign which, by necessity, 
was restricted to the Gulf of Finland, the Aland Islands and 
the Arctic Ocean. The decision of the Finnish Government to 
refuse to lease either Hanko Cape of the Porkkala Islands to 
the Soviet Union as a naval base was apparently the central 
factor which resulted in the breakdown of the negotiations 
between these two nations in mid-November of 1939. Thus the 
problem would appear to be one of naval strength and position 
so that any attempt to analyze the war requires some consid-
eration of the naval problems faced by the Russians in the 
Baltic . 
Much has been written about the Russian search for 
warm-water ports which might open that nation to world 
commerce. While there is no doubt that this theme had its 
importance in the long history of Russian expansion, 1 the 
situation in 1939 could probably be stated as an effort by 
1For a good review of this subject see: Robert 
Joseph Kerner, The Urge to the Sea (Los Angeles: University 
of California Press, 1942). 
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the Soviets to block all western sea routes to their nation 
in order to avoid possible sea-borne invasion or harassment. 
In no other way can this particular Soviet expansion into 
the eastern Baltic be explained since this body of water is 
never ice-free in any part and can very easily be shut off 
by the mining of the Skagerrak and Kattegat between Norway 
and Denmark by any of the principal European naval powers. 
On the other hand, Soviet demands on Finland seem at 
first glance to make no sense from the standpoint of naval 
protection. If Soviet leadership was so concerned about a 
possible German invasion at that time, they were moving in 
the wrong direction, as Marshal Mannerheim pointed out later. 
Their hostility towards Finland could only turn that nation 
into a potential enemy base and the Russian position would 
become impossible under these circumstances since the German 
battle fleet far outweighed the Russian.1 Then, too, with 
virtual control over the three Baltic States of Estonia, 
Latvia, and Lithuania, the Russian rulers had already erected 
about as good a land barrier as they could hope for against 
a potential German invasion. 2 
Before accepting the thesis that the Russians operated 
exclusively in the autumn of 1939 with the Nazis in mind, it 
would be well to recall that the world situation at that time 
was much more fluid and uncertain than it became during the 
1Jane's Fighting Ships, 1939, pp. 221-243. 
2Mannerheim, p. 313, and Citrine, pp. 33-34. 
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remainder of World War II. As of October of that year the 
only definite military action which had taken place was the 
German-Russian conquest and division of Poland. This move 
had marked the beginning of the conflict between the Anglo-
French powers and a greatly enlarged Nazi Germany which was 
now dominant in central Europe. It would appear that the 
recently demonstrated German military and aerial might, 
crouched behind the fortifications of the Siegfried Line, 
had created a Nazi bastion in central Europe which could not 
be immediately threatened by Allied land power. In the 
autumn of 1939 the war had become a problem of just how the 
two opponents might get at one another. And with the Nazis 
daily extending their influence and control further into 
central Europe, the pressure of action appeared to be in the 
hands of the Allies . Likewise, with so much of Europe neutral 
any nation in a position to aid the movements or actions of 
either of the opponents might well wake up one day and find 
itself faced with very unpleasant choices. 
There were two main avenues of approach open to the 
Allied Powers in their efforts to "get at" Nazi Germany and 
damage her growing hegemony in central Europe other than 
the costly choice of a land attack straight through the 
Siegfried Line. Since both of these potential avenues of 
attack would depend largely upon overwhelming naval supe-
riority, it could be expected that they would appeal to 
Allied planners. The first would be a strike at the "back 
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door" or, in later terms, the so-called "soft underbelly" of 
Europe through the Mediterranean Sea area. This, however, 
would certainly bring the Italians into conflict and would 
not be strik ing at the primary source of supply for the German 
war machine (Hungary, Rumania and the Soviet Union). The one 
advantage to this plan was that the Allies already held 
control of most of the Mediterranean Sea and thus would have 
a good base from which to move. 
The other area of possible action would be the 
Scandinavian and Baltic Sea approaches to northern Germany. 
Here, of course, the bad winter and spring weather, the 
nearness of major German air and naval bases, and the rugged 
topography were the principal barriers, not to speak of the 
traditional neutrality of the Scandinavian peoples. On the 
plus side , the British had numerous commercial contacts with 
all the Scandinavian nations, their North Sea bases were 
close by and the fjords of Norway could offer convenient 
anchorages for a large fleet. As a matter of fact, the First 
Lord of the British Admirality, Winston s. Churchill, drew 
up just such a plan of naval intervention in this area. This 
plan , which had the code name of "Catherine," envisioned the 
construction of capital ships which would be able to resist 
the effects of Luftwaffe bombing and torpedo attacks and 
still be capable of shelling German ships and shore installa-
tions in the Baltic . This scheme was to have been initiated 
in the late spring of 1940 with the passage of ice from 
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Scandinavian waters. 1 Any Russian naval strategist, given 
the situation in the autumn of 1939, would have done well 
to consider the possibility of a naval clash in the Baltic. 
This would have to lead to the conclusion that any such 
confrontation between the major antagonists might not be 
limited to the German-held coasts to the south. 
It has been stated that the Russian occupation of the 
principal naval bases in the Baltic States during the fall 
of 1939 made it unnecessary for the Russians to control the 
entrance to the Gulf of Finland. 2 This view does not take 
a number of important factors into consideration. In the 
first place, the new Russian naval bases at Baltiski Port, 
Reval , Riga and Dogra Island could not be put into adequate 
condition for use until the spring of 1940. These areas 
had been partially dismantled by the peace treaties between 
the Baltic States and the Soviet Union in 1919-1920 and had 
not been repaired or even utilized by a naval squadron in 
some twenty years. As simple logic would make obvious, 
one cannot rebuild a first-class naval base in a single 
season , even in good weather, and the Baltic is not noted 
for this benign characteristic. 
The problem of ice severely limits all major naval 
activity in these northern waters during the winter. What 
1winston s. Churchill, The Gathering Storm (Boston: 
Houghton, Mifflin, 1948), pp. !62-164. 
2Citrine, p. 34. 
230 
the Soviet naval strategists were probably trying to accom-
plish in their insistence upon the temporary leasing or 
Hanko Cape (or extensive anchorages in the Porkkala area) 
was the protection or their main Baltic Fleet bases at 
Kronstadt and Tallinn until racilities and ships could be 
constructed to provide adequate naval protection ror their 
recently acquired bases along the Baltic coast. For this 
reason the Finnish rerusal to submit to the Soviet request 
could have seemed rrom Moscow's viewpoint evidence or possible 
collusion with the western allies in their errorts to put 
naval pressure on Nazi Germany. 
Another point or danger which did not escape the 
Soviet leaders was the possibility or a threat to the sea 
approaches to Leningrad in the eastern sector or the Gulr or 
Finland. 1 Although by the Treaty or Dorpat or 14 October 
19202 the southwestern shores or the Karelian Isthmus had 
been demilitarized and the old Tzarist rortirications at Ino 
and Terioki dismantled,3 the possibility existed that should 
Finland join with any prospective enemy or the Soviet Union, 
they might easily move heavy artillery to these positions and 
control the northern channels to Leningrad and even threaten 
the Kronstadt base itselr since it lay well within the range 
1The u.s.S.R. and Finlandf Historical, Economic and 
Political : Facts and DocumentsNew York: Soviet Russia 
Today, 1939), pp. 3-4. 
2nallin, p. 113. 
3schonheinz (1 March 1940), p. 1687. 
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of" these demolished fortifications •1 
One of the important questions about the naval situ-
ation i n the Gulf of Finland revolved around the Russian 
d emands for a lease on Hanko Cape or the Porkkala anchorages 
just t o the east of that port . Why should Soviet naval 
strategists insist upon this base when they had possession 
or such ports as Tallinn and Baltiski Port on the southern 
shor e s of the Gulf in Estonia, just seventy kilometers from 
Hanko ? Of course one of the answers was probably that they 
hoped by setting up coastal artillery at both Baltiski Port 
and Hanko Cape they would be able to c l ose the mouth of the 
Gulf of Finland by shell fire during periods of good vis-
ibi li ty . 2 They might also have wished to deprive a potential 
enemy naval force of the use of this area . Because of these 
considerations , the question of the desirability of Hanko 
Cap e requires a more thorough examination . 
The largest and most accessible harbor on the southern 
c oast of the Gulf of Finland is still the Estonian port of 
Tallinn. During the winter, however, the ice and storms 
effectively close this port and shipping must be transferred 
t o the smaller anchorages of Baltiski Port . 3 For this reason 
1 G. Barandov, Voorus·enii O l o t Sovetskovo 
(The Armed Defense of the oviet Government oscow : 
Gov ernment Social-Economic Institute , 1941), p . 21 . 
2 Jakobsen , p . 118 . 
3Robert McClintock , 11 Strategic Possibilities of Hanko 
and the Visit There by the American Minister , 11 St ate Depart-
ment Telegram #1597, State Department Files . 
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alone there was some purpose to the Soviet efforts to lease 
further harbor facilities on the northern shore of the Gulf. 
In view of this fact further study must especially be 
made of the relative merits of the two winter stations on 
both sides of the Gulf of Finland. Baltiski Port is described 
as: " ••• encumbered with islands and shoals, extending as 
much as twelve miles off shore ••• which calls for alert 
navigation . 111 The anchorage is described as consisting of 
a single basin five hundred feet long and four hundred feet 
wide with an average depth of ten fathoms, entered by a 
seventy-foot channel . Any navigator is especially warned 
that the area west and south of the immediate channel is 
extremely dangerous at all times. For this reason, despite 
the fact that open water is certain from 15 March of one 
year to 1 February of the next, the facilities of Baltiski 
Port cannot be considered adequate. Here you have a single, 
small anchorage reached by one narrow entrance through a 
dangerous channel. 2 All these conditions would make the 
operation of a major naval force from this harbor extremely 
dangerous if an enemy naval force was only seventy kilometers 
away, at Hanko Cape for instance. 
Hanko Port , on the other hand, can be kept open the 
1u. S . Hydrographic Office, Sailing Directions for the 
Baltic, Vol. III: The Gulf of Finlandn the Aland Islands, 
aname Gulf of Botruiia (Washington: overnment Printing 
Office , 1952), p. 69. 
2l!?l.£., p . 75. 
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year around by ice-breakers and the approaches are specifically 
described as possessing no dangerous rocks or shoals. The · 
harbor consists of two relatively large basins, both of them 
wider and deeper than the single anchorage of Baltiski Port, 
with an entrance some three-quarters of a mile wide. Both 
the inner and outer harbors are reported safe from winds and 
storms from any direction. 1 The protection of Hanko Harbor 
is provided by low, encircling capes to the east and west, 
plus a fringe of outlying small granite islands which were 
occupied in 1939 by various coastal defense positions. These 
positions , in the opinion of one observer, made Hanko "dif-
ficult , if not impossible ••• to take by frontal attack 
from the sea ••• at least if such an attack were undertaken 
by the present vessels of the Russian Baltic Fleet."
2 
With these facts in mind, it is easy to see why the 
Soviet naval authorities were so determined to control Hanko 
Cape , either by leasing and fortifying the entire area or 
the establishment of a major naval base in the Porkkala 
Islands which would dominate the entrance to Hanko harbor. 
A base at Hanko itself would be a definite addition to Soviet 
control of the Gulf of Finland. It was almost the only 
anchorage open all winter inside the Gulf of Finland and 
seems to have been the safest refuge possible in case of a 
bad storm . Even if the Russians could not have utilized such 
1Ibid ., p. 110. 
2Mc Clintock, loc. cit. 
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a fine anchorage for their Baltic Fleet, they would have had 
to take measures to deny its use to any potential aggressor. 
Although all this might be called clever rationaliza-
tion, is there any concrete evidence of any sort for assuming 
that the Soviet political leaders had this specific situation 
in mind during their negotiations with the Finns? The answer, 
regretably, must be no, for there were few references to the 
naval problems from the Kremlin during this early period of 
World War II. On the other hand, there is evidence to prove 
that Stalin feared potential naval invasion of the Baltic 
area by one of the major sea powers at some time in the 
future. Here is how he evaluated the situation during the 
negotiations with the Finns in November 1939: "Both Britain 
and Germany are able to send strong naval forces into the 
Gulf of Finland. I doubt that you could get them to stay 
out of the conflict . . . Once the war between these two is 
over, the fleet of the victor will sail into the Gulf of 
Finland." 1 The Soviet record of the period in question also 
revealed some indirect evidence that the Reds were vitally 
concerned about their position in the Gulf of Finland. 
The very first book published in 1940 by the Soviet 
Government which dealt with naval problems in the Gulf of 
Finland2 devoted its first and longest chapter to a descrip-
tion of the naval situation there at the time of the British 
1 Jakobsen, loc. cit. 
2s. Kudriantsev-Skaif, Dekabr lj39 Goda (December 1939) 
(Moscow: War-Fleet Publications, 1940 . 
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intervent ion in support of the White Russian General 
Yudenich. At this time, of course, it was questionable 
whether the British were ther e to disarm the German troops 
in the Baltic States or to overthrow the Bolshevik regime 
in Petrograd. As the story developed it became clear that 
the Soviet f orces were unable effectively to interfere with 
any British plans in this area because of the lack of 
ade quate naval bases in either the Baltic or the Gulf of 
Finland . 
The author made a great story out of the heroic 
exploits of a Russian submarine the "Panther" which in Decem-
ber 1918 sailed from Kronstadt to look over the situation . 
It would seem that the Red Fleet at that time did not know 
wher e the British squadrons were located and , even more 
serious from the Soviet standpoint the Russians did not know 
what the English vessels were going to do in the area. 
'irJhether the Russian leadership in 1939 believed that there 
was a present danger of the same sort , the author ' s comments 
on the situation in 1918 are interesting : 
Kronstadt was under the threat of attack from 
the English fleet. And the attack threat was espe-
cially great since the flight of the Russian sailors 
from Helsingfors to Kronstadt over the ice had 
revealed that winter naval operations in the Gulf 
of Finland were impossible. This was especially true 
because, even in December, the eastern part of the 
Gulf ••• had been welded shut • • • The Baltic 
Fleet knew that somewhere in the Gulf of Finland the 
interventionist ships were hiding but the whereabouts 
of these ships and what they would do was unknown . l 
1.Tui£. , pp . 4-.5. 
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Russian naval strategists since 1918 feared the pos-
sibility of an enemy blockade of the Baltic coast during the 
winter ' s ice . They also feared that a hostile fleet might 
inflict great damage in the Baltic area when weather condi-
tions permitted . It no doubt would be safe to assume, 
therefore, that such an aggressive naval campaign by either 
of the belligerents in 1939 or thereafter was an important 
part of Soviet thinking at that time . 1 
As far as can be determined , the Soviet Baltic Fleet 
in 1939 consisted of some one hundred and ten vessels . 2 On 
the other hand, the total Finnish Fleet, restricted in many 
areas by the Treaty of Dorpat , was about half this number 
and much less in gross tonnage . 3 But there were factors 
which tended to equalize these forces . For example , the 
only important Russian naval base in the Gulf of Finland was 
Kronstadt . This base lies in the eastern part of the Gulf 
which is closed by the earliest ice in the region.4 What 
is even more important is the procedure which is followed by 
the Red Fleet to preserve both the ships and the men through 
the frozen winter . As one Russian observer recalled the 
1william and Zelda K. Coates, Russia , Finland and the 
Baltic (London: Lawrence Wishart , 1940}, p. 93. 
2 Jane's Fighting Ships , 1939, pp. 397-406 . 
3 11 Appeal of the Finnish Government to the League of 
Nations; a Summary Based on the Official Documents," Appendix 
to the Monthl Summar of the Lea e of Nati ons (December 
1939, p. 1 • 
L~Sailing Directions for the Baltic, III, p. 170. 
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situation: 
The spacious anchorage of Kronstadt is closed 
by sparkling ice. The ships sit there connected by 
hausers , gangways, hoses and cables with the shore. 
The smoke-stacks show no smoke. Carefully the hands 
have stretched tarpaulins over the decks ••• All 
electricity, water, and heat come from the shore. 
The ships' carpenters cover the superstructures with 
wooden roofs which smell of fresh pine. These 
structures look like huts with lights shine out of 
their frost-covered windows. Indeed, the whole line 
of anchored ships resembles nothing so much as a 
peaceful village of emigrants still not accustomed 
to the new area.l 
A fleet so solidly frozen in will take some time to 
get ready for action. As has been pointed out, any enemy 
naval force could be maneuvering along the Baltic coast, 
blockading ports , landing raiding parties and seizing iso-
lated Soviet bases long before any Russian flotilla could 
make its way out of Kronstadt, much less reach the mouth of 
the Gulf of Finland. 
Another important factor which probably influenced 
Soviet naval strategy in the Baltic in the autumn of 1939 
was the security of the main channel to Leningrad which 
followed the line of the earliest open water in the Gulf of 
Finland . This channel can be navigated during bad weather 
only through the aid of island lighthouses, especially the 
great light on Suursaari, a Finnish island. 2 A Russian 
author summarized the need for these navigational aids in 
the Gulf of Finland as follows: 
1Kudriantsev-Skaif, p. 3. 
2Sailing Directions for the Baltic, III, p. 175. 
The friendly light of a lighthouse in the 
darkness of deep night gives the seafarer assurance 
and the correct bearing for his ship. Much trouble 
arises ••• when a vessel comes around the reefs 
and sandbars and does not spot in the darkness of 
night the longlasting flashes! Are we off course? 
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In a matter of seconds will the ship, with a grinding 
crash, be cut in two by the rocks? 
There are few areas so complex for navigation 
as the eastern part of the Gulf of Finland. Here 
there are so many sandbars and water-covered rocks 
that navigation is even dangerous by daylight. At 
night one cannot adequately speak of it! If there 
were not lighthouses, night navigation would simply 
become impossible.l 
This concern for navigation was heightened by the 
climatic problems of the Gulf of Finland during both autumn 
and spring. At both periods the cloud cover makes celestial 
navigation difficult. The safety to such an important 
passage must have entered into Soviet considerations after 
the failure of the Moscow talks of 1939. 
The situation in the Arctic area, while relatively 
minor in importance compared to the situation in the Gulf 
of Finland, 2 still was fraught with potential danger for the 
strategic position of the Soviet Union. As one reporter 
pointed out: 11 British naval experts appraise the Petsamo 
region as a potential key to the port of Murmansk and a 
guardian of all trade routes in the Arctic Ocean."3 Pro-
Communist writers also reported that the Finnish position 
1Kudr iantsev-Skaif, pp. 34-35. 
2nallin, p. 115. 
3 Albert Parry, "Russia I s Strategic Seaport in the 
Arctic," Travel (January 1940), p. 40. 
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in the Arctic meant a potential threat to Murmansk. 1 
This concern might seem a bit overdone for the Murmansk 
passage is well protected and remains ice-free the year 
a round. The trip along the Arctic coast, however, is filled 
with danger. It appears that sudden changes in the weather 
especially around the Hibachi Peninsula are to be expected 
in both summer and winter. 2 Extreme tidal currents also are 
not uncommon.3 Even in "normal" conditions visibility is 
none too good in this stretch of the Arctic.4 The Hibachi 
Peninsula is especially mentioned as one of the most notably 
visible landmarks on a coast famous for its lack of any 
natural navigational guides . 5 Added to this are the several 
fjords in the Hibachi Peninsula where fishermen had been in 
the habit of taking shelter during stormy weather and which 
can afford emergency shelter to naval vessels operating along 
the hostile Arctic coast. 6 Any considerable number of ships 
desiring to navigate in this area would have to possess 
1 Amter, p . 7. 
2u. s. Hydrographic Office, Sailinfh:Directions for the 
Northwest and North Coasts of Norwa (Was ngton: Government 
Printing Office, 19 4, p. 2 
3ill.£., p. 289 . 
4u. s. Hydrographic Office, Sailing Directions for 
Northern u.s.s . R. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 
19.54)' p . 164. 
5~. , p. 163 . 
6sailing Directions for the Northwest and North Coasts 





access either to the Hibachi Peninsula of' Petsamo Fjord or 
both, a condition which must have been known to the Soviet 
naval stai'i' in their plans i'or the prevention of' the possible 
approach of' a sea-borne enemy . 
Another question partially eliminated by this inves-
tigation of' the naval situation about Finland in 1939 was 
the choice of' time i'or the attack on the land dei'enses of' 
eastern Karelia. The Soviet military planners must have been 
well aware that December was not likely to be sui'i'iciently 
cold to provide a solid base i'or a highly mechanized mass 
army in eastern Finland. 1 Likewise the heavy cloud cover 
which usually occurs throughout the month of' December in 
those l atitudes would greatly restrict any aerial support. 
Indeed, the previous Russian invasion of' Finland of' 8-9 
February 1809 had been successi'ul largely because the lakes, 
rivers, swamps and the Gulf' of' Finland itself' had all i'rozen 
solid. The army of' Tzar Alexander I i'or this reason had 
been able to attack the whole southern coast at once . The 
Russians in 1809 also had been supported by a well-organized 
group of' Finnish political parties. 2 Despite this historical 
Precedent the Kremlin leaders in 1939 chose to open hostil-
ities on the last day of' November bei'ore any really cold 
laeorge Fielding Elliot, "Reds Attack Finland by Land, 
Sea, and Air," Lii'e (ll December 1939), p . 34 . 
2John Hampden Jackson, Finland (New York: Macmillan, 
1940), pp. 46-47. 
weather had set in. 
The time factor in 1939 most probably was triggered 
by Soviet concern for the safety of the Gulf navigational 
aids, especially the lighthouses which might have been 
destroyed by the retreating Finns. Of · course the Soviet 
strategists would have liked to have had as much time as 
possible to set up defensive measures against any possible 
spring naval attack as well. It made sense, therefore, from 
a naval standpoint to schedule the seizure of the Gulf 
Islands while the water was still open since any wait for 
freezing weather would force the Russians to approach their 
objectives across open ice in plain sight of a prepared 
enemy . 1 Another point would be the desirability of recon-
structing the Finnish navigational aids and establishing 
fortifications while supplies could still be brought in by 
ship rather than moving heavy equipment over the uncertain 
ice in the Gulf. 2 The month of December would certainly in 
the eyes of the Soviet Naval Staff mark the last good chance 
to accomplish all these objectives before the cold weather 
locked the Red Banner Baltic Fleet into Kronstadt until 
spring . From this standpoint, therefore, the Soviet strat-
egists had a good reason to initiate an early attack on 
Finland despite the problems this would have for any swift 
advance by the Red Army. 
1 
Mitrofanov , pp. 42-44. 
2Kudriantsev-Skaif, p. 34. 
As for possible Finnish naval opposition, the whole 
of the Finnish Fleet was apparently composed of two heavy 
coastal defense vessels, five small submarines, sixteen small 
coastal minelayer-icebreakers and some thirty-eight miscella-
neous vessels of light tonnage. 1 Despite that fact that this 
force was described as: "armed by experienced crews and 
. . . well adapted to the waters in which they operate," 2 
this tiny force could not have hoped to survive a direct 
encounter with the Soviet Baltic Fleet. 
On the other hand, the Red Fleet appears to have 
possessed some one hundred and ten naval vessels of various 
sizes and combat strengths.3 How many of these ships were 
in the Gulf of Finland and how many in the Arctic at Murmansk 
and Archangel cannot be determined. At least one destroyer-
minelayer, the "Graza," was reported to have taken part in 
the landings near Petsamo4 and it is certain that other 
elements of the Red Fleet were stationed in the same area. 
Despite all possible detachments, however, the Russian 
flotilla in the Gulf of Finland must have outweighed the 
Finnish naval forces by a wide margin. Indeed, it would be 
safe to say that the only restrictions upon the movements of 
1 Jane's Fighting Ships, 1939, pp. 163-168. 
2T . Bentley Mott, "Service News and Gossip," Army, 
Navy Journal (30 December 1939), P• 382. 
3Jane's Fighting Ships, 1939, p. 398. 
4Akif 1 ev and Bronfman, loc. cit. 
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the Soviet fleet in Gulf waters were those imposed by geography 
and weather . 
The action of the Finnish Fleet at the Beginning of 
hostilities reflected this superiority . On 30 November 1939 
all Finnish naval vessels with the possible exception of the 
submarines were quickly withdrawn from the Gulf of Finland 
and stationed either at Turku, Hanko or the Aland Islands. 1 
For this reason the Soviet Fleet, operating from its bases 
at Kronstadt, Tallinn and Baltiski Port, was able to occupy 
the Gulf islands against no naval opposition. It would seem 
that the Finns also evacuated their defensive forces from 
these islands well ahead of the Soviet occupying squadrons. 2 
The Soviet naval forces apparently moved out of their 
bases on the morning of 30 November to occupy the principal 
Finnish islands. On the first day the Russians seized the 
island of Seiskari while the Finnish garrison escaped on a 
schooner . On the same day other Russian landing forces took 
Lavansaari while the main body continued on to the mid-Gulf 
islands.3 According to Soviet records the fleet with aerial 
support proceeded to the occupation of Suursaari, large and 
small Tartarsaaris , Sommers, Nerva and other islands. The 
whole operation was completed against minimal opposition by 
1Xylander (15 March 1940), P· 170. 
2Elliston, p. 186. 
3zvonkov, pp. 6-7. 
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3 December. 1 At the same time the armored cruiser "Kirov 112 
' 
with attending destroyers, left Baltiski Port and steamed 
directly to Hanko where, battling a heavy storm, it opened 
an all-day bombardment of the forts protecting the harbor . 3 
This last operation raised one of the numerous contro-
versies about the Winter War . The Finns claimed that the 
"Kirov" was struck by shells from their coastal artillery 
and so had to withdraw . 4 This report was lent some credence 
by a diplomatic observer in Tallinn who reported that the 
11 Kirov 11 had had to be towed into Tallinn harbor because of 
damage sustained in the bombardment of Hanko . 5 Of course 
Russian communiques violently denied that this was true . 
The Soviets pointed out that the 11 Kirov 11 had stood outside 
the range of the Finnish coastal arti l lery while bombarding 
her targets and thus could not have received any damage from 
these guns. 6 Another report stated that a few days later the 
1E . Sobolevskii, 11 Fedor Radoos 11 (Theodore Radoos), 
Baltiski Geroi Sovetskovo Souza (Baltic Heroes of the Soviet 
Union) (Moscow: All -World Institute H. R.B . M., 1941), 
pp. 175-176 . 
2Jane's Fighting Ships, 1939, p . 414. 
3zvonkov, pp . 8-10. 
4citrine, p . 31; Rosvall, p . 181; and Xylander (15 
March 1940) , p . 170. 
5John C. Wiley, State Department Telegram #140 
(5 December 1939) . 
611 oproversjeniye staffa Krasnoznamennovo Baltiskovo 
Flota11 (Report of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet), Krasnaya 
Zvezda, 8 December 1939, p . 1 . 
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cruiser was on blockade duty in the Baltic . 1 It should be 
pointed out, on the other hand, that neither the 11 Kirov"nor 
any other Soviet naval vessel made any further effor t to 
bombard Hanko during December although the sea-lanes r emained 
open and the Russians possessed leased ice-free ports in 
Es tonia and Latvia . 
There was also a difference in the Russian and Finnish 
ac counts of the occupation of the Gulf islands which might 
merit further examination . The Finns , as has been noted, 
insisted that the islands had been completely evacuated long 
b efore Soviet landing forces had approached their targets . 2 
The Russian accounts , on the other hand , tell of at least 
one cla sh between Finnish defenders and a Soviet landing 
party.3 In another newspaper story of the campaign in the 
Gulf a local Fisherman on Suursaari thanked the Red Army and 
Navy for his liberation from the "brutality of the Finnish 
of ficers. 11 4 
Despite appearances , there is perhaps less difference 
be tween these two versions of the Gulf campaign than might 
appear at first hand . The " island defenders" who opposed 
the Soviet landing seem to have numbered only four men while 
1zvonkov, pp . 10-11 . 
2Mannerheim, p . 346 . 
3Kudriantsev-Skaif, pp . 18-24. 
4 11 Na Osvobosjdennieh Ostrovah" (On the Free Islands), 




the account had of the "old fisherman" stated definitely that he 
been 1 eft behind in the general evacuation of the rest 
Of th Neither of these accounts, therefore, e population 
disa • 
gree with th each other in the matter of the evacuation of 
e Finns Sov· from the Gulf islands well ahead of the oncoming 
J.et occupati· on forces. 
Indeed, a small group of Finnish 
Soldiers or th local Schutzcorps may well have decided to annoy 
fisherman might well have 
e Russian invaders and an old 




oviet stories about the campaign to occupy the 
Ulf i sla.n.ds twent made one of the major complaints against the 
y ... year F innish occupation of these positions. This 
complaint came out rather sharply in one article where a 
reporter spoke of the island of Seiskari as "an SovJ.· et 
e.xc1 a.mation mark standing in the channel from Leningrad to 
th 
e Baltic Sea . 
i g aphed the movement of soviet warshiPS from this 
For ••• years enemy eyes have observed 
and Photo r 
Sla.nd • S • • 
8
• eiskari and other Finnish islands swarmed with 
Oulr • As for Suursaari, the principal island in the mid-PJ.es nl 
area 'another author declared: 
\lnd To Suursaari came manY health-seekers and 
age~~ this innocent appellation were hidd?n the 
rests of foreign exploiting powers who did not 
.__ so much as spied on our waters. It was very 
l ZVonk:ov 6 ' p. . 
clear that these "tourists" have now flown the 
coop. 1 
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The Soviet planners, in their own view, not only gained 
several extremely important navigational and defensive posi-
tions as a result of this island campaign but also removed 
several nests of spies and observers from the channels leading 
to Leningrad and Kronstadt . 
After the return of the main units of the Soviet Fleet 
to Kronstadt the second phase of Soviet naval operations got 
underway. The fleet began a systematic bombardment of 
Finnish coastal defense positions on the western shores of 
the Karelian Isthmus largely because these forts were very 
active in impeding the progress of the Red Army in that 
area. 2 The Soviets opened this campaign with several 
bombardments of the forts at Muurila , Koivisto and defensive 
positions in the Gulf of Viborg by light destroyers and 
gunboats . 3 The first major attack by heavy naval vessels 
took place on 18 December at Koivisto Island. The area was 
first struck by sixty fighter planes and bombers4 and then 
at noon the 23,25'0-ton battle cruiser "October Revolution, 11 5' 
1 P. Krielov, "Desant Zaniniaet Ostrov Gogland11 (A 
Landing on Hogland Island), Komsomolskaya Pravda, 5 December 
1939 , p . 2. 
2xylander, loc. cit., and Mannerheim, loc. cit. 
33. Abramov, "Na Kanonerskih Lodka" ( On a Gun-Boat), 
Flot v Bo as Belofinnami 19 9- .0 (Moscow: War-Fleet 
Publication , N.K •••• , 19 , PP• 38-41-l . • 
4sobolevskii, p. 177. 
5Jane 1 s Fighting Ships, 1939, p. 413. 
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accompanied by four destroyers, steamed in and began a 
sustained fire on the Koivisto coast artillery positions. 1 
On the next day two morning aerial attacks by forty to fifty 
planes were the prelude for another attempt at smashing the 
fortifications by the Soviet battle cruiser "Marat" 2 which 
sent 175 rounds into the Finnish positions from 25 kilo-
meters away . According to Finnish records, the coast 
artillery returned fire with some thirty rounds and hit 
the "Marat" in the stern which forced the retirement of the 
Soviet squadron . 3 Whether it was damage, weather or just 
the apparent lack of success which caused the withdrawal 
of the Soviet ships will probably never be known. The 
vessels of the Red Fleet, however, did pay a return visit 
to Koivisto on 24-25 December but again inflicted little 
real darnage , 4 for, as one Finnish commentator reported, 
"the sea flank of the Karelian Isthmus up to the last days 
of the war remained in Finnish hands. 115 
Further efforts at bombardment of Finnish coastal 
defenses in the Viborg region continued throughout the 
latter days of December and early January, mainly by heavy 
1Hannula, p . 65. 
2 Jane 1 s Fighting Ships , 1939, loc. cit. 
3Hannula, loc. cit. 
4:x:ylander, loc. cit. 
5ohquist, p. 25. 
destroyer-icebreakers such as the "Leningrad111 and other 
types of warships able to operate under winter conditions. 2 
Although attacked repeatedly by Finnish aircraft on their 
dangerous missions,3 they generally completed their tasks. 
These efforts, however, seem to have had little effect on 
the defenders for most Finnish accounts of the war failed 
to mention them and the Koivisto and Viborg coastal defenses 
were captured or put out of action by the Red Army late in 
the war. 
The descriptions of these naval bombardments are 
rather interesting for they reveal that Russian naval 
commanders planned their attacks well. They would first 
send a fast destroyer in to the forts to draw Finnish fire 
and mark the locations of the guns. Then the heavier vessels 
would move up some time later and pour large caliber shells 
into the coastal artillery positions.4 
Another function of the Red Fleet during the Winter 
War was the maintenance of the blockade declared on Finland 
on 9 December 1939, evidently after the Soviet fleet elements 
had reassembled in the eastern area of the Gulf.5 The 
blockade was largely carried out by destroyers, submarines 
1 Jane 1 s Fighting Ships, 1939, p. 418. 
2zvonkov, p. 15. 
3rbid., p. 17. 
4Kudriantsev-Skaif, pp. 14-16. 
5Xylander , loc. cit. 
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and aircraft. From the records that are available it is 
difficult to reconstruct the details of this blockade with 
any accuracy . As far as surface ships were concerned it 
would appear the Soviet destroyer "Volodarski" patrolled the 
Kotka area as long as there was open water while the ice-
breaker "Leningrad" kept its winter station somewhat further 
to the west. 1 In the Petsamo region of the Arctic the Soviets 
emplaced artillery on the Hibachi Peninsula to command the 
fjord while a minelayer patrolled off shore in readiness to 
close the area to possible enemy fleet penetration. 2 There 
were also other reports that at least three Russian submarines 
maintained constant patrol off the Hibachi Peninsula, to 
prevent intrusion by a hostile naval force.3 
It was, of course, the Soviet submarine flotilla upon 
which the main burden of the winter blockade of western 
Finnish waters rested. In Russian records there are specific 
reports of at least three of these vessels and their patrols 
in the upper Baltic and the Gulf of Bothnia. All of these 
ships reported great difficulties due to the removal of 
navigation lights and the presence of extensive Finnish mine 
fields along the coastal areas and in the Aland Islands.4 
The submarine "S-111 on its first patrol claimed to 
1zvonkov , loc. cit. 
2Erickson, p. 544. 
3xylander (22 March 1940), p. 201. 
4 Zvonkov, p. 21. 
have spotted many transports and sunk one by shell fire on 
the evening of 10 December . The sub was spotted on the 11th, 
however, and had to leave its patrol area. On its second 
patrol the "S-1 11 began to have difficulty with the freezing 
weather. As one of the men reported: "You would begin a 
dive but the boat would not go under water because everything 
had been covered with ice like an iceberg." 1 Despite these 
conditions, the second patrol was maintained for at least a 
month and the submarine's gunners even managed to shoot down 
an attacking Finnish airplane on 11 January 1940. 2 
The submarine "SHCH-311" patrolling the western 
reaches of the Gulf of Bothnia was assigned to break enemy 
c ommunica tions with Sweden in that area . In spite of dif-
ficulties with their deck gun which tended to freeze up, 
the "SHCH-311" sank one transport, carried on an artillery 
duel with another, and finally torpedoed another Finnish 
vessel . 3 The last Soviet submarine specifically mentioned 
in Russian accounts of the war was the "SHCH-324" which was 
assigned to patrol the Aland Islands on 30 December 1939.4 
11. Bakanov, "Blokadnaya Slusj'ba Podvodnoi Lodki 
'S-1'" (The Blockade Duties of Submarine 'S-1'), Flot v 
Boyas Belofinnami (Moscow: War-Fleet Publications, 
N.K.V.M .F., 1942), pp. 45-48 . 
21.!?1£.' p . 50. 
3N. Dobushev, "Za Rodinu1 Za Stalinat" (For the 
Fatherland ! For Stalin!), Flot v Boyas Belofinnami (Moscow: 
War-Fleet Publications, N.K.V.M.F., 1942), pp. 34-37. 
4zvonkov , p . 25. 
In spite man of the very bad weather encountered, 
this submarine 
although there 
aged to mainta· ·t · was in is station for some time 
no record of its having made a confirmed kill of any 
vessel.l 
F· :i.nnish 
These reports of their submarine activity by the Red 
Fleet seem to h Of •hi ave been fairly accurate as far as the number 
Ps sunk of on combat patrols. The best Finnish summary 
naval act· as f ion during this period reported on shiP losses 
ollows: 
Witho~~e Ger,:ian steamer "Oliva" was fired on 
way bet warning off Uti on 5 December 1939 on its 
ber 1
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~een Helsinki and Nantyinota. On 10 Decem-
•ank th f unknown submarine, without warning, 
Gulf of e amburg steamer "Bollheim" , • • in the 
the ni Bothnia off Oregrund with shellfire. On 
opened~! of 28 December 1939 a Soviet war vessel 
Norska ire on the Finnish tanker "Sigrid" west of 
night~ but failed to score a hit. On th• same 
south he Finnish steamer "Vilpas" ran aground 
•ubmar?f Norskar while being attacked by two Soviet 
the swin~s, On 4 January 19~0 a soviet sub sank 
Bide ;dish merchant vessel 'Tenris" on the Swedish 
0 the Gulf of Botbnia.2 
st ile there are discrepancies in the number and circum-Wh· 
8.nce of two th
e Russian submarine attacks, the summarY of the 
reports v was not too far apart on the actual number of 
oft e on and/or destroyed. In spit• of the results esse1 s fir d 
-.__ iet submarine patrols, however, there seems little 
hese Sov· 
~eniy • /: • Kudri ant sev-Skaif, "Vo Vrashe ski• Ti eli" ( In the 
Ublicati~~r), Flot v Boyas Belofinilam.i (Moscow: War-Fleet 
s, N.K.V.M.F., 1942), P• 73• 
toViet u ~eprehensible Methods of th• Armed Forces of the So 211 .,
11
the u:~n," Letter from the National Minister of Finland 
es. ed States secretary of state. state Department 
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doubt that fairly regular sea communications were maintained 
between Sweden and Finland throughout most of the war, 
although they suffered some difficulties because of mines. 1 
This inability to patrol the coast of Finland adequately 
despite the lack of naval opposition and the restriction of 
increased ice tends to substantiate the impression that the 
new Soviet bases in Estonia and Latvia were not yet in a 
state of complete readiness . 
Soviet naval aviation , as has been seen, supported 
the landings on the Gulf island and aided in the bombardment 
of various coastal defense installations at Koivisto, Muurila 
and the Gulf of Viborg . They also had the assignment of 
supporting the Russian blockade efforts along the Finnish 
coast. In this mission they ran into unexpected difficulties . 
Here is how one Soviet naval aviator remembered the situation: 
The Finnish ships would hide in the fjords, 
taking advantage of the inland channels . These 
Finnish ships could travel the length of the Gulf 
coast concealed from our ~leet . Only airplanes 
could keep an eye on them ••• This was made 
difficult by the extremely bad weather which pre-
vailed during much of this period •••• It was a 
hard mission but we had to show
3
the Finns that no 
place was safe for their ships . 
One of the great difficulties reported by the Russian 
naval aviators in searching out Finnish ships in the coastal 
1vallotton, p . 15. 
2N. I. Rakov, "Tri Vieleta" {Three Flights ), Flot v 
Boyas Belofinnami {Moscow : War-Fleet Publications, 
N.K.V.M.F., 1942), p. 51 . 
3~., pp. 55-56 . 
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channels was the ability of the enemy to camouflage his 
1 
vessels in their daylight anchorages. The naval squadrons, 
however, did manage to attack one warship and several 
merchantmen but with uncertain results. 2 Finnish records, 
however, state that one Finnish steamer, the "Notunga," was 
sunk by Soviet naval aircraft in the Aland Islands east of 
Sottunga on 13 January 1940.3 On the whole, however, both 
Russian and Finnish records support the contention of a 
German commentator who stated that the 11 Soviet Naval Air 
Arm was ineffective against shipping along the coast. 11 4 
During the period between the end of December 1939 
and mid-January 1940 a unique problem arose for the Red 
Fleet. While the expanding ice in the eastern reaches of 
the Gulf of Finland had become sufficient to halt major 
fleet activity, it had not become thick enough to permit 
vehicle travel to the recently occupied islands. The Soviet 
navy, however, possessed a number of large icebreakers. 
These were utilized to supply the newly seized islands. 
Despite their long experience at icebreaking, the ships 
seemed to have had much trouble in maintaining a regular 
flow of food and equipment to their new possessions.5 The 
1 Ibid. -
2~ ., p. 58. 
3"Reprehensible Methods of the Armed Forces of the 
Soviet Union, 11 loc. cit. 
4Borgman, Der Ueberfall, p. 264. 
5Kudriantsev-Skaif, Dekabr 2 1939 Goda, pp. 34-41. 
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anticipation of these difficulties could well have been one 
of the more i mportant reasons for the early start of the 
Finni sh campaign since this particular problem would have 
existed wheth er Finland itself had been conquered by the Red 
Army . 
Anyone interested in the Soviet naval operations during 
the l atter part of the Finnish conflict might well ask what 
happened to those Red Sailors who were 11 0n the beach" so to 
speak du r ing the period of heavy ice in the Gulf of Finland . 
It would seem that these men were formed into units called 
nwinter Destroyer s" which took a major part in the February 
and March attacks over the ice onto the south shore of 
Finland . 1 In the various stories about these converted 
sailors we find them acting as island defenders , 2 scouts,3 
ski troopers,4 and field artillerymen . 5 While most of their 
duti es were concerned with specialized attacks over either 
fro zen lakes such as Lake Ladoga or the Gulf ice , such 
1Borgrnan, Der Ueberfal l, p . 240 . 
2Kuselev, "Bou u Posta" (Fight for the Post) , Flot v 
Boyas Belofinnami (Moscow: War-Fleet Publications, 
N. K.V.M.F., 1942), pp. 62-63 . 
3v . Maslov, "Razvedshiki Na Ladoga" (Scouts on Ladoga), 
Flot v Boyas Belofinnami (Moscow: War-Fleet Publications, 
N. K.V. M.F . , 1942), pp. &2 - 63 . 
4 II P . Kapi tza, "Aleksandr Poskonin (Alexander Poskonin), 
Bal t isk i Geroi Sovetskovo Souza (Moscow : All-World Institute, 
H. R. B.M., 1941) , pp . 143-163. 
5L. Osipov, 11 V Pomoshch Slavnoi Pehote" (To the Aid 
of the Heroic Infantry) , Flot v Boyas Belofinnarni (Moscow: 
War -Fleet Publications, N.K. V.M . F., 1942) , pp. 67-68. 
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missions revealed that the Kremlin leaders had no intention 
of wasting such experienced manpower in a wait for the ice 
to break in the Gulf of Finland and release the main battle 
fleet in Kronstadt. 
It can be said in review that the naval aspects of the 
Russo-Finnish War of 1939-1940 were important. The first 
Soviet operations were directed at the swift conquest of and 
the repair of the navigational facilities on the major Finnish 
islands in the Gulf of Finland. The simultaneous bombardment 
of Hanko harbor and the establishment of a blockade virtually 
ended the activities of the Soviet naval squadrons in the 
western waters of the Gulf. The capital ships of the Red 
Fleet then returned to the eastern Gulf area and began to 
support the advance of the Red Army in the Karelian Isthmus. 
With the coming of solid ice even this activity was curtailed 
and ended with the return of the major fleet elements to 
winter stations in Kronstadt, Tallinn and Baltiski Port. The 
Red sailors thus released from sea duty were then used in 
various capacities to support the ground advance of the Red 
Army in many areas. In all one would have to say that the 
Red Fleet played a much greater part in the Winter War than 
has sometimes been given it by students of that conflict. 
The active naval campaign, however, leaves some 
questions in the mind of any observer. Why did not the 
Soviet Fleet with its numerical superiority pursue the 
retreating Finnish Fleet beyond the mouth of the Gulf of 
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Finland in early December 1939 and force a fight · to the 
finish in the Gulf of Bothnia? One answer might be that 
Soviet leaders were concerned about possible Swedish reaction 
t o such an offensive move . Another possibility was that the 
Soviet Navy did not yet possess adequate winter base facil-
i ties at the newly-leased harbors on the Baltic coast . With 
thes e points in mind i t can be understood that the Soviet 
leaders, despite their naval superiority over the combined 
Swedish and Finnish fleets, 1 would have been reluctant to 
push Schandinavia any closer to either the western Allies or 
Ger many. Added to these considerations was the basic plan 
b ehind the Soviet campaign in Finland which called for a 
short, quick conquest and, as a consequence, a fear of 
enlarging the conflict to include other nations . 
From an analysis of both Russian and western records 
about the Winter War one can say that the naval situation in 
the Baltic during the fall and winter of 1939-1940 revolved 
around two uncontrollable forces: the weather and the possi -
bility of an Allied naval campaign in the Baltic . Soviet 
leadership, concerned about the protection of the western sea 
approaches to Leningrad, certainly felt that they must secure 
the best open-water harbor at the mouth of the Gulf of Finland. 
This move would provide their own flotillas with greater 
security against the uncertain Baltic weather and would 
deprive possible enemies of an excellent naval base from 
1Jane 1 s Fighting Ships, 1939, pp . 41+5 -454 . 
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which they might mount a campaign against Leningrad. For all 
these reasons, there would have to be a naval campaign in 
the Gulf of Finland after the failure of the November nego-
tiations with Finland . 
From the standpoint of Soviet naval strategists, 
December 1939 was the latest period in which the Gulf of 
Finland would be open to even minimal naval activity until 
the breakup of the ice in Kronstadt, Tallinn, and Baltiski 
Port . Because this usually takes place in March or April, 
by that time there might well have been a triumphant Allied 
fleet, based in Hanko, moving just behind the outgoing ice 
towards the main Soviet bases protecting Leningrad. This 
necessity of beginning naval operations before ice closed 
the Gulf of Finland must have had a great deal to do with 
the timing of the Soviet attack on Finland. Certainly fear 
of possible Allied penetration into the area was one of the 
most important motives which caused the Soviet attack on 
Finland in late November 1939. 
MAP VI 
THE NAVAL WAR IN THE GULF OF FINLAND 
(30 November 1939--28 December 1939) 
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This map outlines the various moves of the Red Fleet 
in the Gulf of Finland during the first month of hostilities. 
The initial sortie from Kronstadt base on 30 November 1939 
led to a series of assault landings on the principal Finnish 
islands in the middle of the Gulf of Finland. At the same 
time a Soviet task force, headed by the heavy crusier "Kirov," 
left Baltiski Port for Hanko. When the task force arrived at 
its destination it opened a day-long bombardment of the 
Finnish port but with little affect. 
After the occupation of the Finnish Gulf islands, the 
Red Fleet began a program of bombardment of the principal 
Finnish coastal defenses on the western shores of the Karelian 
Isthmus , the coastal islands and the northern Gulf shore. 
These are recorded on the map as red arrows which approach 
and then turn away from their objective. Also red asterisks 
designate the general areas hit in these bombardments. All 
of these attacks seem to have had little effect on Finnish 
abilities to defend their shores. 
An interesting note about the Soviet naval strategy 
in the Gulf of Finland was the relationship between the 
island occupations, the attempt to seize or destroy Hanko, 
the bombardment of coastal defense positions and the main 
ship 's channel to Leningrad. On the map it becomes apparent, 
especially when the primary lighthouses are indicated, that 
the Reds were actually trying to gain control over this 
important waterway. 
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THE AERIAL WAR 
(30 November 1939--12 March 1940) 
Nothing on the first day of action in the Winter War 
demonstrated the strategic concept of the Soviet invaders as 
plainly as their aerial assault on Finland . As one German 
commentator pointed out: 
With the number of planes available to the 
Russian Air Force (about 600 at the beginning of 
the action),l they could either concentrate upon 
attacking Finland's military forces and their 
supply lines, or attempt a
2
terror-saturation attack 
on the Finnish population . 
The Kremlin strategists made the choice of terror 
bombing to produce dismay and defeatism among the population, 
although this was repeatedly denied by the official news 
announcements from the Leningrad Military District , 3 as well 
as pro-Soviet writers in the west .4 Indeed , the term 
"Molotov ' s Bread Baskets" for the multiple incendiary bombs 
II (28 
1Borgman, "Der Sow j etische Luftkrieg gegen Finnland," 
June 1940) , p. 378. 
2Ibid ., I (31 May 1940 ) , p . 319. 
3Hinshaw, p . 173 . 
4Kournakoff, p. 129. 
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used by t he Russian planes originated from the clumsy denials 
from Moscow which proclaimed that the Red Air Force had been 
merely engaged in dropping bread to "starving Finnish 
workers." 1 However, the testimony of numerous observers to 
the fact that the Soviets had bombed towns of even two to 
thre e thousand population2 would seem to destroy the Com-
munis t pi cture of their aerial intentions during the confl ict . 
The Finnish Air Force began the war with about 170 
fir s t -line aircraft, mostly pursuit planes and light bombers.3 
Si nce there was no substantial aircraft industry in Finland , 
all of these fighting planes were of foreign design although 
many were ass embled in the State Aircraft Factory . 4 Replace-
ment s and parts, however, were still greatly limited . 5 
The Russian accounts of the aerial conflict mentioned 
only one type of Finnish aircraft in large numbers , but this 
notation was quite definite . The plane, essentially a 
defensive pursuit craft, was the Fokker D-21 , designed by 
the Dutch aircraft factory of that name and outfitted for 
Finnish service with an 850 horsepower Bristol Mercury VIII 
radi a l engine , armed with four machine guns . It was of 
1Hinshaw , loc. cit . 
2Paul Werner , Reporterre i se in dem Finnischen Kriege 
(A Report on the Finnish War} (Olten : Otto Walter, 19L~2}, 
p . 81 . 
3Borgrnan, Der Ueberfal l, p . 260 . 
4Luukkanen, p . 33 . 
51Ei£., p . 52 . 
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mixed construction (both metal and fabric used and had a 
r ixed undercarriage.l This plane had definite weaknesses 
Which became apparent in battle with more modern Russian 
crart . It had no armor,2 was armed only with light machine 
€;Uns, 3 and could scarcely outspeed an unloaded Soviet bomber.4 
Other Finnish aircraft consisted largely of obsolete 
English Ripon Blackbird IIA's and Bristol Bulldogs IVA's 
Which, as a Finnish pilot wryly observed "from the performance 
viewpoint , were all but worthless."5 Although Russian sources 
mentioned Finnish aircraft purchased from England and Italy, 6 
it would seem that the only planes which arrived in any 
considerable number were some thirty obsolescent Gloster 
Gladiator biplanes which were no match for the better Russian 
Pursuit planes.7 The Italian Fiat G-50's and American 
Brewster B-WE9's ordered by the Finnish Government arrived 
too late to be used in the war. 8 
The Soviet Air Force was largely composed of I 16, 
1
Jane's Fighting Aircraft, 1938, loc. cit. 
2 
56. Luukkanen, p. 
3~., p. 33. 
4Ibid., p. 41. 
5rbid., p. 35. 
6
P. Krainov, L. Argutinskaya, and L. Kutukov, "Boevoi 
Kollektiv" (A .Military Collective), Krasnaya Zvezda, 4 Feb-
ruary 40, p. 2. 
7Luukkanen, p. 65. 
8
~., pp. 75 and 127. 
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I 18 and I 1 5 3 pursuit plane s which had about a 500 mile 
range1 and SB2, DB3, ZAR135 and some TB3 (Ant 4) bombers , 
mo stly of the two-engined type . 2 These bombers were re-
stric t ed in range and bomb load. They were primarily devel-
oped to support ground operations which can be determined 
fr om their limited range of some 1300 ki l ometers . 3 
The principal Soviet air bases for the war were 
evidently located at Kantalshti in Soviet Karelia, and 
Baltiski Port, Haapsalu and Oezel in Estonia.4 It seemed 
like l y that the bombers would have been based in Estonia 
with the pursuit planes mainly in the Karelian airfields. 
Thi s conclusion is supported by the Soviet stories and 
articles about bomber flights, many of which recount that 
they flew over the Gulf of Finl and before coming over their 
targe t areas. As one Soviet navigator put it: 
For twenty minutes we flew over water . Here 
we cannot orient ourselves . Only the waves rolled. 
We sometimes had to f l y only fifteen meters or less 
above them • • • We had to go unerringly to the 
point of orientation in orde~ to properl y make our 
maneuver to the target •• • / 
1Parry, The Russian Cavalcade , p . 260. 
2Borgman, "Der Sowjetische Luftkrieg gegen Finnland," 
III (5 July 1940) , p . 393. 
3J. M. Spraight, "The War in the Air," Foreign 
Affairs (March 1940), p . 402 . 
4Borgman, "Der Sowjetische Luftkrieg gegen Finnland," 
IV (12 July 1940), p . 405 . 
5Anisinov , "Udar o Sjivoi Sile Vraga" (A Bl ow at the 
Vital Force of the Enemy), Boi v Fi nlyandii (Moscow: Military 
Publishers, 1941), p. 77 . -
-
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As should be noted, this necessity was troublesome in 
the beginning because of the very bad flying weather. Other 
Red airmen reported : "we had only maps and the clock to 
orient ourselves. Barely through the openings in the clouds 
could we see the land which was not known to us."1 Indeed, 
one flight of bombers which was to attack a designated target 
in Helsinki early in the war was forced by the weather to fly 
to their secondary target instead. 2 The best testimony as to 
the climatic conditions of the first two days of the war came 
from one of these stories: 
It was a warm November night. In the sky the 
thick clouds prevented us from seeing any light. Rain 
fell continuously. (Even with the approach of dawn 
the weather did not change.) As before, the sky was 
covered by clouds. Visibility was terrible. A light, 
soft snow was falling ••• In the clouds and heavy 
fog the navigator had a difficult time.3 
Thus one can say that the weather on the opening period 
of the war was not too good for a sustained aerial assault on 
Finland. As a German journalist noted: 
Snow storms and clouds made a navigation problem. 
The snow cover prevented the Russians from distinguishing 
the difference between ¥ater and land which also contrib-
uted to their problems.4 
These poor weather conditions apparently prevailed over 
much of southern Finland during the first eighteen days of the 
1Riebakov, p. 3. 
2I. Riebakov, 11 Perviei Vielet" (The First Flight), 
Krasnaya Zvezda, 4 December 1939, P• 2. 
3Mihailovskii, p. 2. 
4Borgman, Der Ueberfall, p. 259. 
war. Evidence of this and the consequent restriction of 
Soviet aerial activity can be noted in the remarks of a 
member of a decorated bomber squadron: 
Only one thing bothered us: there was no 
summer wind . The 'heavenly' seal embroiled all 
of our maps . 
The dark, rainy days were replaced by frost 
and snowstorms . As if in defiance there was not 
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one day of good weather . It was hard to wait for 
the meterological section for they could not predict 
satisfactory weatherl 
But then on the synoptic maps · appeared the edge 
of a cyclone and on 19 December there was promise of 
better weather conditions; it was, it was true ••• 
only a small 'strip ' of clear weather but everyone 
could fly. After one flight had gotten off, however, 
the weather became bad again and we had to sit here 
like a crawfish in chalk. 
On 20 December, the night before comrade Stalin ' s 
birthday, we went out to our airplanes . Again there 
was no flight . The weather could hardly have been 
improved upon for the enemy , but we, for the first 
time in twenty days, saw a strip of rosy sunset . 
Everyone rejoiced at the improvement in the weather . 
Despite many false starts, the mission was suc-
cessfully flown on the 21st and the planes began 
their return trip . The return route was cleverly 
complex. The weather had again deteriorated . The 
last seventy kilometers were flown in snow at an 1 altitude of not more than one hundred meters • • • • 
This degeneration in the weather which seemed to have 
prevented any large-scale bombing raids probably resulted in 
a shift in emphasis in the Soviet plan of aerial attack . 
While there were undoubtedly many raids on Finnish population 
centers after the weather began to clear in late December, 2 
none of these are recounted in Russian records . Instead the 
1K. Golubenko, "V Chest Lubimovo Stalina" (In Honor 
of the Beloved Stalin), Boi v Finlyandii (Moscow: Military 
Publishers, 1941), pp . 2~3-256 . · 
2vallotton, pp . 102-111. 
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emphasis shifted to the bombing of communication lines, 
troop concentrations and airfields. Russian silence on 
terror raids no doubt sprang from an attempt to conceal the 
failure of their initial strategy . By late December it had 
a t last become apparent, even to the Communists, that during 
the first phase of fighting their Air Force had tended ·to 
"make their missions in the deep areas of the Whitefinns but 
not on the battlefield . 111 As a result planes were shifted 
from terror bombing to the objective of aiding the tactical 
advance of the Red Army. 
A German commentator who noted this easement of terror 
bombing ascribed it to the effectiveness of Finnish anti-
aircraft fire . In his report he pointed out that 11 ••• the 
Finnish antiaircraft drove the Soviet bombers to greater 
heights: 1000 meters at the beginning, 300-400 meters at 
mid-point and 5000-7000 meters at the end. 112 On this subject 
the Russians, while admitting to this increasingly greater 
altitude, said that the reason their planes flew higher 
t hroughout the remainder of the conflict was that the grad-
u a lly clearing weather permitted them to spot their targets 
more effectively from greater elevations .3 
The power of Finnish antiaircraft guns would certainly 
1Kuz 1 min, pp . 237-238 . 
2Borgman, Der Ueberfall, p . 267. 
3p . Nahalov, 11 Pyat Reidov v Tiel Vraga" (Five Roads 
into the Enemy's Rear), Boi v Finlyandii (Moscow: Military 
Publishers, 1941), pp . 121~122. 
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be justiried if the figure of 314 Soviet aircraft downed and 
more than JOO damaged could be substantiated . 1 Although one 
can be somewhat suspicious or such high figures of destruction 
for antiaircrart rire, there is some support for this assump-
tion because just about every account of Soviet bombing 
missions makes mention of the heavy concentrations of anti-
gircrart rire encotmtered and described in some detail the 
means taken by Red pilots to avoid this danger . 
Another point which arouses the interest of the reader 
of Russian stories was the problem of aerial protection for 
the Soviet bombers. One observer noted that the Russian 
bomber rormations in the early stages of the war were not 
often accompanied by any pursuit planes . 2 If true , this 
might accotmt ror the Finnish claims of the high losses of 
Soviet aircrart shot down by their pursuit aircraft . 3 It 
would seem rrom this that the bomber force in the Soviet 
Air Force was somewhat or an orphan service . This may well 
have come rrom the ract that the Soviet Air Force had 
recently surrered a rather thorough "purge" which had seen 
the loss or the Commander-in-Chier Iakov I vanovich Alksnis 
and his deputy V. V . JChripin, both advocates of large 
1Ma.nnerheim, p. 370. 
2Luukkanen , pp . 28-29. 
3Hannula, p. lOl~. 
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bombers. 1 The result of this move was to place the new Air 
Force commander, General Novikov , more firmly under army 
control. 2 The ultimate result was that the Soviet Air Force 
which opened the Winter War was essentially "a tactical air 
force for supporting continental land armies ••• with no 
effective long range bomber force to support long-term 
strategic plans directed against enemy industry or comrnuni-
cations . 113 There was also considerable evidence that training 
in bomber escort, night flying, and long-distance operations 
had largely been scrapped within the Soviet Air Force.4 All 
these deficiencies would account for the poor showing of the 
Soviet Air Force in the Winter War . 
The serious student of military history would gen-
erally be inclined to dismiss some of this information as a 
gross exaggeration at best and blatant propaganda at worst. 
However, as one reads through the various accounts of Soviet 
bombing attacks , written by many authors, one receives the 
distinct impression that Russian pursuit aircraft normally 
did not accompany bombers to their targets. At least the 
recollections of the bomber crews usually fail to mention 
1William C. Chapman, "The Soviet Air Force; History 
and Organization" (unpublished M.A. thesis, Georgetown 
University, 1964), p. 16. 
2Lee Asher , The Soviet Air Force (London: Gerald 
Duckworth , 1950), p. 35. 
3rbid., p . 34. 
4~., p. 28. 
the presence of any protecting fighter planes until they 
return to Soviet territory. 
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As an example of all this there was the record of an 
attack of eleven Finnish interceptors upon a Soviet bomber 
which was heroically beaten off by radioman-gunner, one 
Fedor Lopatin . Throughout this desperate fight there was 
no mention of accompanying Soviet fighter aircraft. 1 
This lack of mention was especially true of the earlier 
period of the conflict. In the accounts of later aerial 
action there was some notation of pursuit planes which accom-
panied the bombers for part of their flight, but even here 
they do not seem to have played an important role. 2 It was 
much more common, even in the latter phases of the war, for 
the Soviet aerial gunner in the bomber to drive the Finnish 
interceptors off with his accurate machine gun fire3 or for 
the bomber pilot to lose them in cloud cover.4 
On the other hand, the stories about fighter planes 
all mentioned that one of the tasks of the fighters was to 
accompany bombers on their missions . However, most Soviet 
1I. Riebakov, "Strelok-Radist Fedor Lopatin" (The 
Radioman-Gunner Fedor Lopatin), Krasnaya Zvezda, 5 January 
1940' p . 3 . 
2Ya. Potehin , 11 Podvig Kapi tan Trusova" (The Deed of 
Captain Trusov), Krasnaya Zvezda, 14 February 1940, p. 3. 
3Riebakov, 11 Vozdieshnie Nalet 11 ; Aleksandr Gutman, 
"Palet Biel Normalniem11 (The Mission Was Normal), Boi v 
Finlyandii (Moscow: Military Publishers, 1941), p. 230. 
4Anisinov , loc. cit. 
.... 
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pursuit s quadrons seem to have concentrated on flying the 
front-line pat rols, shooting down Finnish aircraft, firing 
on antiair cr aft guns and even dropping propaganda leaflets. 1 
From the descriptions concerning the relations between the 
pursuit planes and the bombers, it seemed obvious that the 
Soviet interceptors did not accompany the bombers on their 
long raids, possibly because of their own limited range. In 
one account the patrolling pursuit planes just happened to 
noti c e s ome returning bombers under attack by Finnish inter-
ceptor s. Although the Russian pursuits drove the enemy 
away , the author made it very clear that the bombers had 
been h aving a very r ough time up to that point . 2 In another 
instance of Sovie t pursuit planes detailed to cover their 
bombers, the pursuits accompanied the bombers to the limit 
of their fli ght radius and then were relieved by another 
squadron of fighters which awaited the return of the bombers.3 
Apparently, as has been suggested, the Russian interceptors 
were l i mited by their range to an area of some 100 kilometers 
within Fi n l and. While this would take in a good deal of 
southeas t ern Finland, the limitations of weather and the 
lack of proper navigation instruments (hardly possible in 
single seater planes) would keep them from making too many 
1M. Borisov, "Iz Dnevnika Latchika-Istrebitelya" 
(From a Fighter-Pilot's Diary), Boi v Finlyandii (Moscow: 
Military Publishers, 1941), p. 48. 
2rbid., p . 50. 
3Ibid., p • .53 • 
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long distance flights. 
As the Russian articles come to the last part of the 
Winter War, there is much more emphasis on the attacks on 
supply dumps, railroad yards and even the defensive forti-
fications of the Mannerheim Line. An interesting note about 
this duty was entered by the commander of a pursuit wing: 
The pursuit planes were ordered to scout a 
large area of the Karelian Isthmus . My pilots were 
young, and not yet experienced in scouting. At 
night, after the missions, I taught them how to 
determine the strength of the enemy columns by 
their length, how to orient themselves by the high 
command's maps and so forth. 1 
With this sort of on-the-spot training there may have 
been something to the German observation that Soviet flyers 
in the beginning of the war had shown "stiff ineptness" and 
an inability to avoid Finnish antiaircraft fire. 2 
In the same Soviet recollection about pursuit aviation, 
the author related how these same pilots (after their exten-
sive training, no doubt) managed to destroy a number of 
Finnish antitank guns near Laapijasvo on 18 or 19 February 
which presumably permitted Red Army tanks to occupy the 
village . 3 Indeed, the program of systematic attacks upon 
Finnish defensive emplacements, according to reports was 
very effective. For it 
1N. Toropchin, 11 Tstrebi teli 11 (The Pursuit Planes), 
Boi v Finlyandii (Moscow: Military Publishers, 1941), p. 233. 
2Borgman, "Der Sowjetische Luftkrieg gegen Finnland," 
III (12 July 1940), p. 406 . 
3Toropchin, p. 231. 
subdued the Whitefinn zeal for the war. The 
flights of the Soviet flyers blocked the enemy's 
daily movements within a radius of one hundred 
kilometers from the front . When one flew over the 
terrain of Finland, it appeared to be a wasteland 
where everything was dead.l 
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Apparently the aerial offensive which began with good 
weather in mid-January was primarily aimed at aiding the 
advance of the Red Army on the Karelian Isthmus. This, of 
course, did not mean that the Soviet bombers had given up 
their attacks on population centers and rear communication 
lines. However, from Russian sources it would seem that the 
major emphasis swung largely to helping break the Mannerheim 
Line. 
One of the later recollections of aerial combat in-
volved a direct attack upon a known fortification in the 
Karhula area . This was the fort on Hill 38.2, evidently an 
extremely strong position if other accounts are to be 
believed. The bombers, although troubled by bad weather 
over the Gulf of Finland (which indicated that their base 
was in Estonia) were able to find their way to the Karhula 
defense lmot despite the fact that they had been ordered to 
return to their bases. The squadron commander, demonstrating 
some real experience with support bombing: 
••• did not immediately turn towards the 
target . He continued to fly along his original 
bearing in order to throw the enemy observers off 
as to his real intention. He even lessened his 
1lli£,., p. 232. 
speed so that the other planes could close up and 
prepare to meet possible pursuit planes . l 
274 
The improvement in bombing tactics and organization 
evident in these recollections was con:firmed by Finnish 
sources which reported that during this period the, "Russians 
were keeping better bombing formation with •• • better dis -
cipline f'or their f'ormations." 2 
In the case of this attack on Karhula, the pilots 
claimed that their bombs had fallen directly on the fort at 
Hill 38.2 and completely smashed it . vf.h.ile this claim of 
destruction of' principal fortifications in the Mannerheim 
Line by a single bombing raid may be in doubt, it indicates 
that the medium bombers of the Soviet Air Force based in 
Estonia were taking a much more active role in supporting the 
Red Army's advance on the Karelian Isthmus than had been the 
case in the earlier part of the campaign . 
One of' the most unusual incidents recorded in Soviet 
recollections was the account of the use of a balloon to 
direct artillery fire in the region of Summa-yarvi . This 
balloon seemed to have been very much like those utilized 
during World War I for much the same purpose . It is inter-
esting to note that the Russians depended on their anti-
aircraft guns to protect this balloon rather than on a patrol 
1Aleksandr Gutman "Yeskadril ' ya Nad Karhulai" 
(Squadrons over Karhula): Boi v Finlyandii (Moscow: Military 
Publishers, 1941), p . 332. 
2Luukkanen, p. 54. 
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of pursuit planes . 1 This incident also indicated that by 
one means or another the Red Air Force had come to dominate 
the air over the Mannerheim Line during the latter period of 
the war, although they were never able to eliminate entirely 
a certain amount of Finnish interference with their activities. 
It was also a fact of some significance that Finnish sources 
also mentioned the use of this balloon in the Summa front, 
thus confirming the Russian account. 2 
Support of the fighting front evidently involved the 
Red Air Force in the difficult problem of night patrolling 
to keep the roads and railroads under constant surveillance 
and attack. According to at least one recollection, it ·would 
seem to have been the Russian habit to send out individual 
bombers on these night patrols over a particular road or 
railroad center and have them attack any target of oppor-
tunity . It is also interesting to note from the same story 
that the Finns were obviously doing much the same thing, for 
the Soviet bomber crew had a most difficult time persuading 
their own searchlight defenses along the front that the 
plane involved was one of their own. 3 
On this particular flight, the patrolling bomber 
1s. Lavrent'ev, "Razvedka s Ayerostate" (The Patrol 
from a Balloon) , Boi v Finlyandii (Moscow: Military Pub-
lishers , 1941), pp. 316-317. 
2saraja, p. 38 . 
3r. Zavrasjnov, "Nochoi Nalet" (Night Flight), Boi 
v Finlyandii (Moscow: Military Publishers, 1941), p. '3'li:7. 
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managed to fire on several columns of trucks which must have 
considered themselves relatively safe because they still had 
their lights on. 1 After machine gunning the truck columns, 
the bomber then dropped its load on various targets, avoided 
Finnish searchlights and pursuit planes, and returned to 
another airdrome. 2 The Finns confirmed much of the circum-
stances of this type of attack by noting that their pursuits 
had a most difficult time locating and destroying these 
Russian night bombers. 3 
The effects of the constant Soviet aerial activity on 
the Finnish defenders seemed to have varied with the position 
threatened. The front-line troops merely moved into their 
holes and bunkers to let them pass over . 4 The infantry seems 
to have regarded them as relatively minor annoyances which 
tended to arrive on schedule and thus were not able to inflict 
real damage.5 
On the other hand Finnish reports from eastern Karelia 
made it clear that in the latter days of the war the Red Air 
Force was particularly effective in temporarily isolating 
specific front-line sectors by their constant aerial patrols 
over Finnish communication lines . 6 The development of these 
1 Ibid., p. 348. 
21.!?i£. , p. 349. 
3Luukkanen, p. 64. 
4saraja, pp. 8-9. 
51.12i£ . , p. 41 . 
6Palolarnpi, p. 185. 
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ta...ctics also was relatively effective in aiding the Red Army 
a. ttack on the Mannerheim Line during February-March 1939. 1 
Another important mission of the Red aerial arm during 
the clear weather of January and February was flying defen-
s i -ve Patrols over Leningrad and its vicinity. Despite some 
ex.treme claims by pro-Finnish reporters, 
2 
it would appear 
tnst the Russian boast that "over this city (Leningrad) the 
eriemy Will never fly" 3 was pretty much true during the Winter 
..-_,,Ia:r . This concern for Leningrad would seem to substantiate 
t;be rather uncertain reports of the period that Finnish 
1:>oXllbers did make some light raids across the Gulf of Finland, 
e:i.. ther upon Kronstadt4 or the Estonian island of Varvolla 
( stenskaari) near Baltiski Port . 5 Whatever the truth about 
t;bese B.ir raids they obviously could have had very little 
e£fect on the over-all aerial superiority of the Soviet Air 
J?e>l'Ce • 
As to the 
d:"l.1l'ing the war 
f the Soviet pilots and 
performance 0 




1Ib· --..l£., p . 208 . 
2 . pamphlets Rain on Leningrad," 
~k ItT;::_ Eskelund, "Finn
4
~sh P· 1. 
~' S January 19 , 
3 a vahta11 (A Stalin Watch), 
" J:i'· A• Pahomov, 11 Stalins1:'a! tarY Publishers, 1941), p. 252. 
l.nl andii (Moscow: MJ.ll. 
4 Red Bases by Finns Reported, 11 
~k E:~;:°:. Eskelund, "Raid94s O onp. 1. 
~, 22 January 1 ' 
~ , e De artment Tele 
~8 Dece lal ter A. Leonard , stat tmeu~t-=M ... em.._,_..o...,r..:::a~~!a.....!~~~=-
J-B J8.li. rnber 1939 and Stat D a t Files· 
Uary 1940, State Departmen 
' 
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a..11 of these are f'rom largely anti-Soviet sources, their 
comments cannot be entirely disregarded in any estimation of' 
the aerial conf'lict over Finland. Most of them agree that 
d"t..iring the early days of' the war the Red Air Force was not 
to o effective, except f'or their terror bombing of' civilian 
t a..rgets . Since by the best estimation of all observers, the 
soviets only committed some 600-800 aircraf't during the month 
of' December and early January, plus the uncertain weather 
-w-r.i.:i ch Would have severely restricted any large-scale aerial 
activity, all would support the idea that such an evaluation 
o:£ the Russian aerial perf'ormance was probably somewhere 
pear the truth. l 
Th be derived f'rom Soviet e clear lessons that can 
::r> ecol:'ds t foreign observers ( espe-generally chime with wha 
c::i-8.ll:y- the Germans) noted about the aerial war. First there 
,seems little doubt that Russian bombing ef'f'orts in early 
pecernber destruction of' civilian obj ec-
concentrated upon the 
t;:i.Ves r front lines and were probably 
ar beyond the immediate 
~ a.ttem t " 
P at "terror tactics 
to decrease the already low 
morale. 2 Of' this entire 
civilian 
{ :t'J:>oni s . 
ovie t inf'ormation) 
0 8l'npa,i 
gi-i however, it can be 
safely said that: "Terror 
t; 13.ctics 
Th
ey merelY hardened Finnish 
Were of' little use. 
:x:-esa1\re ses for the propaganda 
to fight and provided ca 
l 261. 
Borgman, Der Ueberfa]J., P • 
F" . h " 2 t·o:n of innis Forces, State 
:08 Pal:'t Frani.c p . Hayes, 11 Evalu
8
a J~uarY 1940, State Department 
J:i' iles.ment Memorandum No. 3, 
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'W'riters. 11 1 
A continuation of poor weather and the continued 
resistance of the Finns revealed that such tactics had 
failed, so the Russians shifted over to a combination of 
enlarged bombing attacks, both by day and night, against 
military targets, especially railroads and roads near the 
front lines. This was reinrorced by selective heavy raids 
ag . 
ainst specific industrial targets within easy range of 
Soviet medium bombers (750 kilometers). 2 Apparently even 
th· 3 
is Was not too effective, despite Finnish fears, because, 
!I t 
here Was never enough planes, Finnish industry was decen-
tralized and the alarm system was good. 11 4 
Soviet pilots, however, must have grown better with 
e~Perience.5 The later stories in the Russian material 
reveal that more bombers were being escorted by pursuit 
Planes and were exercising greater caution over areas of 
heavy ant · · t · I d d th · · p t 1a1rcraft concentra ions. nee, eir 1m rovemen 
Plus their increase in numbers led to an interesting rumor 
Wh" 
ich apparently became current in Finland at the time. 
This Was the report that "it was seriously believed among 
1 
Borgman, Der Ueberfall, p. 269. 
2
Borgman, "Der Sowjetische Luftkrieg gegen Finnland, 11 
Irr (5 July 1940), p. 393. 
3Mannerheim, p·. 369. 
4Borgrnan, Der Ueberfall, pp. 266-267. 









large sectors of' the Finnish population that German pilots 
had taken over the execution or at least the leadership of' 
the air attacks . "1 Thus through the development of' skills 
in combat plus a great increase in nurnbers 2 the Soviet 
ae · rial f'leet had f'inally become ef'f'ective against Finnish 
resistance 
' especially on the Karelian Isthmus . 
This experience, as with much in the Winter War, 
seems to have had its ef'f'ect upon subsequent Russian aerial 
strategy . The relative f'ailure of' high altitude terror 
bombing against the Finps3 appear to have soured the leaders 
of the Red Air Force on the possibility of' this type of' 
attack having any immediate ef'f'ect upon enemy resistance . 4 
Certainly it was a f'act that the Soviets in World War II 
ct· id very little long-range bombing and seemed to have had 
l"t 1 tle understanding of its long-term ef'fect upon German 
resistance. Indeed, the Soviet Union, which at one time 
led in the construction of heavy, multi-engined aircraft,5 
Possessed no mass-produced heavy bomber at the end of the 
IV 1Borgman, "Der Sowjetische Luftkrieg gegen Finnland , 11 
(12 July 1940), p . 406 . 
2Borgman, Der Ueberfall, p . 261 . 
II 3Borgman, "Der Sowjetische Luftkrieg gegen Finnland," 
I (5 July 1940), p . 394 . 
4Robert A. Kilmarx, History of Soviet Air Power (New 
York: Praeger, 1962), p . 152. 
p 5Richard E. Stockwell, Soviet Air Power (New York: 
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war. Thus the Soviet experiences in the Winter War probably 
had a great deal to do with their tactics and strategy during 
World War II. 
CHAPTER XI 
CONCLUSION 
Thi s thesis has attempted to examine representative 
material published by the Soviet Union concerning its war 
with Finland during the winter of 1939-1940 . From this 
study it would seem that the Russian press coverage of this 
confli c t changed in relation to the military and diplomatic 
situation. By studying these changes it may be possible to 
gain s ome understanding of just what the Kremlin leaders 
were t r y ing to convey to their people and to what extent 
the Rus sian press itself was influenced by the events of 
the war. 
For the first twenty-six days of the prewar period 
Sovi e t newspapers had two aims : to exert indirect pressure 
upon the Finns to force them to agree to the Russian terms 
for a Baltic settlement, and to persuade the Soviet people 
that t he reluctance of the "bourgeois government of Finland" 
to a ccept these terms was evidence of a hostile attitude 
towards the USSR. Interspersed among these two major themes 
were various stories which revealed that the Finnish working 
class es, suppressed economically and politically by their 
bankrupted rulers, were utterly opposed to this hostile 
attitude towards the "nation of socialism . " 
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With the "Mainila Incident" on 26 November 1939 the 
Kremlin program shifted into high gear . The press denounced 
this "attack on the peaceful Soviet borderguards" as an 
11 attempt of the Finnish military to create trouble a l ong the 
Russo -Finnish border . " The stories insisted that the Soviet 
population was solidly behind the efforts of their "party 
and government" to "guarantee the safety of the City of Lenin . " 
At first this campaign seemed to be aimed at warning the 
Helsinki Government that they must quickly accept the Soviet 
proposals for the withdrawal of Finnish troops from the imme -
diate border area in order to prevent further trouble . When 
the Finns proved reluctant to comply , however, the Soviet 
press effort openly called for the punishment of the "irre-
sponsible Finnish gang, in their own territory if necessary . " 
Through this period the Communist writers, foreign and 
domesti c, continued to insist with great vigor that the 
broad mass of Finnish people would not support their mil-
itaristic leaders and would welcome Russian "liberation" as 
had the oppressed proletariat of eastern Poland . 
During the first four days of the Winter War, Soviet 
newspapers applauded the victorious campaign to overthrow 
the "Whitebandits" in Finland . They confidently anticipated 
swift defeat for the reactionary Finnish bourgeoisie which , 
for twenty long years, had held their peopl e under the yoke 
of international capitalism. All this , it was claimed, was 
substantiated by the "voluntary" establishment of a "Peoples ' 
28/.j. 
Government" in Terioki by the "liberated" proletariat of 
Finland under the leadership of the exiled Finnish Communist 
leader , Otto Kuusinen. This organization, Soviet journalists 
insisted , would provide the leadership necessary to direct 
the great mass of disgusted Finnish workers and small peasants 
in a revolution against their oppressors, the Helsinki 
bourgeois political leaders . Although "eyewitness reports" 
of some Soviet war correspondents revealed difficulties in 
the triumphant march of the Red Army into Finland, there 
could have been little doubt in the minds of Russian readers 
that their liberating armies would soon "plant the banner of 
triumphant socialism" upon the presidental palace in Helsinki, 
and that the "bourgeois political gamblers" there would soon 
be in flight from the wrath of the people. 
Then from 5 to 11 December space devoted to the Winter 
War in Russian newspapers dropped perceptibly. The hopeful 
atmosphere of the first four days remained the keynote of 
such articles as did appear, bolstered by reports of "condi-
tions in liberated Finland" sent out by Soviet correspondents. 
These articles described the adverse effect of the war on the 
inhabitants of occupied towns, the hostility of Finnish war 
prisoners towards their officers, and the widespread dislike 
for the policies of the Helsinki regime. They emphatically 
stated that there was a strong pro-Russian attitude among 
the people interviewed by Soviet reporters . Such reportage 
no doubt encouraged the Russian people to believe that the 
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Finnish populati on was welcoming the Red Army as its lib-
erators . As a consequence of such news coverage it might 
not hav e b e en difficult for Russian readers to accept the 
judgment of t he Soviet press that "Whitefinn resistance has 
been reduc ed to a few nondescript gangs of fanatical 
Schut zcorps and Jaegers. 11 Soviet newspapers insisted too 
that very soon there would be an end to this "focus of war 
on our northwestern borders . " 
Much of this type of news coverage came to an abrupt 
halt on 12 December 1939 . War news, except for the "Opera-
tions Reports of the Leningrad Military District , " was 
reduced to scattered articles and the stories of the actions 
of the many "Heroes of the Soviet Union in battle against the 
Whitefinns." It was as though Kremlin leaders wanted the 
Russ ian people to forget about the earlier expectations of 
a swif't victory over the "forces of' Finnish reaction." 
Generally , Soviet editorial opinion remained essen-
tial ly as before with denunciations of the "terror" initiated 
by the Ryti-Tanner regime in Helsinki and the continued pre-
di ction of' a proletarian revolt against this government . 
However, mention of' the " Peoples' Democratic Republic of' 
Finland" was greatly reduced while the f'ailure of the pro-
le tarian revolt was explained as a consequence of the "bloody 
t error" c arried on by Helsinki leaders . The inability of 
Russi an arms to achieve the expected swift success over the 
"scat tered Whitef'inn gangs" was explained by the difficulties 
of' weather, terrain and the extremely strong "Mannerheim" 
f'ortif'ications on the Karelian Isthmus. 
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By early February 1940 there were signs that Soviet 
leaders, in contrast to their previous stand, were prepared 
to deal with the Helsinki regime to reach a settlement of' 
the Baltic problem . Illustrative of this change was the 
f'act that news of' the puppet Terioki Government and its 
"First Corps of' the Finnish Peoples' Army" largely disap-
peared f'rom Russian newspapers when the Red Army "steamroller" 
f'inally began to succeed in penetrating the Mannerheim Line 
during the early part of' that month. 
Press releases of' the final month of the Winter War 
show a growing conf'idence in ultimate Soviet victory. The 
solid accomplishments of Russian leadership, both diplomatic 
and military, were reported by all the prominent Soviet news 
services. Even the Red Army could accept congratulations on 
its success in breaking the f'ortif'ications of the Mannerheim 
Line . There was no doubt about it in the Russian press, 
victory was in the air. 
When the Treaty of' Moscow was announced, the Soviet 
press, of' course, greeted the settlement of the just result 
of' the "wise Stalin policy of peace." The attitude of the 
newspapers concerning this treaty no doubt reflected the 
sincere joy f'elt by the Russian people at the removal of 
what they had been led to believe was a potential danger to 
their nation. 
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One of the most difficult things to deduce from the 
Soviet pre ss during the Winter War was its effect upon the 
Russian people and especially Red Army personnel. Did the 
earlier expe ct ations of an easy victory have any influence 
on the morale of the average Soviet soldier when it continued 
to insi s t that the Finnish armed forces were being easily 
crushed between the hammer of the "liberating" Red Army and 
the anvil of int ernal revolt? This is very difficult to 
answer because, quite naturally, the Kremlin was not likely 
to publ icize the failure of its estimation of the situation. 
On the other hand, some indirect evidence can be found in 
the r eferences to the attitudes among the Soviet population 
and c ap t ured Russian soldiers contained in the books and 
articles of En glish, American and European observers who 
happened to be in either Russia or Finland during the conflict. 
The depressing effect of the failure of earlier hopes 
for swift victory on the civilian population of the USSR was 
to some degre e borne out by an observation of the Moscow 
corre spondent of the New York Times who reported that the 
11 Sovie t populace had been taught to expect that Soviet troops 
woul d enter Helsinki within a few days and at the most a week 
after the outbreak of the war . "1 Another American reporter 
wro t e of this expectation as stated by a Russian prisoner-of-
war : 
1G. E . D. Gedye , 11 Rumors Stir Russian Public," ~ 
York Time s, 27 December 1939, p . 1. 
Our political commissars told us that we 
would be in Helsinki by December 21st, Stalin's 
birthday. The Red Army, we were told, planned 
to make Stalin a birthday present of Finland.l 
The American Ambassador to the USSR, Lawrence A. 
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Steinhardt also noted some evidence of civilian discontent 
as a result of the disappointment over the failure of a swift 
victory when he reported: 
••• civilian morale is low. It has been 
impossible ••• to conceal from the population 
of Leningrad that the Soviet army has encountered 
serious reverses ••• The attitude of the people 
is more one of resignation and confusion than of 
revolt. 2 
Later in a much less authoritative report on civilian 
discontent in the Soviet Union the ambassador stated as 
follows: 
About a week ago (18-19 January 1940) (there 
was) a riot at the Kaluga hospital. Population of 
the city (Leningrad) refused to work and stood two 
days and nights. On the third day food shortages 
relieved. No arrests made of rioters or population.3 
Along these same lines, the British observer Langdon 
Davis reported that "the Russians mingled with their military 
preparations many of the elements of a political parade, and 
at the beginning seemed undecided as to whether their advance 
would be best facilitated by guns or by propaganda."4 The 
1Elliston, p. 372. 
2Lawrence A. Steinhardt, State Department Telegram 
No. 30, 6 January 1940. 
3steinhardt, State Department Telegram No. 106, 
1.5 January 1940. 
4Langdon Davis, p . 8. 
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initial mistake of Sovi et r eliance on political subversion 
was even noted by some pr o-Communist writers. Typical was 
the statement that "undoubtedly there were errors of the Red 
High Command at the outset of the campaign, based primarily 
on faulty politi cal calculations. 111 
As f or the reaction of at least one Russian prisoner-
of-war , a British labor leader reported what the former said 
about the conflict : 
Well, they told us that Finland had attacked 
Russia and that the Finnish workers had asked for 
our help agai nst their capitalistic oppressors. 
But we have been here ten days now and I think 
there must be something wrong about this because 
p eople l ive so much better than we do . ~ 
More evidence of confusion among the personnel of the 
Red Army between the reports of their leaders and the actual 
situation can be found in an interview with a captured Soviet 
officer who stat ed: 
At first ••• there was great enthusiasm 
(for the war) because the people had thought it 
was goin g to be another march into Poland. But 
now t h ey are disillusioned. The soldiers were 
cold, hungry and facing totally unexpected dangers 
and now they only wanted to get out of it.3 
Ano t h er observer who interviewed Russian prisoners in 
Finland reported that in response to his questions about why 
1william Peyton Coates and Zelda K. Coates, The Soviet-
Finni sh Campaign, 1939-1940 (London: Eldon Press, 1942), 
p . vi i. 
2c itrine , p. 177. 
3Edward Henry Harold Ward, Despatches from Finland: 






Russia was fighting against Finland one interrogee responded: 
"They told us (but I did not believe it), that Finland had 
attacked Russia and the Finns had killed many of our soldiers." 
.A.s Proof 
' he added, that this story had been in the newspapers II 
and What is printed is surely true." All this was described 
as evidence that the average Red Army man had been much 
depressed by the contrast between the reports in his newspapers 
and the reality of the situation in Finland. 1 
It can be argued that this testimony might have been 
just as erroneous as the Soviet newspaper reports upon which 
such testimony was based . It should be noted, however, that 
none of the observers quoted above could read Russian, and 
Yet the answers from the interrogees contained the same 
confidential predictions found in Soviet newspaper articles 
of late November and early December 1939 . This would tend 
to verify the fact that these observers actually did inter-
View Russian prisoners-of-war and that the attitude of the 
men interviewed was substantially what was reported • 
For almost half-a-month before the beginning of the 
War the Russian soldier had been told by his leaders and 
newspapers that the Finnish Army was only a hollow shell, 
bolstered by the support of western imperialists. Indeed, 
at the first blow of the "victorious forces of socialism," 
so the myth ran, the bourgeois government of Finland would 
come down like a "house of cards," and he would be welcomed 






as a liberator by the Finnish proletariat. The contrast 
between expectation and reality may well have led the Red 
Army man to feel that someone had made a mistake. Badly 
directed by his officers, who apparently based their plans 
of invasion on these same political miscalculations, the 
Russian fighting man may well have put forth less than his 
maximum effort in the early days of the campaign . 
The results of the Kremlin-directed press brings up 
this question: How well did Soviet newspapers do their job 
of reporting the news during the Winter War? To answer this 
it must be understood that almost all newspapers seek to 
accomplish two aims. First they try to gain and keep the 
confidence and interest of their readers by reporting the 
news accurately and quickly . Then, utilizing this confi -
dence, they seek to influence the thinking of their readers 
either by "slanting11 the news or through the use of editorial 
comraents. It might be supposed that the Russian press, so 
carefully controlled by the Communist Party, would have no 
need to gain and keep the confidence of the average reader . 
This assumption cannot be substantiated by this study . 
To begin with, no matter how much they deviated from 
the truth, the Russian newspaper writers were very careful 
not to lie about items that could be verified by the Russian 
soldiers. It was perfectly in order for them to picture 
"vJhi te Finland" as a country defended only by a small group 
of "criminal Schutzcorps and Jaegers" as long as the Soviet 
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righting man could not learn the truth. Once the Red Army 
the 1.nnish defense forces, had come into close contact w1.· th F' 
however, it became necessary to abandon this description of 
th "M e annerheim armies." 
Another indication of the fact that Soviet press 
leaders were willing to change their line was the abrupt halt 
made in early newspaper stories which had predicted a swift 
victory over the forces of the "unpopular bankrupt Whitefinn 
regime· 11 When, on about 12 December 1939, it became painfully 
apparent that there would be no blitzkrieg in Finland, the 
Kre 1 · · From then on the 
min immediately shifted its emphasis. 
dirriculties of the invasion were played up and the Red Army 
wa able to advance against 
s congratulated for having been and strong opposi-
rormidable natural obstacles, bad weather, 
gh 
the "bandit gang 
tion from th Thereafter , althoU e enemy. tones, Finland 
or Helsingrors" was still denounced in ringing 
. t torshiP which, 
1 . tic d1.c a was Pictu d re as a strong capita 1.s and the d France Englan , 
with th aid profferred bY e extensive 
formidable 
had built up a 
t ·on of armed bB.S 1. 
United St t a es, 
might ~ithin her borders. 
. this 1ater 
certa1.nlY 
W
.., 8 much Finns "' 
estimation 
closer to the 
of the r· f the ighting potential 0 
real e • t combat forces• turned 
JCPeriences of the sovJ.e eJCperts ·et news of hOW SoVl. ·es was 
inaccurac1. 
9 arli 9 !' 
a cover for their ovlll 1etarian JCpected pro 
demonstrated by tne failure of tne •. t-Stalini•t do@"a tne 
l 
MarJCJ.S 
revo t . d' g to in Finland. Accor 1.n 
An excellent example 
realib}" . "into 
labor1 ng clas agai ses of Finland 
nst th eir 
exploiters as soon as thB Red "liberators" 
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Cl' ossed the f 
rontier . Nothing of th• kind occurred, of 
cou. l'se ' so 
~at· some sort of excuse had to be invented that would 
lanai· l.Ze th 
is fai l ure for th• soviet people, 
Fort . th unately for the Russi an news bosses, if not for 
e Red Army 
Poli ' the Finn• elected to utili•• a "scorched earth" 
cy as 











Ps in p · 
B.nd inland was one of silent villa!!""' bllrned houses 
dead 
thei cattle . I 
:r, e o/hiter · xcuse . Obviously , th•Y stated, th• "reactionarY 
1.nn l 
di sc eaders," fearing possi ble contact between th• 
ontent . " haa ed working masses and their narini•• of 1n,eration, 
,.._ forcibly f the Red "'°"''l' ' evacuated th• wor>k•r• and peasants r
0
'" 
the rs Path to prevent a union which 111i ght 11el l hav• spread 
or t hes of revolution tl,r ough )lhi ta-Finland• Th• strength 
his inte l"Y -in the fact that it 
cou1a resting rationalization • • be v . ·an co111bat fore••· 
~i erified by th• exper iences of JlU••' 
s e.x l n P anat· a11 ion demonstrated 
sts t come o shift thei r ground when their 
true • 
This pict ur• gave th• J{re1111in news writers 
th• abilitY of Russian jour· 
predictions did not 
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Was proper t . . 0 
inflate th• nUJllber of captured Finn•, the arms 
th
e types of fortification• occupied by th• Red 
After all 
t8J{ en and 
dis , none of these i t am• could be easilY Army . 
ho;, Y 
th
e average Soviet fi ght ill!! man, On• item, 
PUted b 
ever ' that · 
r~ could very readilY be checked bY a Russian 
ont - 11 
ne soldier was the nwn• of a to>l!l or village reported 
We by his unit , In thiS matter the "Operations Reports" 
captured 
never inaccurate and, i ndeed, th•Y tended to be 
conservative , Thi• illustr ated th• requira!ll•nts 
:re almost 
some-what 
upon the soviet press by th• event s and conditions 
imp 0Sed 
Of the W inter V var . 
Sov · The stories , descriptions and r ecollections of th• 
let figh w· t Wal' found 
i ting men who t ook part i n th• ,n er ' 
n bot 
h book h~ d 1ess of a burden to car rY 
than s and newspapers , 
0 
the da'l . I th• first place th••• 
ace i Y newspaper stories, n ounts . f ' ghting and so 
"hat were about individuals engaged ,n 
1 
ever ld have little iI!lillediate 
err was contained in them wou ect 
O 
ri·ct once the 
,, n the p~ ctu"" e of the con J. . 
orr· newspaper ~ • lcial" d b en pronounced bY 
11 version of the \'linter \'le.I' )la • ' II. II 1940 there l'IB.
5 
l· olotov in his speech of 28 March 
lttle d 
th d to b• concern• 
ab at subsegµent storytelling ll• out ex . probla!ll"' ts 1onS as 
th capt governJJlent censors1>
1
P f e~e t~o ossentiB.l facts 0 
Was t ·tb µg g 
th no sharp disagr eemen W1 
e Co fe to describ• anY 
e llllnunist apPe.rentlY s• '<Pe~i record , it was . d of conflict with 
ence . g tbe per:i.o 
th which occurred durJ.n 
e p · inns • 
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To keep in mind what the "official" Kremlin history 
of 
th
e Russo-Finnish War of 1939-1940 encompassed it would 
recall the major points of Molotov's speech. 
be well to 
, was the myth that the Finns, encouraged by western 
First 
imperialistic powers, had created an immediate and direct 
th
reat to Leningrad in the fall of 1939• It was in answer 
to this threat that the Soviet Union sent its armed forces 
into battle in Finland. Secondly, the Red Army had been 
shackled during the earlY phase of operations from 30 November 
l939 to 26 December 1939 by the difficulties of geography, 
weather, and the extremely strong Finnish fortifications.
1 
Since all these problems were real enough in the experiences 
of the participants, there could be little controversy 
between the "official line" and the recollections of the 
various individuals who had taken part in the campaign. The 
ird point, the one that probably presented the greatest 
th· 
possibility of conflict with the censor, was the ease with 
Which the 7th Red Army broke through the Mannerheim Line 
du · 4 h ring February and March of 19 o. Even here, owever, 
Personal descriptions of the difficulties encountered in 
this last great breakthrough seem to have been allowed to 
appear in published material. Altogether, the great mass 
of personal recollections, with onlY a few exceptions, seem 
to have been honest reports of the combat experiences of the 
Participants. 
1Kuz 1min, p. 235· 
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The greatest amount of recollections, as well might 
be 
expected, dealt with the land campaign on the Karelian 
Isthmus. Here the initial difficulties of the Red Army's 
attack seem to have resulted from the tendency of commanders 
to order their units forward without proper preparation. In 
most cases the Russian units, either infantry or armored, 
Would frequently find themselves cut off by encircling Finns 
or running into totally unknown defense positions. Another 
Problem which plagued these initial moves in the Winter War 
Was the lack of proper coordination between infantry, armor, 
8.nd artillery which resulted in unsupported, weak, piecemeal 
attacks and .frequently allowed the "bandit-like" Finnish ski 
troops to penetrate between the units and strike far behind 
the .front lines. 1 In addition to this problem was the 
VUlnerability of the Russian light tanks used in the initial 
advance to Finnish antitank measures.
2 
Most of these defects were the natural result of poor 
leadership, reconnaissance, and intelligence. As the personal 
recollections emphasized, the Red Army had to train and equip 
'Units of specialized scouts properly before it could hope to 
locate, isolate and eventually destroy the enemy. These 
reports also pinpointed a major defect in ski training which 
hampered the activities of the Red Army on the Karelian 
Isthmus. 
lv K k'i "Viesota 'Zhamenitaya'" (A Hill Named 
'Famousr); B~fe~sF~niyandii (Moscow: Military Publishers, 
1941), p. 192. 
2Andrononikov and Mostovenko, P• 224· 
297 
As this material revealed, these defects were recog-
nizect 
and solved one by one . There was a major change in 
conirna.nd . 
in the Leningrad Military District in early January 
1940. c 0 ordination, especially between infantry, armor and 
arti11 . 
ery was tightened and the engineers were integrated 
into the combined operations which began to reduce the 
p· 
innish fortifications on the Karelian Isthmus . Special 
scout . t 
uni s were organized and trained while both the scouts 
anct the resular infantry were given skis and trained in their 
Use. 
Even the Soviet Air Force during the February advance 
W'a.s apparently shifted from "terror bombing11 to close 
tact· ica1 support for the ground units. The picture which 
emerged from these recollections was one of new leaders 
Pul1· ing otherwise basically good soldiers into a well-oiled 
machine for the renewed attack on the Mannerheim Line. 
There is, of course, one noticeable omission from the 
Soviet Picture of combat experiences during the Winter War. 
Thi · h h s W-as the experiences of the Russian soldiers w. o ad 
taken part in the numerous penetrations of the eastern border 
of Finland and were so often trapped and cut to pieces in the 
t'a.nious "mottisrr by lightly-armed Finnish troops . In the 
matter of these campaigns the Russian record, loud in its 
discussion of the deficiencies noted and corrected in the 
Ka.relia.n attack, falls silent. The only mention of these 
extensive operations in the deep forests of eastern Finland 
W"a.s the note by a pro-Communist writer that such thrusts were 
----11111 
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carried out to prevent the concentration of Finnish forces 
before Viborg. 1 Very likely this defect in Russian tactics 
was never successfully solved so there would be some reluctance 
to t men ion it in a public record. 
The naval campaign, in contrast to the land attacks , 
Was largely successful. The Finnish islands in the Gulf of 
Finland, so critical to winter and spring navigation in that 
area, were all occupied during the first week of action. The 
Ribachi Peninsula and Petsamo were seized to protect the water 
routes to Murmansk and to prevent possible intervention from 
the West. From the recollections on this phase of the war, 
however, the difficulties of weather and Finnish resistance 
to ship bombardment did prevent the Red Fleet from occupying 
or neutralizing Hanko or enforcing a close naval blockade. 
The use of major fleet units to attempt the reduction of the 
Finnish coastal defenses at Koivisto and Muurila were also 
something less than a glorious success although these efforts 
did give the Russian naval units some experience at operating 
in conjunction with aerial forces . In the Soviet records of 
the naval war there was the feeling that the Red Fleet did 
Very Well considering the limitations of weather in the Gulf 
of Finland and the northern Baltic. 
There is some evidence that the timing of the Soviet 
conflict with the Finns may have been dictated by naval 
strategy. Almost certainly Russian strategy was based upon 
1Hooper, The Soviet Fighting Forces, P• 31. 
the · immediate 
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attack . since 
Soviet Uni att on, was the German Wehrmacht, which could have 
acked that 
need for the protection of Leningrad from naval 
the only land army in position to threaten the 




t s the last month in wlrl.ch ships can sai:ely move 
hrough the 
Gulf of Finland, the Russian naval attack could 
accomplished its mission in that period before ice 
Only h ave 
ock it into their bases in the Gulf of Finland. This 
would l 
the Red Army would be forced to move into eastern 
meant that 
long before the waterways and swrunps had frozen p· inland 
iently to allow th• proper deployment of the numerically 
SUffic • 
uss1an forces. 2 The inescapable conclusion is, 
superior R . 
re, that the Kremlin strategists were fearful of a 
therefo 
e naval threat to Leningrad and were forced to begin 
Possibl 
ggression long before the proper season for a swift 
their a 
attack on Finland but wlrl.l• their fleet units could 1a.nd 
still 
support landing and supply 0 perations to the Finnish 
Gul.r . islands. 
The least runount of material published about the 
Soviet · b t t· it· or side of the Winter War concerned the com a ac iv ies 
th 
e Red Air Fore•• Despite this, the accounts tend to 
conr1 
rm some opinions of t)le effectiveness of Soviet aerial 
act· 
ion duri· T~e most notable point was tb.e 
ng this conflict. l~ 
D· lT. . w r and Peace in soviet 
~lam imothy Andrew Taracouz10, a P· 2 o. 
ac_x (New York: Macmillan, l9 O' 
2von Schonheinz (15 March 19~0}, PP• 1766-1767, 
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failure of terror bombing during the first month of the war 
to lower Finnish morale significantly, 1 if indeed, it did 
not stiffen their resolution to fight. 2 The western observers 
thought this might have been due to poor planning, use of 
second-rate aerial units and the combined efficiency of 
Finnish antiaircraft fire and pursuit aviation. 3 But Russian 
accounts seem to place most of the blame upon bad weather 
conditions which prevailed over Finland for the first month 
and a half of action. There were also references to the 
Finnish defense measures in the Soviet records but, except 
for antiaircraft fire, little notice was taken of the effec -
tiveness of Finnish pursuit planes . 
The most notable switch in the aerial combat record 
carne with the "opening" of the weather over Finland after 
mid-January 1940. From the stories which date from this 
Period one receives the impression that the Kremlin's 
II 
eagles" were exercising greater care in their missions. 
They began to coordinate their bomber-pursuit plane activ~ 
ities with telling effect and changed their target emphasis 
from distant population centers to tactical objectives in 
the immediate area of the Karelian Isthmus . Such new 
techniques as night patrolling and tactical bombing of 
III 
1 Werner, p. 86. 
2
saraja, pp. 46-47. 
3Borgman, 11 Der Sowjetische Luftkrieg gegen Finnland, 11 
(12 July 1940), p. 406, and Luukkanen, p. 75. 
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fortifications make their appearance for the first time. 
Altogether it would seem that the Russo-Finnish conflict made 
the Red Air Force a better organized, more flexible striking 
arm of the Red Army. The one area of de-emphasis , strategic 
bomb· ing, was apparently due to the disappointment of Russian 
aerial commanders with the failure of their early efforts to 
destroy Finnish will to resist with the mass bombing of 
Population centers . 
The final conclusion drawn from this examination of 
the many Soviet records in comparison with accounts of this 
same conflict from western sources is that Russian leadership 
did Permit a significant amount of truth to "leak" through 
th . eir close censorship . Indeed, on many points the Russian 
Version of the problems encountered in the Winter War agree 
Very Well with the bulk of western commentators. In areas 
Where the two accounts disagree in details, there is a 
suspicion that this may well have arisen from the diffi-
culties in obtaining concrete information in a confused 
combat situation . 
The efforts of the Kreml in leaders during and after 
the Winter War to keep their public records somewhere near 
the truth indicates that even in this period the average 
Soviet citizen had not become the "Pavlovian reactor" implied 
in the term the "new Soviet man." Western writers tended to 
see the Russian citizen and soldier as an unthinking product 
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of mass training and psyehology. 1 The reluctance of the 
Communist bosses to lie about events and details which could 
be easily verified by individuals leads one to the conclusion 
that the average Soviet reader possessed more discernment 
than he has frequently been credited by some western observers. 
There is one last important lesson to be derived from 
this study which concerns the tendency of many western 
Writers and observers to reject Soviet material as too full 
of myths and half-truths to be of any use in historical 
analyses. From the experiences of this writer in handling 
and analyzing information from Soviet sources, this complete 
rejection of Soviet material is not acceptable. In order to 
maintain the confidence of their readers even Soviet pub-
lishers and newspaper editors must be careful not to make 
gross errors in reportage and to repair quickly such errors 
as are made with either de-emphasis or denials. This 
necessity of Soviet writers and editors to remain at least 
Within the near realm of fact make Soviet records, if handled 
Properly, very useful to the student of history who may dis-
cover unsuspected sources of useful information in analyzing 
historical events from the Soviet viewpoint. 
1Borgman, Der Ueberfall, p. 6. 
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